UDANAVARCA

Chapter VI

SILAVARCA - Morality

1. The prudent man practices morality if he desires the three happinesses: honour, riches and the joys of heaven after death.

2. Contemplating these (four) conditions, the wise man will practise morality: noble and endowed with perception, he obtains happiness in this world.

3. Happiness, the acquisition of morality: his body does not overheat; in happiness, he sleeps at night and delights on awakening.

4. Practicing morality until old-age is excellent: firm faith is excellent: for men wisdom is a meritorious treasure unseizable by thieves.

5. The wise man who performs meritorious actions, the moral man who gives alms attains happiness in this world and the other.

6. The monk is firm in morality, master of his senses, moderate in his food and adhering to mindfulness.

7. Living thus, vigorous and indefatigable night and day, he is no longer exposed to suffering: he is very near Nirvana.

8. Firm in morality, the monk develops his mind and wisdom: vigorous and prudent, he will obtain the cessation of suffering for ever.

9. May one practise morality without respite; may one devote oneself to concentration; conscientious in insight and study.

10. The wise man dissolves the bonds, he is free of pride and free of attachment: after the destruction of the body, he does not undergo countless births but attains Nirvana.

11. He in whom morality, concentration and wisdom are well developed, is perfected, pure, happy and puts an end to existence.
The prudent man practises morality if he desires the three happinesses: honour, riches and the joys of heaven after death.

2. Contemplating these (four) conditions, the wise man will practise morality: noble and endowed with perception, he obtains happiness in this world.

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10. The wise man dissolves the bonds, he is free of pride and free of attachment: after the destruction of the body, he does not undergo countless births but attains Nirvana.

11. He in whom morality, concentration and wisdom are well developed, is perfected, pure, happy and puts an end to existence.
12. Delivered from the bonds, free of desire, fully comprehending, free of attachment, he is beyond the realm of Mara and shines like the sun.
13. In an arrogant and shallow monk, whose mind is directed to external matters, morality, concentration and wisdom do not attain perfection.
14. Rain penetrates what is covered, not what is uncovered; it is therefore necessary to uncover what is covered so that the rain cannot penetrate.*
15. Having seen that, the wise man should practise morality constantly; very quickly will he purify the path which leads to Nirvana.
16. The perfume of flowers does not travel against the wind, neither that of the day-tagara, nor that of sandalwood; conversely, the perfume of worthy people travels against the wind; the worthy man exhales on all sides of the horizon.
17. Be it tagara, sandalwood, jasmine or lotus, the perfume of morality transcends the whole variety of such perfumes.
18. Of little account is the perfumes of the tagara and sandalwood; but the perfume exhaled by worthy people reaches the gods.
19. Pure and moral men, who refrain from frivolity and are freed by perfect comprehension, Mara cannot outwit.
20. This is the path of safety, this is the path of purification; those who have taken the initiative and devote themselves to meditation will cast off the bonds of Mara.

* [Ed.] The commentarial story alludes to a miraculous occasion on which rain did not penetrate the only house without a roof in a village. Here rain represents the allusion of ignorance which cannot penetrate a mind the cover (roof) of which no longer obscures the Four Noble Truths.

(Translated by Sara Bold-Webb from the French of N.P. Chakravarti)

ARYABHAVAŚANKRANTIНАMAMAHAYÁNASÚTRA

THE NOBLE SÚTRA ON THE PASSAGE THROUGH EXISTENCES

Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonecci

Introduction

The text of the Bhavaśankrantiṣūtra

The original Sanskrit text of the Bhavaśankrantiṣūtra has not been preserved. There exist three Chinese translations of it, Taishō 576, 576 and 577 (Nanjio 285, 286 and 526 respectively; Répertoire, p.61), which were respectively done by Bodhiruci (who lived in China between 598 and 537), Buddhāśānta (who worked in China between 529 and 539) and I Ching (635-733). There is also a Tibetan translation, Tóboh 226, Catalogue 892, due to Jinamitra, Dānaśila and Ye-she sde.

Several fragments from the Sanskrit text are extant either in the form of quotations or included in other texts, in both cases with slightly different readings. See notes 17, 18, 24, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36.

Modern editions and translations of the Bhavaśankrantiṣūtra


G. Stramigioli, 'Bhavaśankranti' in Rivista degli Studi Orientali, Rome, XVI, 1936, pp.294-306 : it contains the editions of the Tibetan text from a manuscript from the Tológ monastery; this manuscript dates from the thirteenth or fourteenth century and is probably a copy of an older one from the tenth-eleventh centuries. Together with the Tibetan text, this article contains an Italian translation from the Tibetan and another from the Chinese text.

N. Aliyarwani Sastrī, Bhavaśankranti Sūtra and Nagarjuna's Bh-

Bhavasamkranti Sutra with the Commentary of Maitreyaśācara, Madras, 1938 (Adyar Library): it contains a Sanskrit reconstruction on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese translations, an edition of the Tibetan text according to the North Kang edition, compared with the Peking one, and an English version of the Tibetan and Chinese translations.


Form and constitution of the Bhavasamkranti Sutra's text

Under the name of Bhavasamkranti there exists two different Buddhist works: 1. the Bhavasamkranti Sutra, to which we have referred, attributed to the Lord Buddha, and 2. the Bhavasamkranti, a Sāstra attributed to Nāgārjuna, the original Sanskrit text of which has not been preserved and which is known only through its three Tibetan versions (Tōhoku 3860, 4162 and 4558, Catalogue 5240, 5662 and 5472), and its Chinese version (Taishō 1574, Mansio 1305, Répertoire, p.134).

The Bhavasamkranti Sutra contains, in its Tibetan and Chinese versions, a part written in prose and a part written in verse. The Bhavasamkranti, attributed to Nāgārjuna, is a short treatise of 16, 19 or 21 stanzas according to its different recensions. Both works have in common several of the stanzas: 1 = 11, 3c, d and 4 = 12; 5 = 13; 6 = 14; 7 = 15.

How to explain the presence of common stanzas in the Sūtra and in the brief treatise attributed to Nāgārjuna? We think that the original Sūtra was constituted only by the part in prose, which deals with the passage from one existence to another. Thus there was perfect agreement between the subject and the title of the work. Afterwards, to the prose part were added the stanzas that deal with the "voidness" of everything, which constitutes the principal thesis of the Mahāyāna school. Some of these stanzas were taken from Nāgārjuna's treatise. This addition was done by some author of the Mahāyāna school with the desire to establish a closer connection between the Sūtra and the school. In the same way, another author of the same school replaced the proper beginning and end of the Śālistambasūtra by a beginning and end which connected the Śālistambasūtra with the Mahāyāna school, transforming it into the Mahāyāna-Śālistambasūtra. This addition obviously took place before 500 A.C., by which date the first translation into Chinese was made, since the Chinese (and Tibetan) translators knew the Sanskrit text with its addition, in the same form in which we have received it.

In this way, it is possible to explain the lack of agreement between the title of the Sūtra and its subject matter and between the prose section and the verse section.

Location of the Bhavasamkranti Sutra in Buddhist literature

The titles of two of the Chinese versions (Taishō 757, Ta feng têng hui to lo wang ching, and Taishō 577, Ta ch'êng liu chuan chu yu ching) induce us to think that this Sūtra was considered to be a Mahāyāna sūtra by its Chinese translators. The Tibetan version (Tōhoku 266 and Catalogue 982, Hphags-pa srid-pa bho-ba dzis-byas-ba theg-pa chen-pohi mdo) considers it also as a sūtra of the Mahāyāna. The ninth-century Sanskrit-Tibetan dictionary, the Mahāvyutpatti, sub 1379, mentions it among the ancient sūtras of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Finally, Mahāyānist authors such as Asāṅga (in Bodhisattvabhumi), Candrakīrti (in Prasannapada and Mahāyana-Kāvatāra), Śāntideva (in Śūktanātasa), Prajñākarānti (in Pañjikā), Haribhadra (in Aloka) and Śāntarakṣita (in Tattvasaṅgraha) quote it in extenso.

As it has come down to us, the Bhavasamkranti can in fact be considered as an independent sūtra of Mahāyāna Buddhism and one of the sūtras that could enjoy preference by the Mahāyāna school, since in the prose section and especially the verse section the doctrine of emptiness is dealt with.

Doctrinal contents of the Bhavasamkranti

In relation to its contents, the Bhavasamkranti comprises two
well differentiated parts. In the first, which corresponds to the prose section, the themes dealt with are, on the one hand, the reappearance of actions in the mind at the moment of death and, on the other, the passage through (samkrtiti) existences (bhava). Of these two themes it is the second one which gives the Sutra its title. The theme dealt with in the second part, which corresponds to the verse section, is the theory of Snyatā "emptiness". The reappearance of actions

The question which King Bimbisara of Magadha puts to the Lord Buddha and which initiates the dialogue between both is: How do actions, which a man performs during his life and which disappear as soon as they are performed, manifest themselves again in his mind at the moment of his death? The Lord Buddha answers that the reappearance of past actions occurs in the same way as the image of a beautiful woman, whom a man sees in his dreams and who is completely non-existent, reappears in the mind of that man. Thus the Lord Buddha accepts the reappearance of past actions in the mind of the dying man and presents as support for its possibility the similar case of the recollection of a dream. Then the Lord Buddha compares the man who attaches himself to agreeable forms he perceives to the man who feels love for the beautiful woman he has seen in his dream.

However, the Lord Buddha does not explain the purpose of actions reappearing in the mind at the moment of death and the reason they do so. We think that the answers to both questions have to do with the doctrine of karma. Probably past actions (of course as recollections or ideas) reappear in the mind of the dying man in order to determine the new existence, which is about to begin in the series of rebirths that corresponds to the dying man. This explanation relates to the belief that the last thoughts of a dying man are decisive in determining the rebirth he will have after his death. This belief is valid as much in Hinduism as in Buddhism. And actions reappear by virtue of the inherent force of karma.

The mechanism of "transmigration" without any doubt this theme constitutes the most interesting of the Sutra. In the next paragraphs, we expound the mechanism of "transmigration" or "passing through" according to the Bhavasamkrtantisutra, which is in agreement with general Buddhist doctrine regarding this point.

There is no entity (soul, pudgala, spirit, consciousness, dharma) which passes from one existence to another. This is the orthodox position, accepted by the majority of Buddhist schools with the exception of the Vaisiputrya (and other schools which spring from the Vaisiputrya). This school postulated the existence of a pudgala which, based on the skandhas, passed from one existence to another.

From the Buddhist point of view, there is no single consciousness which exists during the whole life but a series or succession of consciousnesses or conscious states that follow one another related by the law of causality. This consciousness stream (vijñanasrota) constitutes the individual comes from beginningless eternity, and does not stop with death if the individual who dies has accomplished during his life actions having as a consequence a new rebirth. In this case, one of those consciousnesses comes to be the "last consciousness" (caraman vijñanam), not of the series but of a section of that series. That section is conceived as a life or an existence. The following consciousness, related to the previous one by the law of causality and belonging to the same consciousnesses series, comes to be the "first consciousness" (prathama vijñanam) of a new section of that series. This new section is conceived as a new life or existence. The cessation of the "last consciousness" and the arising of the "first consciousness" are simultaneous, like the going up and going down of the arms of a balance. The "last consciousness" is conceived as death, the "first consciousness" as birth.

The relation between the "last consciousness" of a section (existence) of the series and the "first consciousness" of the next section (existence) of the series is the same that exists, in any life's course, between any conscious state and the next one, with the following differences: in the case of the passage from one section (existence) of the series to the next section (existence) of it, together with the "last consciousness" there
is the destruction of the material component (body) belonging to the finishing section (existence); and together with the "first consciousness" there is also the birth of a new material component (body) belonging to the new beginning section (existence). The "first consciousness" and those which follow, related to it by the law of causality and all belonging to the same series, are not accompanied by the memory of experiences undergone in the previous sections (existences) of the series. There is only one consciousnesses series which, as we have already said, come from eternity and will flow on until it is cut off by the practice of Buddhist moral and intellectual principles, but the destruction of the material component (body) of each section (existence) of the series and the disappearance of the memories of experiences undergone in the previous sections (existences) of the series conceal the series' continuity and produce the belief in the existence of individuals who are born without any connection with anybody in the past, without any connection with anybody in the future. This was not the Lord Buddha's case. He knew, thanks to his great spiritual development, to which individuals of the past he was related, by the fact that they all belonged to the same consciousness-series - as an old man knows to which child, of sixty or seventy years before, he is related by the fact that both belong to the same consciousness-series.

In this way, this brief and valuable Sūtra harmonizes two important Buddhist principles, the "transmigration" and the non-existence of a permanent and eternal ego, giving a simple, subtle and elegant solution to the paradox of a "transmigration" without a "transmigrator"; and, eliminating an apparent contradiction, allows a more profound insight into the vast treasure of spiritual riches that is Buddhism.

As regards the problem of the birth of the body, the present Sūtra affirms only that the first consciousness of the new existence arises in a new body, which can be that of a god, a man, a demon or an animal.

It is the Śālistambasūtra which explains how the birth of a new body takes place. The body is not the work of a creator, neither is it due to chance, nor does it come forth out of nothing.

The new body, its nature and qualities are the product of the conjunction of a series of causes and necessary conditions: the union of the father and mother, appropriate womb, opportune moment, material elements, the first consciousness, previous existences, etc. The new body is produced and the new consciousness, which participates in its production, arises in it, and not in another body, only and exclusively because all the factors mentioned determine it to do so. The birth of a new body and the arising in it of the first consciousness are an example of the prime importance that the concept of causality has in Buddhism: "everything has a cause", "everything produces effects", "when the cause is eliminated, its effects are also eliminated".

The last three dealt with in this Sūtra is the thesis of emptiness or "voidness" (śūnyavāda) and its implications: all things are "void", lacking an own being, insubstantial, non-existent in se et per se; they are only creations of the human mind, products of imagination, and as such they do not really exist; they are only names conventionally established, behind which there is not the thing they designate. The same mind, the same imagination, that creates the false empirical reality in which we move, is also "void", it does not really exist. The image of empirical reality created by our minds conceals from us the true nature, the true way of being - voidness, illusion - of empirical reality. So what we see is called "Conventional Reality" or "Reality of Convention".

Text employed for the present translation
For the translation we present in this article, we have used the Tibetan text of the 3de-dga edition (photocopies provided by Harvard Yenching Institute, Harvard University): Bkha'-hgyur, Sdo-sde, Dsa. 175 a 6 - 177 a 3.

In some places, which we now indicate, we have adopted a different reading:
175 b 4 (end of the line): chad mi ḍsas bar ḍsas da : Sastri's edition; 3de-dga : chad mi ḍhna'i bar ḍda.
176 a 3 (middle of the line): ḍpags pa na : Sastri's and Stra-
Translation

THE NOBLE SUTRA OF THE MAHAYANA DENOMINATED

"THE PASSAGE THROUGH EXISTENCES"

(175 a 6) Homage to all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

Thus have I heard. Once the Bhagavant stayed in Rajagrha, in the Bamboo-forest, in the place of the Kandalaksas, in the company of a group of one thousand two hundred and fifty bhikshus and of very numerous great Bodhisattvas. Then, the Bhagavant (175 b), while he was surrounded by many hundreds of thousands of his followers, looking at them, expounded the Dharma (Docime) and expounded in its integrity the Brahmacarya (Religious Life) beautiful in its beginning, beautiful in its middle, beautiful in its end, fair in its meaning, fair in its expression, without confusion, completely fulfilled, completely pure, completely immaculate.

Then Sreniya Birinisara, King of the Magadha country, going out from the great town of Rajagrha, with great royal pomp, with a great royal force, went to the Bamboo-forest where the Bhagavant was. On arriving, after bowing down at the feet of the Bhagavant and turning (around the Bhagavant) the right side towards him three times, Sreniya Birinisara, King of the Magadha country, spoke thus to the Bhagavant: "O Bhagavant, how do actions, (a long time) after having been done (and) accumulated, a long time after having ceased, (re)appear in the mind, on being near the moment of death? All conditioned things (samskaras) being void, how do actions pass without being annihilated?"

So (the King) spoke, and the Bhagavant to Sreniya Birinisara, King of the Magadha country, said thus: "O great King, just as for instance a man, in a dream he has while sleeping, dreams that he extremely enjoys himself with a beautiful woman of his country and, when he awakes from his sleep, remembers that beautiful woman of his country (he has seen in his dream) - what do you think, O great King: does that beautiful woman of the country, (seen) in the dream, (really) exist?"

(The King) said: "O Bhagavant, she does not exist."

The Bhagavant said: "O great King, what do you think: that man who ardently desires the beautiful woman of his country, (seen) in his dream - is he a wise man?"

(The King) answered: "O Bhagavant, he is not - if it is asked why, O Bhagavant - because that beautiful woman of the country, (seen) in the dream, does not exist at all: and (176 a) although he does not perceive her, (nevertheless) he goes on thinking of enjoying himself extremely with her. Thus that man, being deprived of her, has a destiny of sorrow."

The Bhagavant said: "O great King, in the same way, an ordinary man, foolish, ignorant, on seeing with his eyes lovely forms, ardently desires those forms which are agreeable to his mind, while ardently desiring them, he becomes attached to them. On becoming attached to them, he feels a passion for them. On feeling a passion for them, he performs with his body, speech and mind, actions that are born out of desire, hatred and error. And those actions, after having been performed, cease. And after having ceased, (those actions) stay neither in the east nor in the south nor in the west nor in the north nor up nor down - nor in any region of space. But, at any other time, at the moment near the instant of death, when the karma corresponding (to the life that is being concluded) is exhausted, at the (very) moment the last consciousness ceases, those actions (re)appear in the mind (of the dying man) - just as for instance the beautiful woman of the country (in the mind) of the man that wakes from his sleep. O great King, thus, on the last consciousness ceasing, the first consciousness, which forms part of the (new) birth, arises either in a god or a man or an asura or an inferior being or an animal or a preta. 0 great King, immediately after the first consciousness has ceased, there arises the series of consciousnesses, which corresponds (to the life that is beginning), and in which the ripening (of actions previously performed) will be experienced. O great King, although no element of existence (dharma) passes from this world to another world, nevertheless death and birth take place. O great King, the last consciousness which ceases (176 b) is called "death": the first consciousness..."
which arises is called "birth". O great king, the last consciousness, at the moment it ceases, does not pass to anywhere; the first consciousness, which forms part of the (new) birth, at the moment it arises, does not come from anywhere. If it is asked why, (I answer:) because of their lack of an own being. O great King, although the last consciousness is void (of the own being) of a last consciousness, death is void (of the own being) of death, action is void (of the own being) of action, the first consciousness is void (of the own being) of a first consciousness, birth is void (of the own being) of birth, nevertheless actions do not perish. O great King, immediately after the first consciousness, which forms part of the (new) birth, has ceased, these arise without interruption the series of consciousnesses, in which the ripening of actions previously done will be experienced."

Thus said the Bhagavant. Having spoken thus, the Master said again in this way:

(176 b 4) 1. "All things are only names, they exist only in the mind; separated from the word what the word designates does not exist."

2. Any element of existence (dharma) can be designated by any name; that (- the element of existence) does not exist in this (= the name); this is the essence (dharmacāya) of the elements of existence (dharma).

3. The name is void (of the own being) of a name; the name as a name does not exist; all the elements of existence, lacking (in reality) a name, have been designated by names.

4. Since these elements of existence do not exist, they arise completely from imagination; the name imagination, by which they are imagined as void, does not exist here.

5. What a man, who sees correctly, says:

"The eye sees the form that, in this world dominated by the evil of error, has been called 'Conventional Truth' (samytecaryā)."

6. What the Guide has correctly taught:

"Vision arises by virtue of a conglomerate that by the Wise has been called 'The ground of access to Supreme Truth'."

7. The eye sees no form, the mind knows no idea (dharma); this is the Supreme Truth (paramārtha) into which the world does not penetrate." (177 a 1) The Bhagavant having spoken thus, Śrīniya Bimbisāra, King of the Magadha country, and the Bodhisattvas and the bhikṣus, and the world with the gods, men, asuras and heavenly musicians (gandharvas) were pleased and greatly praised what the Bhagavant had said.

(Here) ends the Noble Sūtra of the Mahāyāna denominated: "Passage through existences".

Notes

1 Very probably this treatise was not written by Nāgārjuna. B. Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Wiesbaden (C. Harrassowitz) 1981, p.29, n.64, thinks that it is probable that this treatise may not be by Nāgārjuna but by a later author. Chr. Lindner, Nāgārjuna, Copenhagen (Akademisk Forlag) 1982, considers this treatise to be one of the "dubious texts", "perhaps authentic".

This treatise was included by N. Aiyaswami Sastri in his edition of the Bhavasyakānti Sūtra already mentioned (Tib. text, Skt. reconstruction and Eng. transl.). C. Dragonnelli, Bhavasūktaṅkāntiśūtra do Nāgārjuna, Buenos Aires (Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas) 1977, edited the Tibetan text with a Spanish translation. In V. Tola and C. Dragonnelli, Budismo Mahāyāna, Estudios y Textos, Buenos Aires (Klo) 1980, pp.102-23, a Spanish translation is included.

2 This text has been edited by V.V. Gokhale in P.I. Vaidya (ed.), Mahāyāna-

Sūtra-Saṅgraha, Darbhanga (The Nithila Institute) 1961, pp.107-16.

3 See notes 17, 18, 24, 27, 28, 34, 36 for these quotations.

4 In the last part of the prose section of the text there is a brief reference to the doctrine of voidness.

5 See H. von Glasenapp, Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions, Calcul-

6 In the following exposition, we also take account of the Śālistambhāṣṭra.

7 On the principal that 'no dharma (see n.22) passes from this world to another world', expressed in the Bhavasamkrūntisūtra (end of the prose section) and Śālistambhāṣṭra, p.4 (Skt. reconstruction), and p.69 (Tib. text), ed. B. Akyawami Sastri; see also pratikṣyamasmadpādhyayakārikā, attributed to Nāgārjuna, at. 5 and commentary (in Skt. and Tib.) edlocum; Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, III, 18.

8 On the Vācāśpruṭīya, see N. Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India, Calcul-


11 The recollection by the Lord Buddha of his previous existences is referred to for instance in the Jātaka.

12 The original Sanskrit text of this Śūtra, which is lost, has been restored with the help of extensive quotations by Candrakīrti (Prasannapadi), Prajñākara-
mati (Pāñjikā), Śāntidora (Śīlaśāmanośvary) and Yasomitra (Abhidharmakośaśāvanāyika).

13 It is also quoted by Vācāśpruṭīya (Nāgārjuna) and Mīchāva (Sarvadarsanasaṅgraha, Chapter on the Buddha's Doctrine). It was edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin, W. Akyawami Sastri and P. L. Vaidya. C. Dragonetti, Shālistambhāṣṭra, Buenos Aires (Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas) 1977, edited the Sanskrit text of this Śūtra (as preserved in the quotations) together with a Spanish translation. In F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, Budismo Mahāyāna (already quoted), pp.37-62, a Spanish translation is included.

14 According to Pāli sources, this place was called "Kalandakaniśvāra" and in it food was given to squirrels. In the Tibetan text, its name is Kalandaka yogs pa, "the place of the kalānda" (kalandakaniśvāra). Cf. G.P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names, London (P.T.S.), 1960, 1, p.534. According to Tibetan sources, the word kalānda (for kalandaka) designated some kind of bird. Cf.W.W. Rockhill, The Life of the Buddha, reprint, San Francisco (Chinese Materials Center) 1976, pp.43-4.

15 Two things happen with actions: 1. after having been performed, they disappear, but remain accumulated in a latent potential form somewhere (the text does not say where); at the moment of death they reappear in the mind, i.e. they are remembered (as actually happens with many dying people); and 2. actions leave behind themselves the "seeds" (bijā) of good or bad effects: they are the deferred effects of actions, which exist alongside their immediate effects. These deferred effects remain in a latent, potential form somewhere and are actualized in a new existence, giving rise to good or bad experiences which are the reward or punishment of the actions previously performed. See n.19.

16 Of the several meanings of the word saṃkṣāra ( dużo used in the Tibetan version) we think the most appropriate in the present context is "conditioned thing". Actions are "void", i.e. do not have an own being, do not exist in so or so per se, as they require for their existence the presence of many causes and conditions. And what is conditioned is untenable, like a mirage, it does not exist.
17 The Tibetan text (175 b 5 middle of the line - 176 b 3 beginning), corresponding to the English translation from "O great King..." up to "...actions do not perish", is quoted in Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, pp.127, 3.17 - 129, 1.17, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. This last work is extant only in Tibetan. The quoted text is expressly attributed to the Bhavacakrāntiśūtra.

18 The original Sanskrit text, corresponding to the Tibetan text 176 a 1 middle - 176 b 3 end, and to the English translation from "The Dharmavant..." up to "...the ripening of actions previously done will be experienced", has been preserved in a quotation by Prajñākaraṇi, Pañjikā, pp.224, 1.20 - 225, 1.6, ed. P.L. Vaidya. The quoted fragment is attributed to the Pitāmārāmāyaśūtra. It is also quoted by Śāntideva, Śīkṣāsamuccaya, pp.362, 1.3 - 363, 1.15, ed. C. Kendall, without any indication of its provenance.

19 The word karma designates here, on the one hand, the totality of actions performed by a man in his present and past existences and, on the other, more precisely, the totality of deferred effects of those actions. So long as a man performs actions which leave deferred effects, and so long as deferred effects exist, man has to be reborn. Buddhism teaches the way of behaving that does not give rise to new deferred effects and destroys already existing ones. That part of the totality of karma, of the deferred effects to be actualized in any existence, is the karma corresponding to that existence. See n.15.

20 Enemy of the gods.

21 Spirit of dead persons.

22 Un dharmas, elements or factors of whatever exists, see F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, 'La doctrina de los dharmas en el Budismo' in Yoga y Mística de la India, Buenos Aires (Kier) 1978, pp.91-121.

23 The thing "car" does not exist: "car" is only a word which designates a conglomerate of places (axle, wheels, steering-wheel, etc.) things, being only words, exist only in the mind.

24 The Sanskrit text of this stanza is quoted by Haribhadra, Ālokā, p.204, lines 23-24, ed. P.L. Vaidya. Cf. Līṅkāvatārāśūtra, III, 78, p.76, lines 5-8, ed. P.L. Vaidya. In both texts the stanza is quoted without any indication of its provenance. Besides that, the stanza is partly quoted in the Acīṃyastava, 35, a hymn attributed to Nagarjuna, as having been said by the Lord Buddha. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, 'Nāgārjuna's Catusrāva' in Indian Philosophy, Vol.13, 1985, p.17.

25 Any element of existence can be designated by any name, since there is not an essential and permanent relation between words and the things they designate; words are mere conventional denominations.

26 There is no identity between the word and the thing it designates.


28 Quoted by Śāntideva, Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p.241, lines 13-14, ed. C. Kendall, attributed to Lokānta (Vākaraṇa).


30 It is an error to think that the eye sees a form, since the only thing in front of it is a mere conglomerate of dharmas, parts or atoms, which it erroneously grasps as something unitary and compact. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, 'Dignāga's Ālambanaparāśavṛtti' in Indian Philosophy, Vol.10, 1982, pp.109-10.

31 'Conventional Truth' or "Relative Reality" (samvrtisatya; in Tib. rdo rje phyag pa) is empirical reality in its totality. Empirical reality is only a mere creation of our mind; it is superimposed upon True Reality; it "encovers" or "conceals" True Reality; it is in fact True Reality wrongly perceived or conceived. And in turn, True Reality is only the true nature of being, the true nature of empirical reality - voidness.

32 The Lord Buddha.

33 Vision takes place thanks to the cooperation of a series of factors such as the object seen, the light, the eye, consciousness, etc., and the object is only a conglomerate of dharmas.

34 To know that we have to do only with conglomerates, that these conglomerates do not exist as they appear before us, that the parts of the conglomerates in their own turn can be analyzed into their sub-parts and so on, in an analy-
tical and abolishing processes that leads us to "voidness" - this knowledge
is the means to introduce ourselves into the Supreme Truth, into the True
ality of things.
Stanza 6 is quoted by Candrakīrti, Prasannapādā ad III, 8, p.46, lines 11-
13, ed. P.L. Vaidya, and attributed to the Lord Buddha.

35 In truth there is not an eye existing in se et per se, which sees forms ex-
isting in se et per se, nor a mind existing in se et per se, which knows mental
creations, ideas existing in se et per se. The only thing we have is an eye
and a mind, conditioned, composed of elements, and as such unreal, which per-
ceives forms and dharmas which are equally conditioned, composed and unreal.

36 For our translation of dpogs, see Lokesh Chandra, Tibetan-Sanskrit Diction-
ary, sub voce.

Stanza 7 is quoted by Candrakīrti, Prasannapādā ad III, 8, p.46 lines 10-
11, ed.P.L. Vaidya, and attributed to the Lord Buddha.

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Catalogue - The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Fukushū Edition), ed. D.T. Suzuki, Cate-
ologue and Index, Tokyo (Suzuki Research Foundation) 1962.

Nanjio = A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, by
Bunji Nanjio, reprinted San Francisco (Chinese Materials Center) 1975.

Répertoire = Répertoire du Canon bouddhique Sino-japonais, comp. P. Demiéville,

Taisbō = Taišō Shinshō Daizōgyō (The Tripitaka in Chinese), ed. J. Takakusu
and K. Watatsuki, Tokyo (The Taišō Shinshō Daizōkyō Kanko Kai) 1980 sq.

Tōhoku = A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Sk̪a-ba-gyur
Imperial University - Seiō Gratitude Foundation) 1934; repr. Delhi (Bibl.
Indo-Buddhica, 12) 1983.

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According to the oldest biography of prominent Buddhist monks, the Kao neng chu'an, the MA which Samghadeva translated was recited by Sambharakasa; yet there is no mention of the recitation of the EA which Samghadeva also translated. Therefore, the original text of this EA was probably from a different provenance. It is thus possible that the MA and EA which Samghadeva translated had been transmitted by different schools in different languages, which would explain the fact that the two extant MA and EA show discrepancies. For these reasons we can infer that both of the extant Agamas could have been translations by Samghadeva, though originally from different sources.

2 Original Language
Bu-ston (1270-1364 A.C.), as is well known, refers to Padmakaramghosa who, in his De-slo-gi da-n-pohi lo dri-ba composed towards the end of the tenth or at the beginning of the eleventh century, said that the language used by the Sarvastivadins had been Sanskrit. The Chinese MA has been ascribed to the Sarvastivadins. Nevertheless, O. von Hinüber has recently demonstrated that the Chinese MA was of Gândhārī origin written in Kharoṣṭhī. This can also be corroborated by the transliteration of Indian proper names in the text as follows.

mīśilā (Sanskrit): མི་སྤིལ། - m-i-sī-ū [Ancient (Karli-
gren) or Middle (Fulleyblank) Chinese]. This transliteration would reflect an original like mīśilā which is a Gândhārī form with -zh-→ -s-.

āṣapā (Sanskrit): འསོ་པ་ - a-sāp-pā [Ancient or Middle
Chinese]. This transliteration would also reflect an original like 'āṣapa' which is also a Gândhārī form with -dv-→ -p- and -ji-→ -i-.

3 Place of transmission
As mentioned above, the Kao neng chu'an states that the original text of the Chinese MA had been recited by Sambharakasa. Since he and the translator, Samghadeva, are said to be from Chi-pi (T41), this account suggests that the original text was also from Chi-pi. At that time, Kashmir or Gandhāra was referred to as Chi-pi, because the word kāśmira had been translated or rather transliterated as Chi-pi, at least between 306 A.C.

and 512 A.C.: furthermore Fa-hsien saw the Buddha's alms- bowl in Gandhāra, while other Chinese pilgrims saw the same bowl in Chī-pi at the same period. It is therefore possible that the original text of the Chinese MA was current in Kashmir or Gandhāra. The first alternative is more acceptable because the Chinese MA, as demonstrated by S. Bandopadhyay, includes a theory peculiar only to the Kashmirian Sarvastivādins. The Kashmirian Sarvastivādins together with the Chinese MA enumerate two celestial beings residing in the first stage of the realm of form, whereas all other branches of the entire Sarvastivādins enumerate three.

4 School
The Chinese MA contains many verses parallel to the so-called Mānasavarga (Uv). At present there remain three Sanskrit recensions of the Uv, viz., the older recension, the later Eastern Turkestan Sarvastivāda recension, and the Middle Sarvastivāda recension. When we compare the Uv parallels found in the Chinese MA with the three recensions of the Uv, the Uv parallels in the Chinese MA are almost identical with the older recension of the Uv.

The Chinese MA enumerates ten items as the questions the Buddha refused to answer, while other Sarvastivādins literature lists fourteen. This evidence has raised a doubt as to the ascription of the Chinese MA to the Sarvastivādins. However, the oldest Chinese version of the Vābbhāsāstra belonging to the Sarvastivādins, PLi p' o sha lun, also enumerates ten items identical with those of the Chinese MA. These ten items agree with those found in the Pāli Nikāyas of the Theravādins as well, which would suggest that the ten items are older ones, the fourteen being later ones augmented after the schism between the Sarvastivādins and the Theravādins. These facts would confirm that the original text of the Chinese MA probably belonged to a tradition of the older MA transmitted by the Sarvastivādins. The Sarvastivādins affiliation of the text can also be certified by the following evidence.

The Chinese MA includes a passage which corresponds to a citation given in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as scriptural proof of the most important theory of the Sarvastivādins, the
theory being that in its own-being a thing remains the same throughout all three times, i.e. past, present and future.

5 Structure

In Samathadeva’s commentary upon the Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya, he states that the Sūtra containing the above cited passage is the first to appear in the Samādhisamayukta and that this Sūtra is known as the Dīrghaśīla. The corresponding passage in the Chinese Mā is also found in a Sūtra entitled Dīrghaśīla that appears at the beginning of a collection which is instead called Dīrghaśīla as well. On the other hand, in the Vinaya of the Mulasarvastivādin, we come across the passage, Dīrghaśīlaśūtra Madhyamāgama Samādhisamayukta, as well as some accounts of the Dīrghaśīlaśūtra. The accounts of the Sūtra are closely related in content to the Dīrghaśīla of the Chinese Mā. Furthermore, the Agamas to which Samathadeva refers are more closely allied to those of the Mulasarvastivādin than to any other schools or branches of the Sarvastivādin whose literature is extant. It is therefore probable that the Samādhisamayukta of the Mulasarvastivādin Mā corresponds to the chapter Dīrghaśīla of the Chinese Mā.

In the Vinaya of the Mulasarvastivādin, we also find another passage, Poṣadhaśūtra Madhyamāgama Samādhisamayukta, and some accounts of the Poṣadhaśūtra. The accounts agree with the contents of the Poṣadhaśūtra in the chapter name Mahā in the Chinese Mā. Moreover, in the Chinese version of the Vinaya, there is a reference, Vasāvatā Pada Madhyamagama Samādhisamayukta, and also descriptions of the Vasāvatā Pada. The accounts accord with the contents of the Sūtra entitled Shāng jen ch’iu ts’ai ching in the chapter Mahā in the Chinese Mā. Thus we can accept the following chapter correspondences between the Chinese Mā and the Mulasarvastivādin Mā:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Mulasarvastivādin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 *Rājasamyuktaka</td>
<td>Rājasamyuktaka 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Dīrghaśīla</td>
<td>Samādhisamyuktaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mahā</td>
<td>Sangīta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 *Brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>Brāhmaṇa 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Place of Formation or Transmission

In the Chinese Sā, we notice two Sūtras, both of which inform us of the Buddha preaching the same discourse on Ācārasuṣṭa-dharmāvīpa (the self as refuge, the Dharma as refuge) at the same place, Mathurā. Their parallel Sūtras in Pāli, however, mention Sāvatthī and Uktaceḷa respectively as the place where they were preached. The Buddha is not mentioned as having taught at Mathurā in any other Agama or Mākāya. Furthermore, in a Pāli text the Buddha is said to have avoided Mathurā because of its five faults, although the Mulasarvastivādin version of this text narrates that the Buddha entered Mathurā and preached there. Those descriptions in the Chinese Sā and the Vinaya of the Mulasarvastivādin would help lend authority to the Buddhist Order at Mathurā. Thus the original text of the Chinese Sā and the Vinaya of the Mulasarvastivādin are likely to have been formed or at least transmitted at Mathurā.

3 School

The Chinese Sā may be ascribed to the Mulasarvastivādin, which could be inferred from a comparison of the Sūtras with the three Sanskrit recensions of the Uv. Although the designation “Mulasarvastivādin” appears for the first time in the translations by I-ching in the second half of the seventh century, particular examples of diction peculiar to the Mulasarvastivādin are found in a Sanskrit manuscript dating from as early as the fourth century and in the Sarvastivādin works translated by Hsüan-tsang in the first half of the seventh century.
4 Structure

We notice the following correspondences of chapter between the original text of the Chinese SÅ and the Sànyuttaniyàka in Pâli.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SÅ Sànyuttaniyàka</th>
<th>Citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 <em>Pañcopiñânakhandha</em> 46</td>
<td>3 Khandha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 <em>Sudàyatana</em></td>
<td>4 Sàljàyatana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 <em>Miñânasanyukta</em> 47</td>
<td>2 Nàdàna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 <em>Sàvakâvûksàkyàna</em> 48</td>
<td>5 Hàrgeverge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 <em>Mûrgeverge</em></td>
<td>5 Mahâ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 <em>Buddhàvûksàkyàna</em> 49</td>
<td>7 <em>Sàmgàta</em> 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Quotations

The Chinese SÅ contains Sàtras which quote passages from the Pàràsa† 51, Arthavargià, Sàkraprañà, Udàna(?) and *Sàmgàta. Passages corresponding to the Sàtras and quotations in the Sùtras can be found in the Pâli Nikàyas, mostly in the Sànyuttaniyàka, except for one Sùtra 52 which lacks a counterpart. It is therefore probable that these Sùtras were composed after the Pàràsa† and the others had been formed, even if these five were not exactly the same as the extant ones; and those Sùtras were composed before the scriptural tradition split into the (Màla-)*Sàraàvàstùvàdina and the Theràvàdina.

On the other hand, some Sùtras of the Chinese SÅ, which appear to be later accretions at first glance, are cited as scriptural proof in later philosophical works, e.g.,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SÅ Sùtra No.</th>
<th>Citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1177</td>
<td>Mahàyanàuttràliàmkàra, p.93,17 (Kàranad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1356</td>
<td>Abhidharma-kôôbbîhàya, p.314, 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV 1 Smaller Chinese Sànyuktiyàga

The smaller Chinese Sànyuktiyàga (Ptieh tsa a han ching) 53 has previously been ascribed to either the Dharmaguptakas or the Mahàliàsàkas 54. However, an examination of parallel passages between the smaller Chinese SÅ and the Vinayas of those Buddhist schools show that they belong to different traditions 55. Besides, the two Vinayas were translated into Chinese in almost the same period as the smaller Chinese SÅ 56, and hence the Indian originals of these texts can be presumed to be nearly contemporaneous to the original text of this SÅ. These facts suggest that this SÅ does not belong to those schools. Instead, this text is closely related to a relatively earlier tradition of the Mûlasàraàvàstùvàdina, which could also be inferred from its Uv parallels 57.

IV 2 Ekottarikàgàma

Concerning the Chinese Ekottarikàgàma (Tàng i a han ching) 58, there are complicated questions which have yet to be solved on the school, place of formation, language of its original text, etc. As discussed above, it can at least be inferred that the translation of the text was made by Samghadeva.

IV 3 Dirghàgàma

The original text of the Chinese Dîrghàgàma (Ch'ang a han ching) 59 belongs to the Dharmaguptakas, transmitted in Gandhàrâ. Recently L. Waldehmidt published a Sanskrit fragment which he regarded as part of the Mahàparinirvànasùtra of the Dîrghàgàma belonging to the Dharmaguptakas 60. Comparing the Sanskrit fragment with the Chinese Dîrghàgàma in detail, however, we come across some discrepancies between them, especially with regard to the order of items of the so-called dvaddàsàngà dharmaprapàcanà (the twelve kinds of scriptures). The Sanskrit fragment 61 arranges them in the same order as that of the Chinese SÅ of the Mûlasàraàvàstùvàdina 62, while the Chinese Dîrghàgàma 63 almost follows that of the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas 64.

We have so far conducted investigations into the original texts of the five Chinese Âgamas, yet there are still questions left to be solved, especially on the Ekottarikàgàma. Besides, there are many Âgamic Sùtras in Chinese which require detailed studies. In particular, the Sùtras which An Shih-kao translated are important because they date from so early as the second century A.C. Thus this paper is meant to be an initial step towards the comprehensive study of the Chinese translations of early Buddhist scriptures.

Notes

1 Taishô Ki. (T) 26.

2 T 99.


7 T 2145, p.99b.

8 Mizuno, 'Kan'yaku... ', pp.88-90; 'Zoitsuagon'yō... ', p.428.

9 E.g. Mithāla (Sanskrit) : 輯譌 (Chinese MA, see II 2). Missali (Gañḍhārī) : मिसली (Chinese BA, T 121, p.806c21-22). *mīdhiāla.

10 T 2059, p.36lb24 ff.


13 It is necessary to select transliterated words which are not found in previous translations. Cf. J.W. de Jong, 'Fa-hsien and Buddhist Texts in Ceylon', JPTS, Vol.9, 1981, p.112.

14 T 26, pp.511c20, 68as5.


16 T 26, p.472al.


20 Na hsin pi ch'u ching (translated between 377-420), T 1670, p.702a : Milindapañha (PTS) p.82.

21 A p'i ta mo ta p'i po shā lu (translated between 421-427), T 1546, p.681a : A p'i ta mo ta p'i po shā lu, loc. cit.

22 Shan chien li p'i p'o shā (translated in 458), T 1462, p.684a, where gañḍhārī in transliterated as chien t'o lo (pronounced sh/on); Samantapāsākī (PTS), Vol.1, p.64.

23 A yu wang ch'ing (translated in 512), T 2043, p.193c : Dīvyāvadāna, loc. cit.


27 See F. Enomoto, Udānavarga Shohon to Zōgongyō, Betsuyakuzōgongyō, Chīaōngyō ho Buu Kōdo [On the Recensions of the Udānavarga and the Schools to which the Chinese Samyaktāgama, the smaller Chinese Samyuktāgama and the Chinese Mahāyānagama are ascribed], IBE, Vol. XXVII, 2, 1980, pp.91-31.

28 T 26, p.804.


16 T 1547, p.467b.
17 T 26, p.516c27 f.
18 T 30, I, 12 f.
19 Pei-hung, Thu 1986. On this important work, see Y. Honyo, A Table of Équiva-
citations in the Abhidhamakahāsa and the Abhidharmakośopāya, Part 1, Tokyo 1984 (privately printed).
21 Ibid., Vol. III, I, p.107, 2-5.
22 Sūtra No.122.
23 T 1448, p.698a-0.
24 Sūtra No.136.
25 Cf. E. Waldschmidt, 'Central Asian Sūtra Fragments and their Relation to
the Chinese Āgamas', Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung,
26 Ibid.
27 See Lü Chüang, 'Tsa-a-hm-ching k'ên ting the IA Record of Revision Work
made on the Chinese Sanyuktiśāma', Mei huih [The Inner Learning], Vol. 1, 1924,
pp.104-23: A. Nukai, 'Yogacārya Shōjirō to Zāgoge (The Vastusangmaṇi
of the Yogācārābhūmi and the Sanyuktāśama)', Hokkaidō Daigaku Hougakubu Kyō
[Annual Report of Cultural Science, Faculty of Letters, Hokkaidō University],
Vol. XXXIII, 2, pp.1-41.
29 T 1579, p.963b.
30 Sūtra No.36 and 639. See T. Kadokawa & M. Uno, 'Basse Chōketsu to Kyōten
so Kennets [A Study on the Eight Scenes of Buddha's Life]', ISK, Vol.XXII,
1, 1973, pp.447-60.
31 Sanyuttaniśāma, XXII.43; XLVII.14.
32 Aṅguttaraniśāma, V,220; Manorathapūrāṇī (PTS), Vol.III, p.129.
"Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois que le Bouddha résidait dans le parc d’Anathapindada, dans le bois de Jera, à Śrāvasti, il conseillait aux bhikṣu de pratiquer assidûrement et de propager largement un dharma... les dix recommandations suivantes:

1. la première consiste en la commémoration du Bouddha,
2. la deuxième concerne la commémoration du Dharma,
3. la troisième est la commémoration du Sangha,
4. la quatrième concerne la commémoration des règles et des disciplines,
5. la cinquième recommande la commémoration de la générosité,
6. la sixième consiste en la commémoration des divinités,
7. la septième est la commémoration de la sérénité de l’esprit,
8. la huitième concerne la commémoration de la respiration,
9. la neuvième recommande la commémoration de l’impermanence du corps humain,
10. la dixième consiste en la commémoration de la mort.

Ces bhikṣu pourront, disait le Bienheureux, alors externaliser toutes pensées illusoires, acquérir des pouvoirs surnaturels (rāddhi), obtenir des résultats grands, ultimes visées de tous les moines (śrāmaṇe) et enfin parvenir au Nirvāṇa.

En résumé : il faut en premier lieu méditer sur le Bouddha, le Dharma, le Sangha, ensuite sur les règles, la générosité, les deva, la sérénité de l’esprit, la respiration, et en dernier lieu sur l’impermanence de son propre corps et sa mort.
LA BUDDHĀNUSMRTI : La commémoration du Bouddha

Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois que le Bouddha résidait dans le parc d’Anathapiṇḍakā, dans le bois de Jeta, à Grāvastu, il conseillait aux bhikṣus de pratiquer et de propager la première recommandation, c’est-à-dire la commémoration du Bouddha ou buddhānusmṛtī. Cette action leur amènera des résultats grands tels que l’obtention de la ‘rossée d’immortalité’ ou arātī, l’accession au stade de l’āsanārtha d’être inconditionné, l’acquisition des fonda-ments du pouvoir surnaturel (ānihīpīḍa) et enfin le Nirvāṇa.

Le Bouddha demanda aux bhikṣus : "Puis-je le simple fait de méditer sur le Bouddha peut-il apporter des conséquences semblables?"

Les bhikṣus lui répondirent : "Vous nous avez déjà expliqué l’origine de toute chose, nous vous implorons maintenant de nous donner la merveilleuse signification de ce phénomène. Nous suivrons consciencieusement vos conseils par la suite."

Le Bienheureux leur dit alors : "écoutez-moi bien avec votre cœur et votre intelligence et réfléchissez finement à ce que je vais vous expliquer.

Pendant la méditation, assis en position de lotus, gardez des attitudes correctes, l’esprit maintenu dans l’objectif principal, sans se laisser perturber par des pensées illusories, méditez alors sur le Tathāgata, vos yeux toujours fixés sur sa figure; contemplez sa nature et ses mérites.

Comment est fait la nature du Bouddha ? Elle est dure comme le diamant, dotée des dix forces ou dāsabala, des quatre assur-ances ou veśabhṛtā et du courage hors du commun.

Le Tathāgata possède un regard de droiture extraordinaire qu’on peut contempler sans se lasser; ses qualités sont aussi pures, aussi dures et parfaites que celles du diamant et du lapis lazuli; la stabilité de sa concentration n’a jamais faibli. Il a déjà exterminé ce qui devait être éliminé, par exemple : l’orgueil, la passion, la colère, l’ignorance, la vanité. La sagesse du
trois mondes]10 et on qu'ils sont délivrés, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ont acquis l'Eveil.

Qu'est-ce que c'est le Samgha? C'est l'Ordre [des moines et des moniales] qui ont acquis les quatre états de Sainteté11.

Vous devez respecter et vénérer les [disciples du Bouddha], diges d'offrandes, parce qu'ils constituent des champs fertiles où tous les êtres peuvent semer les bons grains. Ils ont tous le même but : participer à la délivrance de soi-même et d'autrui pour prévenir au Tryiyā12. Ayant accompli toutes ces actions, ils sont considérés comme des disciples du Bouddha."

4. LA ŚILĀKĀRĀNUSMRTI : La commémoration des règles

Le Bienheureux recommanda aux bhiksu : "Pendant la méditation, sans se disperser mentalement, réfléchissez sur les règles et les disciplines. [Quelle est l'efficacité de ces règles?] Elles nous permettent d'exterminer les mauvaises pensées. Elles nous dirigent vers la réussite finale qui nous rendra heureux. Elles sont comparables à des glands qui nous orment. Analogues à un vase miraculeux, elles peuvent faire réaliser tous nos vœux. Tous les [trente-sept] auxiliaires de l'illumination13 ont été ainsi élaborés grâce à ces disciplines.

Voici, bhiksu, ce que la méditation sur les règles et les disciplines peut vous apporter comme conséquences positives."

5. LA ṬHĀJIYĀNUSMRTI : La commémoration de la générosité

Le Bienheureux conseilla : "Dans la méditation, réfléchissez aussi sur la générosité. Si nous sommes généreux sans regret au coeur ni attentes de la reconnaissance d'autrui, nous récolterons de merveilleux résultats. Si on nous insulte, nous ne devons pas lui rendre pareille; lorsqu'on veut nous maîtriser et à ce moment-là nous tenons quelque chose dans la main, nous ne devons pas nous en servir pour riposter; même lorsqu'on utilise un couteau, un bâton, une pierre pour nous attaquer, tout en cultivant de la compassion nous ne devons pas nous fâcher. La générosité pratiquée de cette façon n'aure pas de fin et vous, bhiksu, vous aurez appliqué la grande générosité et vous recevrez de merveilleux résultats."

6. LA DEVAPĀṇIKAṆUSMRTI : La commémoration des divinités

Le Bienheureux dit : "Pendant la méditation, en maintenant l'esprit dans l'objectif principal, sans se laisser perturber par les pensées illusoires, réfléchissez sur les deva. Gardez votre corps, vos paroles, vos pensées dans la pureté et la sérénité. Ne créez pas de comportements malins, appliquez les disciplines pour le corps et votre esprit émettra de la lumière qui éclairera partout. Il deviendra alors un corps céleste lumineux. Un deva est celui qui a accompli toutes les bonnes conduites. C'est la conséquence de la méditation sur les deva."

7. L'UPAŚAMĀNUSMRTI : La commémoration de la sérénité de l'esprit

Le Bienheureux conseille : "Méditez assidûment sur la sérénité de l'esprit. Ceci consiste à exterminer toutes pensées illusoires, à poursuivre jusqu'au bout la recherche de la Vérité, à ne pas commettre des actes de violence, d'actes de cupidité, à vaincre toutes les passions, à ne refugier dans les endroits paisibles et d'y trouver le moyen d'accéder à la concentration suprême (samādhi)."

8. L'ĀKHAPĀṆIKAṆUSMRTI : La commémoration de la respiration

Le Bienheureux recommanda : "Dans la méditation, n'oubliez pas d'observer votre respiration. Cela consiste à prendre conscience à tout moment de l'inspiration, de l'expiration, [du souffle long, du souffle court], du souffle froid, du souffle chaud. Examinez-vous de la tête au pied, prenez conscience du rythme de votre respiration. Comptez-le et analysez-le. La compréhension parfaite de la respiration vous apportera de grandes réussites."

9. LĀVAGETĀNUSMRTI : La commémoration du corps

Le Bienheureux dit : "La méditation sur le corps concerne la réflexion à propos des cheveux, des poils, des ongles, des dents, de la peau, des muscles, des nerfs, des os, de la vésicule biliaire, du foie, des poumons, du cœur, de la moelle, des reins, des intestins grêles et gros, de la graisse, des excréments, de l'urine, du pancréas, des larmes, de la salive, des crachats, du sang, des pus, du pus, etc. òmes poser des questions sur ce corps : Est-il vraiment composé de 'l'eau', de 'la terre', du 'feu' et du 'vent'? D'où vient ce corps? Qui a créé les yeux, les oreilles, le nez, la langue, le corps et l'esprit? A quel endroit retournera-t-il à la fin de la vie?

Bhiksu, c'est comme cela qu'il faut méditer sur le corps."
10. LA NAKAKANUSHMRTI : La commémoration de la mort

Le Bienheureux enseigna : "La méditation sur la mort nécessite une réflexion, une analyse approfondie à propos du passage de la mort à un endroit à la Renaissance dans un autre monde, à ce va-et-vient incessant par les mêmes voies de souffrance, à l'impérmanence de la vie, à la détérioration des sens comparables au pourrissement des arbres morts, à la fin d'une vie qui provoque inévitablement la séparation d'avec les êtres chers, la disparition du corps, de la beauté, de la voix. Cette méditation exhaustive sur la mort peut vous apporter, bhikṣu, des conclusions positives vous permettant des réalisations grandes.

Voici les dix recommandations, méditez-les soigneusement, propagez-les autour de vous ; vous récolterez de merveilleux résultats."

Après avoir écouté cet enseignement du Bouddha, les bhikṣu, fort satisfait, n'emprunteraient de suivre ces précieux conseils.

Notes


2 Tout au long de ces dix recommandations sont répétées les mêmes Conseils, seul l'intonation change. Pour la dernière, il y a en plus un passage apparemment déplacé dans l'original chiinois, car le texte dans T2, 533a5-9 est une répétition de ibid., 552c29-532a6 de la partie Introduction. Ibid., pp.553a5-24 ressemble ibid., 552a6 et suiv. ou le roi Nāgār∅a adresse son fils aîné. Dans ce passage le roi Longue Vie (Teč′ang Cheou) informe le prince héritier que ses cheveux ont blanchi. Il veut lui faire comprendre par là son intention d'entrer dans l'Ordre des moines bouddhistes. Le passage termine abruptement ; une gāthā est annoncée, mais rien ne suit.

3 Voir T2, 55a4 et suiv.

4 Buddhakumarīçi ou commémoration du Bouddha ne veut pas seulement désigner le Bouddha en tant qu'entité, mais désigne aussi la nature de Bouddha qui existe dans chaque être. Cf. aussi É. Lanotte, Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (abr. en Traité) III, Louvain 1970, p.1329 et suiv.

5 Au sens figuré du terme, il désigne la libération de toutes souffrances de ce bas-monde.

6 Pour les coudés, voir Traité, pp.1177-9, 1815, 1891-22.

7 Les dix forces (dāhāli) sont :
   a) la faculté de distinguer ce qui est conforme à la vérité, les bonnes nobles et sages effets des actes.
   b) la faculté de connaître le karma des êtres dans les vies antérieures.
   c) la faculté de connaître la vie actuelle et dans les vies futures.
   d) la faculté de percevoir les dispositions des êtres.
   e) la faculté de déterminer la compréhension de la Doctrine (Dharma).
   f) la capacité de connaître les ressemblances et les dissimilarités des différentes régions de l'univers.
   g) la capacité de comparer le karma des résidents dans les 6 destinées (des Devas, des êtres humains, du génie de l'enfer, des esprits errants et des animaux) et le karma des religieux qui s'engagent dans le soutien occupé.
   h) la faculté de connaître le comportement des êtres dans des multitudes d'univers.
   i) la connaissance de toutes les vies antérieures des êtres.
   j) la capacité d'éliminer tous les conditionnements détruisant ainsi toutes les habitudes.

Voir aussi Traité, p.1305 et suiv.

8 Quatre assurances (vātiṣṭhadharma) : il en existe deux catégories, les assurances des Bouddha et les assurances des Bodhisattva.
   a) les assurances des Bouddha sont 1) la connaissance universelle, 2) l'extinction des souffrances, 3) la capacité de montrer la façon d'éviter le mal, 4) la capacité d'expliquer la cessation de la souffrance. Ces quatre assurances leur permettent de n'avoir pas de rien.
   b) Les quatre assurances des Bodhisattva : les Bodhisattva n'ont pas pour de propager le Dharma parce qu'ils ont 1) la mémoire infiniment, 2) l'utilisation du Dharma comme remèdes de tous les maux des humains, 3) la capacité dans les discussions, 4) la possibilité de répondre aux doutes et questions des humains.

Voir aussi Traité, p.1567 et suiv.
9 Le début et la fin des dix recommandations se ressemblent, ainsi nous ne les répétons pas.


11 Lit. ce qui correspond aux "quatre paires d'objets" (purisampayāmi) et aux "huit caractères humains" (purisapuggalā) de la tradition pāli. Voir références dans FIS PED, p.470; cf. aussi Nyanatiloja, Buddhist Dictionary, 3e éd. Colombo 1972, pp.20-2, q.v. aṣīya-puggalā.


13 Voir Krahe, p.1115 et suiv., q.v. "les trente-sept auxiliaires de l'illumination". Cf. aussi BSR 1, 2, p.46, n.12.

14 L'eau, la terre, le feu, le vent : ce sont les quatre grands éléments physiques et les qualités primaires de la matière, présentes dans tout objet matériel. Voir Nyanatiloja, Buddhist Dictionary, p.48, q.v. dhātu.

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Buddhist Scholarship in Canada: Addenda

Russell Webb

49 (end of para.2) insert: Two Japanese pupils of Warder obtained their Ph.Ds under his supervision: Shoryu Katoura for 'A Study of Harivarman's Tatvasiddhi' [SatyasiddhiSārā] (1974), and Funimaru Watanabe for 'Philosophy and its Development in the Nīlayas and Abhidhammas' (1976) which was subsequently published under the same title (Delhi 1983).

50 1.2 Waterhouse has surveyed 'Buddhism in Modern Music and Dance: Wagner, the Naropa Institute and Some Others' (Spring Wind 5.3, Toronto 1985).

- 1.13-14 fr.b.: (ed-Chai-Shla Yu...).
- 1.7 fr.b.: (ed.Hok-lam Chan and Wm T.de Bary,....
59 1.9 fr.b. add: The Third Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies was also held in Winnipeg 1980 at which Prof.Guenther delivered the Presidential Address on the theme 'Tasks Ahead' (published in JIAS 4, 1981).
60 1.20 fr.b.: Be [Kawamura] has also contributed the entry on Buddhism in Canada to the new Canadian Encyclopaedia (Edmonton 1985).
62 1.12 fr.b. insert new para.: A Ph.D. candidate from 1982 has been Gareth Sperham who was born in England and had lived as a monk in India and Nepal studying the Vajrayāna. During the
previous eight years he had been attached to the Buddhist School of Dialectics at Dheramsala. He has produced a new English translation of the Udānavarga entitled The Tibetan Dhammapada (Mahayana Publications, New Delhi 1983; repr. Wisdom Publications, London 1986) and a spiritual autobiography in 'A Personal Account of Buddha' (Spring Wind 5,4, Toronto 1985-6).


65 insert new para.: An ex-patriciate scholar is Leonard W.J. van der Kraap. Born 1952 in Geldrop, The Netherlands, he read, i.a., Psychology and Philosophy at Brock University, Religious Studies and Philosophy at Carleton University, Ottawa, and Religious/Mongolian Studies, Tibetology and Sinology at Saskatoon (all between 1970-8). He obtained an M.A. from the last-named university under the tutelage of Prof. Guenther and completed his training in Tibetology, Mongolian and Manchu studies, Indology and Sinology at Bonn and Hamburg in W. Germany - gaining his doctorate from the latter in 1979 for a study which was published under the title Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century (Stuttgart 1983). During the years 1980-3 he served with the Nepali-German Manuscript Preservation Project, later becoming Deputy

63 add final para.: Mention must also be made of Glen H. Mullin who was born in Cape, Quebec. In 1972 he travelled to Dharamsala, the gare of the Dalai Lama in India, and joined the Buddhist Studies Programme which had been established at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives by Geshe Käwang Dargye (his first tutor). He was a script consultant for Graham Coleman's documentary film, 'Tibet: A Buddhist Trilogy', and serves in the Research and Translation Bureau of the Dalai Lama's Library. He has already translated the following Tibetan texts: Stanzas for a Novice Monk [attributed to Nāgārjuna] and Essence of the Ocean of Vihāra [by Tsongkhapa]. With Lobzang Rabgya (Dharamsala 1976), Four Songs to Je Riagpo, with Lobzang Norbu Tsawaa (ibid.), Bridging the Sutras and Tantras: A collection of ten minor works by Dalai Lama I (ibid. 1981; repr. by Snow Lion Press, Ithaca, NY 1982, in their series Selected Works of the Dalai Lama). In the latter he has tr. Dalai Lama III: Essence of Refined Gold (1982), DL VII: Songs of Spiritual Change (1982) and DL III: The Tantric Yogas of Sister Niguma (1985). He has also, with Brian C. Beresford, tr. the Bodhipathapradīpa and other (Tibetan) treatises for mahāyāna Texts on the Graded Path (Dharamsala 1978), with Doobon Tulku, tr. The Life of Jowo Atisha and Attha's Mahāyāna-pāṭha-sadhana-vinaya-sūgraha, Vimalaratnakalaka and Satya-dvaya-avatāra for Atisha and Buddhism in Tibet (Tibet House, New Delhi 1983), and miscellaneous Tibetan texts for his compilation on Death and Dying: The Tibetan Tradition (Boston and London 1986).

Buddhist Scholarship in Canada: Addenda

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OBITUARIES

A. L. Basham (24.6.14 – 27.1.86)

One of the foremost historians of Indian civilisation (and one of the very few Western specialists in this field) died of cancer in Calcutta and was buried at Shillong. Although a naturalised Australian citizen, he was undoubtedly a spiritual son of India.

Arthur Llewellyn Basham was born in Essex, England, the son of a journalist attached to the Indian Army. In 1938 he won the Ouseley Scholarship in Urdu at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and thereafter graduated with a First Class Honours degree in Indo-Aryan studies. After the Second World War he was appointed Reader in the History of India (1953) and four years later became Professor of the History of South Asia at the University of London. He always concentrated his energies on teaching and throughout his career supervised over 100 doctoral dissertations. As a student at one of his year-long courses in Comparative Religion at an evening institute, the writer of this tribute can testify to the persuasive charm of his appealing oratory and to his deep-rooted adherence to Indian philosophy.

He became a Visiting Lecturer to universities in the USA, India and Pakistan and was a sectional president at the International Congress of Orientalists held in New Delhi 1964. In the following year he accepted an invitation from the Australian National University in Canberra – a move he described as the ‘brain drain’ in reverse! – to become Head of the School of General Studies in the Faculty of Asian Studies. On his retirement in 1976 he became Visiting Professor at the School of Graduate Studies in the Centre for Religious Studies, Toronto University, lecturing occasionally at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, and Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota. Before leaving North America he acted as President of the Fourth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies which met at Wisconsin University, Madison, in 1980. Five years later, at the age of 71, he was invited to Calcutta by the Asiatic Society of Bengal which honoured him with the Visvakarman Professorship of Oriental Studies and its bicentenary plaque. (He had already been awarded the title of Desikottam by the Visvakarman University, Shantiniketan.) At the time of his death he was master-
minding an ambitious Encyclopedia of Indology on behalf of the Asiatic Society.

Although few of Prof. Bascham's writings dealt exclusively with Buddhism, it was always accorded sympathetic treatment in numerous books and papers. His most celebrated study and the one work by which he will long be remembered is the highly readable tome, "The Wonder that was India" (London 1954, pbk repr. 1965; New York 1963 and Delhi 1984), which surveys the totality of culture in the Sub-continent up to the Muslim conquests. (Translations of this unique study have been made in French, Polish, Spanish, Hindi, Malayalam, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu and Sinhalese.) Based on his doctoral dissertation at SOAS he produced a seminal and, indeed, the only full-length account of the History and Doctrines of the Śāṅkhyas (London 1951; repr. Delhi 1981) and later contributed entries on this 'vanished Indian religion' to the Encyclopedia of Buddhism (Vol. I, fasc. 2, Colombo 1963) and the Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Institute (Vol. XXII, Calcutta 1971). His inaugural lecture at his alma mater was published under the title The Indian Sub-Continent in Historical Perspective (SOAS 1958; German tr. by F. Wilhelm, Saccodium X, Munich 1960). His remaining books comprise Studies in Indian History and Culture (a collection of essays which includes the early history of Ceylon, Calcutta 1964) and Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture (Bombay 1966). Following a conference on the subject held in London 1960, he edited the Papers on the Date of Kanîka (Leiden 1968), and later edited The Civilization of Non-Asian Asia (Sydney 1974) and A Cultural History of India (to which he also wrote the introduction and Conclusion - Oxford 1975; repr. OUP, Delhi 1985).


V. S. Karunaratne (1929 - 80)

A scholar, active Buddhist and one-time diplomat, Prof. Karunaratne died in Colombo aged 57.

He pursued graduate studies at the University of London which, in 1956, awarded him a Ph.D. for his dissertation on 'The development of the theory of causality in early Theravāda Buddhism'. From his previous position as senior lecturer in Pali and Buddhist Civilization at Peradeniya, he was appointed to the Chair in 1964 and subsequently elected Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies. After a short interval during which he served as Sri Lanka's ambassador to the USA (where he founded the New York Buddhist Vihāra and the Sri Lanka Buddhist Association) he became Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies at Kelaniya.

He wrote in Sinhala and English, contributing several items to Buddhist journals together with a description of 'The Effortless Way to Nirvāṇa' for the Malalasekera Commemoration Volume (ed. O.H.de A. Wijesekera, Colombo 1976).
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BOOK REVIEWS


This is a sumptuous production and is recommended to Buddhists in any country where they are cut off from the sources of Dharma inspiration both by distance and alien culture. To leaf through the illustrations could be a refreshing reminder of the riches of Buddhist culture when one is surrounded by the uninspiring materialism of modern urban sprawl. This is not to say, of course, that Buddhist-influenced cultures do not have their failings, though this line of thought, for lack of space, cannot be followed here.

The World of Buddhism is very much more than a handsome picture book for it contains articles on various aspects of Buddhism from its beginnings to its modern manifestations. Thus we have an Introduction by Richard Gombrich on 'The Buddhist Way' in which he very ably maps out the Indian background to Buddhist Teachings and something of the diversity of Buddhist organisation. In the centre of all this stands the Sangha, mostly and usually monastic though there have been many variations.

In the opening chapter Etienne Lamotte offers us 'The Buddha, His Teachings and His Sangha', a learned and concentrated account of the Triple Gem, with special emphasis on the rules, ideals and lives of monks and nuns. While the late author of this chapter knew his texts well, he is not so well-informed about practice. I have never, in any Buddhist tradition, found Uposatha days celebrated as "a day of fasting", the reverse certainly being true in South-East Asia! His account of Uposatha (Sanskrit, Posada), the Observance Days, of which he says that the monks in unison chant the monastic rule (pātimokkha/pātimokṣa) while it may have been conducted in that way in ancient India, certainly differs from present practice in Asia where only one monk chants and the rest listen respectfully. As he has drawn here from the Sanskrit traditions, many not generally available in English, one cannot say that he is mistaken. And it is perhaps only a
non-Buddhist who could write in the concluding paragraph, of the Buddha's monks and nuns after the final Nibbāna, "abandoned by their master, the disciples had to continue the work...". Arahants surely did not feel abandoned, nor other Noble Ones, and while the disciples who still had 'ordinary' minds may have felt grief, 'abandoned' is still the wrong word to use.

In the next section, 'The Indian Tradition', there are chapters on 'Buddhism in Ancient India', 'Expansion to the North: Afghanistan and Central Asia', and 'Nepali: the Survival of Indian Buddhism in a Himalayan Kingdom'. In the first sub-section, 'The Evolution of the Sangha' by Gombrich, the texts are dealt with and their transmission through the various Councils. A reasonable critique is also given of the 'authenticity' of the scriptures, noting the Indian tendency from earliest Vinaya and Sutta texts down to the latest of the Tantras, to ascribe everything to the (or a) Buddha or his disciples. This makes for many complications in the minds of Westerners who tend to take a rather literal view of authorship. It is perhaps rather strange to quote a translation of the Dhammapada so ancient as that of Max Müller (1881), but the other quotations at the end of this section are more up to date.

Two further sub-sections on 'Mahāyāna Buddhism' and 'The Monastic Contribution to Buddhist Art and Architecture', by Lamotte and Lal Mani Joshi respectively, follow. The reviewer found all this material well-presented and was particularly fascinated with some of the material in the latter section. After this Oskar von Hinüber deals with Afghanistan and Central Asia. This is a specialty interesting section as the former Buddhist culture there is still poorly known to many Buddhists today. It was a very rich and varied culture which interacted not only with Hindu elements but also with the Nestorian Christian, Zoroastrian and Manichaean traditions, while in the easternmost parts it was subjected to Chinese influence. Its final downfall was the result of increasing Muslim influence though, surprisingly, the Buddha's Teachings and Islam coexisted for even hundreds of years in some places.

Nepal is a country where coexistence has been possible (but not profitable) with Hinduism, as the next section by Siegfried Lienhard shows. The richly ornate Buddhism of the Newars of the area around Kathmandu is a tenacious survival of the more 'popular' elements. A monastic (celibate) Sangha has not survived nor, one suspects, has meditation practice. Instead there are rituals and worship, with great festivals and processions occurring every year. Though the artistic heritage of Buddhism from India has survived sheltered in this little valley, and though the rituals and festivals are splendid, yet the dissatisfaction of many young Newars with this rather empty shell can be seen in the increasingly flourishing Theravāda influence.

In the next three chapters in fact, Theravāda in the countries where it is strongest is illustrated in pictures and described with text. Sri Lanka's Buddhism, 'They will be Lords upon the Island', is ably dealt with by Michael Carrithers - history, the monk as teacher, preacher and priest, the monk as landlord (not the way one thinks of monks in this country, so far!), monks in politics and, the monk as forest-dweller, leading up to the modern Sangha.

Heinz Bechert's 'To be a Burmese is to be a Buddhist' comes next and the author gives a lively account of how Buddhism has fared in Burma. There is a good outline history right up to the present with interesting details of what happened to Burmese Buddhism under the British. The cartoon ridiculing foreigners (a British Raj) who would rather be carried round a pagoda on the backs of Burmese than submit to the 'indignity' of removing their shoes, is indeed amusing. The post-WWII ups and downs of politics and religion are well compressed, with mention of course of the great Sixth Council. The structure of the Burmese Sangha and the various attempts at reforming it, including the latest plan of 1979, are given in some detail. One of the initiatives of the present government is the Pāli Translation Society which, under the leadership of former Prime Minister U Nu, is preparing a new translation of the Pali Canon. Nuns are mentioned too, with the mysterious date '436 AD' given as the time for the extinction of the bhikkhunis. I wonder where this date is derived from? Nats, the native deities of Burma, have to be mentioned of course, but too, by contrast, are a few monks believed to have been Arahants. This section ends with an account of temples and monasteries, specially referring to their educatio-
Review through date. South to Important the Bangkok, the Japan Mahamakut Cambodia of Buddhism, understanding a out the monasteries, outlined the author not be Sangha a the Thailand, The or at role three time 'yellow many description paragraph regarded "Pali Theravada the East lay Bunnag's improving t on good the Tha: Or Thai rather is This lot details Buddhism Buddhism the Buddha the the Thailand's society, Kahlyana, two nun«, is life number small supposes United open taken rather re higher town Cambodia' the pages! P- mention monks that review

The Way of the Monk and the Way of the World: Buddhism in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia' is Jane Bunnag's contribution. She has outlined how Buddhism entered Thailand and Laos first. In the course of this there is mentioned "Pali literature both sacred and secular", but the reviewer is unaware that any of the latter exists. Perhaps she means various 'historied' (vassa) written in Pali but these are, after all, predominantly religious histories. The position of Buddhism in Cambodia follows, showing how the elaborate structure of Mahayana, often fused with Hinduism, crumbled as the Khmer empire decayed, to be replaced by "the egalitarian teaching of Theravada Buddhism". 'Sangha and State', a section on the relationship between these two, is important for understanding Buddhism in these three countries. She quotes a Japanese author approvingly when he says that due to too close a control of the monks, especially in regard to the examinations, "the Thai monks' understanding of Buddhism became stereotyped". This is very true and is reflected in the rigidity of Thai ecclesiastical arrangements which are arch-conservative and in the consequent hierarchy in the Sangha which is more marked than in other Theravada countries. Under the heading 'The Life of the Monk', some rules are listed with one or two inaccuracies, but there is not much room for details here. The information given on entering the Sangha and personal aspects of the monk's role is perhaps not easily available elsewhere. The fact that the Sangha is open to almost anyone to join is rather surprising to Westerners who are accustomed to a priesthood that has taken various degrees and has already the benefits of higher education. Buddhist monks, some of them, may go on to acquire this but they do not have to possess it at the time of ordination. Some of then indeed tire of the system (and the monks' own life can be rather boring) and go on a kind of pilgrimage to different teacher-monks and shrines. It is interesting that when they do so they are regarded with suspicion in Thailand, as their mode of life then comes nearest to that of the Buddha himself and the Sangha in the early days. This reflects the same rigidity commented on above. A small error in the description of the print on p.165: it does not have the Buddhist Wheel symbol in the centre but rather, Vishnu's Wheel, a good illustration of

how 'popular religion' mixes elements of Buddhism, Hinduism and the native animism. On the subject of small faults, an illustration of a monk receiving almsfood on p.37 is almost certainly not in Kangoen but in Bangkok.

Monastic aspects of the monk's role give some 'inside' information on monasteries, what the abbot does, how the lay people relate to the monastery and a paragraph or two on nuns. Of the latter, the author gives a rather abysmal picture and does not mention two or three movements which are improving the role of nuns in society, through scholarship as at Mahamakut University and their own training centre in Phetburi, through the 'yellow nuns' of Nakorn Pathom who are led by Thailand's only bhikkhuni, or through the 10-precept nuns of the rebel, Acharn Bodhirakk.

There is quite a lot on amulets and superstition, fair enough one supposes as so many Thai monks encourage it, but the space could have been better used to mention more Sangha-teachers than Acharn Buddhadasa and the rather disreputable Kittivuddho. It is surprising that the meditation teachers in the north-east of Thailand, who will probably prove to be the most significant factor for the flourishing of Thai Buddhism in the future, are not mentioned at all. This is a great pity. The influence of meditation on many new lay Buddhist groups and its strength in university Buddhist groups, such as that led by some new and large wats on the outskirts of Bangkok, has also been missed.

Well, the review has already reached rather uncontrollable lengths and, as the reviewer is most familiar with the Buddhist of South and South-East Asia, he will pass over the very interesting chapters on China, Vietnam and Korea (Erik Zurcher), Japan (Robert Heinemann), and then Tibet (Per Kvaerne), leaving enjoyment of these to the reader.

A number of things could be said about the last chapter by Bechert, 'Buddhist Revival in East and West', but the most important perhaps is how impossible a task it is to pack all the information into just over ten pages: Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States are all treated, but obviously the author has not enough space and certainly with Britain his information is out of date. The Chithurst-Amaravati Sangha of mostly Western-born monks and nuns is not mentioned.
Countries like Australia, where Buddhism is much smaller (and where this reviewer lives), have no space at all. Still, every aspect of Buddhism today— an ever-changing present— could never be included.

Concluding then, may I recommend this volume to your libraries?— It will give you much to look at and think about.

Phra Khansigako (Head of Wat Buddha-Dhamma, New South Wales, Australia)


The preface to this work summarises its intentions in saying that it is not an ordered, doctrinal presentation but a blend of what I have to say about the teachings and of material concerning the life of Shakyamuni taken from the oldest and most reliable sources. This is an accurate description though, having read it, one is left wondering whether the author should not have made up his mind one way or the other and either written an evaluation of the ideas of primitive Buddhism as expositor and advocate or more firmly assumed the role of impartial historian and textual scholar. After a very brief introductory chapter on 'The Indian background' we are given a fairly standard account of Gotama's life and ministry from Buddhist sources, with digressions into important doctrines and such matters as 'Supernatural powers' (ch.16) and 'Buddhism and Jainism' (ch.11). The fact that the last two chapters deal with 'The Great Decease', i.e. Gotama's death and the events that immediately followed, and 'A Buddhist Guide for Living' (essentially a synopsis of Buddhist lay ethics based on the Sīghālovīḍa Sutta) perhaps sufficiently illustrates the ambivalence referred to. The blend in other words does not entirely work as far as this reviewer is concerned, though there is much to interest. Apart from the text, there are sixteen pages of black and white photographs (of not particularly high quality) showing the usual places of pilgrimage and a glossary which, reasonably enough given the nature of this book, is much stronger on personal and place names than on technical terms.

Absence of diacritical marks throughout is a minor flaw and the translation sometimes jers, as when we are offered 'Right memory' (p.57) instead of the more familiar 'Right mindfulness'.

On the evidence of the English edition, one must assume that the book is intended for readers with little knowledge of Buddhism. The semi-biographical and anecdotal presentation makes it easy and attractive reading, but more information by way of notes on the source material would have enhanced its interest for those directly acquainted with some of the texts. For instance, the well-known account of Gotama's period of asceticism is given here with the information that the five followers he acquired were in fact men sent by his father to care for his son (p.26). The reviewer was not able to trace this embellishment in the translations from the Pali and would be interested to know where it came from. Some general summary of divergencies between the Pali Canon and the Chinese version of the Aṇgamas would indeed have been welcome and, for that matter, the extent to which each has been drawn on.

Occasionally the author irritates or puzzles. The statement in the preface that 'Shakyamuni is ranked as one of the four great sages of the world together with Socrates, Jesus Christ and Confucius' is surely an uncritical quotation from Karl Jaspers' book The Great Philosophers, and Hindus will hardly be overjoyed to learn that only Buddhism, Christianity and Islam rank as 'great religions' (p.9). Then again, it is puzzling to be given a reference to the three marks or attributes of existence which substitute 'nirvana is quiescence' for the expected mention of dukkha (suffering or dissatisfaction) (p.97). However, when the author allows himself to speculate freely he is often illuminating, as in suggesting that a fanciful account of the visit by the Master to the 'Heaven of the Thirty-three Devas' simply represented the pious imagination at work during a period of prolonged absence on solitary meditation, when, of necessity, 'hard information' about him would have been difficult to come by (p.142).

Most readers, then, can hope to get something from this book, provided they can steer a sensible middle course between pious credulity and a negative reaction to certain aspects of the author's style.

David Evans

This work was originally published in twenty-eight issues of the monthly magazine Kosei, then in book form (1980), before being ‘completely re-organized’ for its English-language edition. The author teaches Buddhism at Konazawa University and is described as an authority on Pali texts.

The book is essentially a history of the ‘vast task of communication and translation’ involved in the handing on of the Buddhist Canon. While there is discussion of its formation and diffusion in India and Sri Lanka, the work focuses on the transmission of the Canon in China, through the barriers of geography, culture and language. The author has indeed given a multi-faceted overview of this ‘vast task’ and, in doing so, uncovers a story of energy and scholarship that stands as an inspiration for the current generation of scholars.

In India, the Agamas/Nikayas were orally transmitted in various languages, translated from the (Old) Magadhi that the Buddha probably spoke. In time they came to be written down, generally in the Brāhmī script thought to have developed from Phoenician around 800 B.C. (The author points out that nearly every human script, except for Chinese and its derivatives, developed from Egyptian glyphs, through Phoenician script.) Brāhmī itself was the basis of scripts in Sri Lanka and South-East Asia (from the rounded southern Brāhmī) and in Nepal, Tibet and Mongolia, whence it even influenced a Korean script.

While the Theravāda school generally kept its texts in Pāli, a west Indian language (Paśācī), the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna texts reaching China, through Central Asia, were translated into the language of the Chinese empire. The earliest translations date from 67 A.D., at least, dealt with matters easiest for the Chinese to appreciate: ethics and stories of the Buddha and his previous lives. Doctrinal matters were harder to put across; the earliest method, later rejected as misleading, was to use Taoist terminology as the medium of translation. The author gives interesting details on the difficulties, described by the translators, of moving between the two totally unrelated languages of Sanskrit and Chinese. The former is, for example, highly inflected but stylistically simple, while the latter lacks such inflections but was generally written in an ornate and polished style.

Of the many translators involved in the origin of the Chinese Canon, the author names four as the most important: Kūnārajīva (344-413) from Kučā, Central Asia; Paramārtha (499-569) from Western India; the Chinese pilgrim Hsuăn-tsang (596-664); and Amoghavajra (705-774) from Sri Lanka. The biography of Kukunajīva is outlined, and his seminal influence on East Asian Buddhism is emphasized: his translations were the first really to capture the essential meaning of crucial doctrines, and did this in elegant Chinese which was also excellent for recitation purposes. The heroic journey of the pilgrim Fa-hsien (340-420) is also described, as is the difficult life of Paramārtha, whose translation work was constantly hampered by the war-torn conditions of Southern China in his day. The author devotes a chapter to Hsuan-tsang, the only Chinese of the four great translators; his output was of very high quality, and comprises one fifth of the Chinese Canon. After learning all he could of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna ideas from numerous teachers in China, he travelled to India to learn more. He later returned to a triumphant welcome with 658 works: Sutras, Vinayas and treatises. While the bulk of these were Mahāyāna, they also included texts from several Hinayāna collections, including fifteen Theravāda ones. Little is said of Amoghavajra and the Tantric texts that he translated, but it is noted that he studied Tantric Buddhism in Sri Lanka for three years, after previously coming to China at the age of fourteen.

Once Buddhism was rooted in China, it underwent both persecution and promotion by the royal court. A result of one such persecution, in 574, was the birth of the custom of inscribing sūtras on rocks for posterity. For example, between 605 and 1094 many sūtras were inscribed on the polished walls of chambers hewn in the living rock of Mt. Fang. The author also describes the meticulous methods of translation-bureaux set up with royal patronage, and the several sūtra-catalogues that were commissioned.

Sūtra-catalogues were very necessary in order to keep track of the growing corpus of texts, as new ones were translated,
old ones were re-translated - and 'sūtras' originated in China. Some sūtras of Chinese origin were accepted as 'genuine', others were labelled in catalogues as 'spurious'. The 'genuine' ones were those seen as being in accord with fundamental Buddhist teachings; their origin lay in the effort to adapt these teachings to the Chinese way of thinking. According to the author, one such text was the 'Sūtra of Meditation on Amitābha Buddha' (Kuan wu-liang-shou-ching), though other scholars see this as of Indian origin. Many of the 'spurious' sūtras existed: a 730 A.C. catalogue lists 392 of them, compared with 1076 non-spurious works. Such spurious texts included (over-)simplified abbreviations of Indian sūtras, teachings uttered by people in a possessed state, attempts to palm-off folk-beliefs as Buddhism, and attempts to take advantage of Buddhism for some purpose.

As well as categorising sūtras as spurious or not, the Chinese also had to develop systems for classifying the many Hinayāna and Mahāyāna sūtras which came to be translated. Discrepancies and contradictions were apparent between these, yet they were all regarded as having been taught by Śākyamuni Buddha. Difficulties were removed by following the principle that the Buddha adapted his message according to the capacity of his audience - or that his 'one message' was interpreted according to such capacities. The early classification-systems simply assigned sūtras to different periods of the Buddha's life, in a relatively value-free way; later systems, though, were used to accord highest value and truth to the chosen sūtra(s) of a particular school, e.g. the T'ien-t'ai.

Sūtra-study is not the whole of Buddhism, and the author points out that those schools which emphasized study at the expense of practice did not survive long in China. In particular, he implies that Bodhidharma's almost non-scriptural approach should be understood as a corrective to the eclipse of practice by study in sixth-century China.

On the aspect of sūtras as written documents, the author suggests that the Mahāyāna emphasis on the merit of copying out Mahāyāna sūtras was because early Mahāyāna was a purely lay movement, lacking specialists (monks) who had time to memorize, and so pass on, orally transmitted texts. In time, sūtras came to be printed, as well as written out, in China. The oldest extant printed book, indeed, is a Chinese recension of the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (868 A.C.), while the oldest extant piece of printing is a Japanese chūranji dating from approximately 767 A.C. The late tenth century saw the first printing of the complete Tripitaka in China, while the eleventh century saw the use of movable wooden type. The author describes the various editions of the Tripitaka printed by Chinese governments, and also in Japan.

The mid-nineteenth century saw the Japanese, under the influence of Western Orientalists, start a historical study of the development of Buddhism, in particular, attention came to be focused on the previously neglected Āgamas (the equivalent of the Pali Nikāyas) and four translations of the Dharma-pāda in the Chinese Canon. As early as 1901, Japanese authors were arguing that the Mahāyāna sūtras might well have not been taught by the historical Buddha. Kōgen Mizuno himself holds that, while they cannot be shown to have been the Buddha's words, they 'merely explain in greater detail the many elements of Mahayana belief that are described but briefly in the Agamas' (p.132), with the Āgama containing 'almost all the sources of Mahayana teachings' (p.132). As a result of their efforts, Japanese scholars have now compared all the Pali sūtras with their Chinese equivalents. Japanese Pali scholarship also produced, in the six years from 1935, a complete Japanese translation of the Pali Canon and related Pali works: the 70-volume Randen Dalzōkyō, or 'Southern Route Canon'.

A key fruit of Japanese comparative and critical study of Chinese editions of the Tripitaka is the 100-volume Taishō Dalzōkyō, produced in the years 1924-34. This includes: sūtras and other texts translated from Indic languages into Chinese; texts recovered in the twentieth century from the T'ou-huang caves; Chinese and Japanese commentaries, treatises and catalogues; and illustrated works on Buddhist art and images. Notes often supplement the Chinese text by giving Sanskrit and Pali parallels to the Chinese terms. It is not surprising, then, that the author

describes this as 'incomparably larger and more definitive than any previous edition of the Buddhist Canon' (p.185). He also makes clear the great wealth of scriptural resources in Japan: including Sanskrit manuscripts, Chinese manuscripts and printed texts which were lost in the persecutions and war of Chinese history. Japanese scholars also study the Tibetan, as well as the Chinese and Pali Canons. As great effort has been put into the study of these, there is clearly good reason for Western Buddhologists to learn Japanese, so as to share in the fruits of Japanese scholarship.

By way of criticism of the work, it is noted that, as the author intended it 'for the general reader' (I am not sure how realistic a goal this is), he has omitted all discritical marks, in the body of the text, from Sanskrit and Pali words. This omission, though, is remedied in a Glossary-Index, as well as in the Appendix of titles of Scriptures and Catalogues in Sanskrit, Chinese, Pali, Japanese and English. It is noted, though, that the Pali Athavakagga is still rendered as Athavakagga, and (consequently?) is translated as the 'Meaningful Chapter' (p.114) rather than as the 'Chapter of Eights'. It is also noticeable that the author seems to associate the first acham with the time of Asoka, and thus with the Third Council, rather than with the Second Council (pp.9 and 112). The work would also benefit from the addition of a bibliography. These comments aside, it is a useful and inspiring survey of the diffusion of the fundamental Buddhist texts.

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In May 1931 a group of boys watching their flocks in the vicinity of Gilgit in Kashmir uncovered the remains of an old stone-built structure. There is some doubt about the precise find-spot, but it seems likely to have been in the remains of an old Buddhist stupa, or perhaps library, at or near Naupur. Further digging by local villagers laid bare a circular structure containing a box full of Sanskrit manuscripts written on birchbark and paper. The importance of the find was soon realized, the 'irresponsible excavation' was halted, and the Wazir of Gilgit took possession of the manuscripts.

By chance Aurel Stein passed through Gilgit on his return from Chinese Turkestan in June 1931, and was able to inspect the site and the relics recovered by the villagers. He made the news of the discovery known to the world by reports in the Indian press in July and The Times in September. A brief report on the find was published in JRAS (October 1931) and was reprinted in The Indian Antiquary (March 1932). This included information about the materials of the manuscripts, their scripts and their probable dates. The French Citadelle Mission (to Afghanistan) under J. Hackin visited the site very soon after Stein, and obtained photographs of some manuscripts and a few fragments which S. Levi edited in JA 1932 (pp.1-45), together with some folios sent to him by Stein. Other folios were sent by Stein to England.

Despite the early realization of the value of the find, and the extensive publicity afforded to the discovery, little was done in the years immediately following. Calcutta University sent N. Dutt to Kashmir to examine the manuscripts, but he reported that the majority were still at Gilgit, and he had to be content with examining five which had been sent to Srinagar. He published details about these and summaries or transliterations in the Indian Historical Quarterly in 1932, 1933 and 1934. Lack of information about the other texts included in the find meant that no work could be made of them, and Dutt's edition of the Pañcarājasūtra (1934) made no reference to the Gilgit manuscript of that text (despite Das Gupta's statement to the contrary [see below]). Nor did Regamey refer to the Gilgit manuscript of the Samādhirājasūtra in his edition of three chapters of that text in 1938.

The Wazir of Gilgit sent the manuscripts to Srinagar, and there they remained for six or seven years locked up in the Government Records Office. It seems that a change of Prime Minister in Kashmir in 1938 led to a renewed interest in the manuscripts, and an expedition was sent to search for more manuscripts in

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the area in that year. A report of its finds were published by M.S. Kautil Shastri in the Journal of the Mythic Society (1939). At about the same time Dutt was asked to edit the manuscripts which had been found in 1931, and in 1939 he published the first volume of Gilgit manuscripts, with the aid of D.M. Bhattacharya and Shivnath Sharma. The volume contained a number of Mahāyāna texts: Bhaṇḍayanguruvūtra, Ekkāsāmukha, Mahābhavavidyā (these two texts had already been published by Dutt in INQ (1936), Śrimahādevīvyākaraṇa (ed. A.C. Banerji), Ajitaranavyākaraṇa (ed. D.M. Bhattacharya), and Sarvatothisatadhiśāhā-sattvālokana-buddhakusumandārāśa-vyūha. To the volume was prefixed a long introduction giving information about the discovery of the manuscripts, a brief history of Buddhism in Kashmir, and summaries of the texts it contained. Volume II appeared in three parts in 1941, 1953 and 1954. It contained the Samāhāraṇāsūtra, and was edited by Dutt with the aid of Shivnath Sharma. Volume III, containing the Vinaya of the Mūlaśarvāstivādinś, appeared in four parts in 1947, 1949, 1953 and 1950. Once again Dutt was aided by Sharma and, for Part 4, by D.M. Bhattacharya also. Volume IV was published in 1955. It contained four Mahāyāna texts: Mahāsāṃśāpattarathaketa-dhāranī-sūtra, Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, Ārya-buddha-balādhāna-prāthārya-vikurvāne-nirdeśa-mūla-mahāyāna-sūtra and the Ārya Maitreya Vyākaraṇa. The last-named was edited by P.C. Majumdar. Once again Dutt was assisted in his edition of the first three texts by Sharma.

Meanwhile, because of the situation in Kashmir, the manuscripts which were preserved in the Srinagar Museum were taken to New Delhi in 1947 for safe keeping, and were stored in the National Archives there. Between 1950 and 1974 a facsimile edition of the manuscripts was published in the Śaṭa-Piṭčaka Series (Vol.10, 1-10) by Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra. The technical quality of the photographs, however, was not always of a high standard and, either by inadverence or because they had been lost, some of the folios used by Dutt in his editions were not included, while others were given twice, and a number were misplaced.

It would seem that the finds made by the 1938 expedition, which were kept in the Sir Pratap Singh Museum in Srinagar, were not taken to Delhi in 1947, but remained in Srinagar, for Oskar von Hinüber was able in 1976 to inspect and photograph portions of two manuscripts of the Saṅghātāsūtra which had been discovered in 1938, supplementing other manuscripts of this text which had been found in 1931 and edited in an unpublished Cambridge Ph.D dissertation by R.A. Ganatilaka. At the same time Professor von Hinüber discovered in the museum a palm leaf manuscript which had not been included in the report of the 1938 expedition, although presumably discovered at the same time. This proved, on investigation, to be a portion of the Saddharma-pundarīkāsūtra, and his transliteration of this manuscript, with facsimile reproduction, was published by the Rājyukika Library (Tokyo 1982).

Besides the few folios which were sent to London and Paris by Stein, and a folio which was shown to Dutt in Bombay, other folios too became separated from the main body of the Gilgit manuscripts. When scholars began to examine them, it became clear that a number of texts were incomplete, while the folios which remained were in a jumbled state. This, and the total absence of the painted boards which were used to protect the manuscripts, showed that between the discovery of the manuscripts and their handing over to the Wazir a considerable amount of material had gone astray. It is possible that the fragments which Hackin sent to Lévi were obtained from some unauthorized source. In more recent years a number of the missing folios have come to light. Certain fragments of folios were sent to the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute in 1940 for investigation, and in the Annals of the Institute for 1949 P.V. Bapat announced that these fragments were part of the Vinaya of the Mūlaśarvāstivādinś. With a substantial number of other folios, they belonged to an army officer in Lahore, from whom they were purchased by G. Tucci on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, which entrusted them to him in 1956 for publication. The portions of the Vinaya, which proved to complement the folios published by Dutt, were edited by R. Gnoii in 1977-78, while other folios, containing sections of a Prajñāpāramitā text, have been edited by E. Conze. Another section of the Gilgit manuscripts, comprising 34 folios, was bought by the Scindia Oriental Institute in Ujjain, while a fragment is to be found in Poona. Four folios of the Saddharma-pundarīkāsūtra, which from their appearance may well have come
from Gilgit (although no information is available about their provenance), were found in the Nepal National Bill Library, and were published by Zulrya Nakamura in 1970.

The publication of the Gilgit Manuscripts series by Dutt and his associates aroused great interest in the manuscripts, and their removal to Delhi and the subsequent publication of the facsimile edition made it possible for scholars all over the world to study these texts. As a result, a considerable number of them have now been edited and published. They include fragments of the Prårāmokasa, various Karmavākyā or Karmavācāna texts, and examples of Vedānga literature, including the Viśvantarāvedāna, to which a brief statement about the history of the Gilgit manuscripts is prefixed by the editor K. Das Gupta. There are also several portions of the Saddharmapundarīkakāśita, which have been published by S. Watambe and H. Toda.

It has become a major task for those working in this field to disentangle the often conflicting information which is available and to keep track of the editions which have been published. That task has been eased as a result of a very intricate piece of detective work carried out by von Hinüber, who in 1979 published a short monograph entitled Die Erforschung der Gilgit-Handschriften (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, 1979, Nr. 12), in which he set out the contents and whereabouts of every portion of the Gilgit manuscripts known to him at that time, together with information about editions which have been published. Two supplements (in ZDMG 130 [1980], 25–26 and 131 [1981], 9–11) gave further information, and clearly continual updating will be required. An edition of a fragment of the Dharmakāndha by S. Dietz has now appeared [Ed. see next review], and other scholars have announced their intention of editing various works.

The importance of the Gilgit manuscripts lies in the fact that they are the only Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts, except for the Mahājaśīrāmlakāla, found in India proper, the remainder known to us coming from Nepal, Tibet or Central Asia. Dutt is, therefore, almost justified in writing (Gilgit manuscripts I, p. 1) that these are “the only Buddhist manuscripts discovered in India”. The manuscripts are all written on paper or birchbark, except for the one on palmleaf mentioned above, and are dated from their scripts variously between the fourth and sixth centuries although opinions differ about the precise dates. Most of the texts in the finds were previously known only in Chinese or Tibetan translations.

The four volumes (in nine parts) of Dutt’s Gilgit Manuscripts have long been out of print, and have only been obtainable secondhand at greatly inflated prices. Thanks are due to Sri Satguru Publications for making them available again in a well-bound and well-printed form. The size of the printed page has been slightly reduced, with narrower margins and thinner paper than the first edition. In a uniform binding, in place of the varying bindings of the earlier publications, the result is a neat and attractive format. Criticism was rightly levelled against Dutt’s editions as being made with insufficient care, so that use could be made of them only with extreme caution. There was, for example, little information about doubtful or illegible passages, although it was usually made clear which portions were conjectures based upon Tibetan and other versions. Now that the facsimile edition is available as a check upon Dutt’s readings, it is possible to use his editions more confidently. They appeared too late for Edgerton to make much use of them for his Dictionary and Grammar of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, so there is a need for an analysis of their vocabulary and grammar, and also for a translation of those works which have not yet been rendered into English. It is to be hoped that the publication of this reprint edition will increase interest in these very important texts and will inspire scholars to undertake these tasks.

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In his Buddhist sects in India (Calcutta 1970) Nalinaksha Dutt had
 remarked (p.156) that in the colophon of the Chinese translation of the Dharmasamhāra (Dhsk) this text was described as "the most important of Abhidharma works, and the fountain-head of the Sarvāstivāda system". Dutt suggests that the Dhsk "appealed to the Chinese not for its subtlety and depth of philosophical discussions as for its comprehensiveness outlining the general course of spiritual training prescribed for a Buddhist monk. This work can also be paralleled to the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa" (ibid.). Comparing the Dhsk to the Visuddhimagga, however, does not seem very convincing. E. Frauwallner, on the other hand, has drawn attention to the remarkable and undeniable fact that the Dhsk, despite the different treatment of topics, closely coincides with the Vibhāṣās of the Abhidharmakotika of the Pāli tradition (cf. 'Abhidharma-Studien, 11. Die kanonischen Abhidharma-Werke', WZK 30, 8, 1964). Also in 'Die Entstehung der buddhistischen Systeme' (BAGW No.6, Göttingen 1971), Frauwallner underlines the importance of Abhidharma works ushering in, with first attempts at systematization, a new phase in the teaching tradition of Buddhism in the third century B.C. The Vibhāṣās, which Frauwallner considers one of the oldest Abhidharmakotika works (ibid., 115(5)), and its Sanskrit parallel, the Dhsk, can be regarded as deriving from a common nucleus of both the Sinhalese Pali and the north-western Sarvāstivāda traditions dating back to the time before the Aśokan missions started around the middle of the third century B.C. (cf. ibid., 120(6)). In view of the great significance of these two texts, we are now very fortunate that Dr. Dietz has made accessible the by no means scanty fragments of the Dhsk from Gilgit.

In her prefatory remarks she states that the present edition of the Dhsk is based on a fragmentary MS deposited in the library of the Scindia Oriental Museum in Ujjain. Bhatto, only a "most unsatisfactory transcription and description" of this MS was accessible, published by Sudha Sengupta in her 'Fragments from Buddhist Texts' (see Buddhist Studies in India, ed. R. Pandey, Delhi 1975, pp.139-83). For her critical edition Dietz utilized photos and diapositives kept in Göttingen and Berlin respectively. Moreover, it was possible for her to consult the original MS in the library of the Scindia Museum.

The book under review is divided into seven parts: description of the MS; on the Dhsk; the text of the fragments; concordance to MS folios/Sengupta edition/Chinese translation; lists of quotations found in the Dhsk fragments; index of names and select texts; list of abbreviations with bibliographical notes. Parts 1 and 2 can be regarded as an introduction to part 3, the critical edition of the MS remains.

On p.9 we are informed that the Gilgit MS written on birch bark contains thirty-four folios pertaining to three different texts: nineteen folios of the first text. Jikido Takasaki had already identified in 1965 as Dhsk fragments; the second portion of nine folios was identified by Chandrabāhi Triṇibhi as belonging to the Ketottarāgama, and the third comprising six folios Dietz and Kazuaki Matsuda identified as being fragments of the Lokesprajāpāli. Dietz's edition of the remains of this latter text will appear before long.

That the editor has studied the Dhsk fragments with all due care and competence is evidenced by her introductory parts. She deals meticulously with the script of the MS, with the state of preservation of the folios, orthographic peculiarities, peculiarities of sandhi, grammatical forms in Hybrid Sanskrit (with valuable material supplemental to Edgerton's Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar), punctuation and usage of words. In part 2, on the Dhsk, Dietz refers to the Chinese translation of the text, which is the only version in which this Abhidharma work is preserved in its entirety. She also quotes Frauwallner's list (cf. the first of Frauwallner's writings mentioned above, pp.73-4) giving the topics treated in each of the twenty-one chapters of the Dhsk. In a footnote on p.16, Dietz states Frauwallner's viewpoint that the Saṅgītīpāraṇyā is the oldest Abhidharma work of the Sarvāstivāda. She indicates that the latter text must certainly be younger than the Dhsk; for it is in the Saṅgītīpāraṇyā that thirty-three quotations from the Dhsk occur. See, on the other hand, J.W. de Jong's review of V. Stache-Rosen's Das Saṅgītīpāraṇyā and seine Kommentar Saṅgītīpāraṇyā in which he refers to Japanese authorities on the anteriority as well as posteriority of the Dhsk vis-à-vis the Saṅgītīpāraṇyā (cf. Orientalische Literaturzeitung 69, 1/2, 1974, p.81, and G. Schopen, ed., Buddhist Studies by J.W. de Jong, Berkeley 1979, p.276).

Dietz concludes her introductory parts by discussing the
structure and contents of the fragments preserved in the original Sanskrit. Through a comparison of the length of the MS remains with that of the Chinese version, she has calculated that the MS from Gilgit corresponds to about 17.7% of the complete text in Chinese. The Gilgit remains comprise parts of three chapters in an order of succession differing, however, from that of the Chinese version, dealing with a) prātryajjasautpāda, b) śīksapadā, and c) upamāṇā. Therein a considerable number of technical terms, subjects of instruction and psychic facts pertaining to the main topics are defined, and frequent explanations are given with the help of quotations from sūtras or vyākhyās. Apart from the Gilgit MS remains, a few quotations from the Dhks are found in later Sanskrit treatises. These Dietz has also cited: three quotations found in the Abhidharmakośabhāsya (hereafter abbreviated Bhāṣya, all references to the Pradhan ed.), one in the Abhidharmakośavākyā (abbrev. Vākyāḥ, Waghara ed.) and one in the Abhidharmadīpa.

A good many footnotes in part 3 of the edition of the Dhks fragments treat textual problems and interpretation, providing the editor’s emendations or comments that are always carefully substantiated on the basis of the corresponding Chinese version consulted and its appended German translation. In addition, the critical notes indicate quotations and parallels found in Sanskrit and Pali sources or deal with etymological problems.

On p.22 is cited one quotation from the Dhks occurring in the Vākyāḥ. There is one more quotation from the same source at Vākyāḥ 339, 10-31. This second one is closely related to the Dhks quotation at Bhāṣya 184, 17-18 (105, 13-14) cited by Dietz on p.23, concerning the impossibility of two Tathāgatas appearing in the world simultaneously. The last sentence, verse 18, yassati te dvija evam ekavartirnā ihi, both editors of the Bhāṣya (Pradhan and Dwarikadas) have marked as part of the quotation. That this is not correct is borne out by the corresponding passage in the Chinese Dhks, in which the impossibility of two Āvatāras simultaneously appearing in the world proceeds, in analogous wording, that of the two Tathāgatas (in the Pali parallels it is vice versa) (cf. Taishō (T) 1537, p.502b11-16). Here in the Dhks, we actually have a quotation from the Bahudhārakasūtra (cf. the Pali parallel at M I 1165) which is preserved in the Chinese Madhyāmantaka (T 26, pp.724c28-724a2). The Chinese text in the Madhyāmantaka generally tallies with the Dhks passage apart from minor differences in wording. The additional Vākyāḥ quotation from the Bhaddekaravāsūtra, though not given in full against Bhāṣya 184, 17-18, reads: asthānaṃ anirvāṇo yad upāvāsitaṁ dvāv ekavartirnā (Dwarikadas ed.: ...vartīnaū) loka upāvāsitaṁ iti.

On pp.73-4 (17v5-6v) the Sanskrit text provides a definition of 'upāsaka'. In footnote 316 Dietz elucidates this definition as a sūtra quotation: she names all Pali parallels and a Chinese equivalent from the Mahānāmasūtra in the Śāntarakṣita. She also cites the quotation from the Mahānāmasūtra as it occurs at Bhāṣya 215, 2-4 and which, accompanied by comments and abridged, is quoted again at Vākyāḥ 376, 9, 10, 31-32. She seems to consider different the two quotations as found in the Dhks and Bhāṣya/Vākyāḥ respectively. The quotation in the Bhāṣya differs, as she observes, from the Dhks citation in three points: a) Mahānāma is addressed in the former text, b) the Dhks has in addition citata utpāda, and c) for upāsaka the Bhāṣya reads upāsikā. A. Hirakawa, however, regards upāsikā as a faulty reading at Bhāṣya 215, 3, 4, 9 that should be corrected to upāsaka (index to the Abhidharmakośabhāsya, Part 1, p.43) which is confirmed by Bhāṣya 241, 14: yat sa eva evapāsākṛtvā eva upāsakavāpanṭavah. With regard to citata utpādaja in the Dhks quotation, we have to take into consideration the fact that textual discrepancies in quotations from the Agamas or, e.g. the Udānavarga/Dharmapada are due to varying recensions and linguistic preferences pertaining to the various Hinayāna schools. Thus, while the name Gilgit is associated with the Mūlamadhyamāvatā, a large number of Bhāṣya/Vākyāḥ quotations from 'canonical' scriptures are attributable to both the Mūlamadhyamāvatā and Sarvāstivādin traditions. To clarify this point, one more important citation found in the Dhks must be mentioned.

A quotation from the Mahānāmasūtra occurring on p.34, 18-35, 6 (Dhks 65b-7) of Dietz's edition is of considerable relevance. There are several parallels to it explaining the meaning of vijñānapratyāpamā nāmaśāmā, two of which are cited in footnote 69 (D II 62, 36 - 63,17; Madhū K (Prasannapada) 552). Another paral-
Bel, though a rather short one, is given at Bhāṣya 131, 14 (III. 20) which again is quoted at greater length at Vyākhyā 669, 1-6. Although both the Dhks and Vyākhyā quotations derive from the same source, the textual divergencies are substantial (e.g. Dhsk: vijñānam ced śanda māṭā̤ kuśa̤ kuśanāvaśkarmanyād... against Vyākhyā: viñjñānam ced śanda māṭa̤̤ kuśa̤ kuśa̤ kuśa̤ avamānād...). In the Chinese Āgama collections we find two parallels related to the passage under discussion, in the Dirghāgama of the Dharma-gupta school and in the Madhyamāgama generally attributed to the Sarvāstivādin tradition (cf. T 1, p.61b and T 26, p.579c). The Dharma-gupta version of our passage is shorter than and differs from both the Pali and Sanskrit recensions. On the other hand, the Chinese Madhyamāgama version agrees with the Vyākhyā citation quite closely (details cannot be discussed here). For this reason, it seems plausible to conclude that the Bhāṣya/Vyākhyā citation belongs to the Sarvāstivādin tradition, whereas the Dhsk quotation has to be set apart as a Mūlasarvāstivādin recension. In other places, however, with many quotations found in the Bhāṣya and its commentary as handed down to us, it is often extremely difficult to draw the dividing line between Sarvāstivādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin recensions.

Pp. 20. 34-35, 41: 57, footnote 214; 59, footnote 217: śāla-vrataparāmarṣa, "Sich-Anklammern an [falsche] Sittengebote und Observanzen" (clinging to [wrong] moral precepts and observances). By adding "wrong" in brackets, Dietz interprets the explanation of this term in Dhsk in the light of the definition at Dhammasaṅgaṇī 1003 (the same is given in the Vibhaṅga) with reference to the wrong (kuṭumbago, mūcchāpato) moral precepts and observances of non-Buddhist practitioners (bahiddhā samanabhāmānām). Any worldling, however, whether a professing Buddhist or not, who practises meditation correctly according to the relevant discourses found in the Tripiṭaka, will have to be freed from the three "fetters", one of them being śāla-vrataparāmarṣa, in order to realize "entrance into the stream" (sotapattipati). At Sāmghavīdānā (Vibhaṅga-Āthkathā) 182, reference is made (pathaṇam desitaṃ) to the "outer meaning" (lit. olāriṣa) of śāla-bhavatapāḍaṃ. Then the "inner meaning" (ante) is stated: sukhumatā ante attāvädpāṇaṃ ti atyaṃ atesaṃ desanākkama; and a few lines above, it says: attagānapubbhāgamo sasattucchedābhinivuso / tato "sasato

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| 75 n.323,1.3 | prayo-| keine Sanskrit- | prayo- |
| 81   | 8    | prayo-| keine Sanskrit- |
| 83 n.379,1.1 | keine Pali- oder Sanskrit- | keine Sanskrit- |
|       |      | add: Vgl. die Pali-Parallele | add: Vgl. die Pali-Parallele |
|       |      | in Sn 937: | in Sn 937: |
| 85   | 14   | śamayati| Saṃayat
| 87   | 3    | āju | Śju keśvā |
| 91   | 12   | add: (Parallele im Suttani- pāsa) | add: (Parallele im Suttani- pāsa) |
| 95   | b18  | āju | Śju |

Fatone's book expounds Madhyamaka arguments in some detail, usually through expansion of the relevant sections in the Madhyamakārīkā and Vīgrahaśvāravatānī. He treats Madhyamaka sympathetically, in a flowing style which sometimes makes it difficult to tell whether it is Nāgārjuna, some other Madhyamaka or Buddhist scholar, or sometimes one of Nāgārjuna's opponents who is arguing. He frequently fails to give adequate textual references for his assertions, and where he does the reader is not helped by the fact that numbers do not always tally with footnotes! Fatone places the Madhyamaka squarely in the context of Abhidharma philosophy, and occasionally makes references to Hindu and Western systems (particularly interesting in the latter context is the parallel argument against atoms in Buddhism and in Pascal (p.160)). Notwithstanding his limited sources, dated from our contemporary perspective, the author has clearly read widely among those sources, contemplated and generally, I think, understood them reasonably well (in spite of his modest claim that 'we do not pretend to have always interpreted the thought with accuracy' (p.1). He sees the Madhyamaka as having extended the application of the Buddha's original unanswerable points (āvākṛta-vacūṇā) to all judgements (p.21), 'Instead of building a system he (Nāgārjuna) opted for an attitude, the suspension of judgement' (p.144; italics in the original). Nāgārjuna's 'absence of inherent existence (nīsāvabhāvātā) is taken by Fatone as equalling ultimately nonexistence, that is, really nonexistence. Conventional
truth (pratitya samutpada) is given as 'superficial truth' a position of 'as if' - one proceeds as if the Four Noble Truths and Dependent Origination were true.

Much of this is debatable, and could be debated from within the Buddhist tradition itself. Tsong kha pa, for example, would criticise Fatone for failing to clarify what exactly is being refused, and stress what does exist, the way things do exist. Existing conventionally is not pretending to exist, but existing in a particular way, the only way things can exist, existing without inherent existence. Central to Tsong kha pa's Madhyamaka, and noticeable in its omission from Fatone's, is an extensive discussion of the two sargsa, the meaning of ultimate and conventional truth. Moreover, like so many earlier Western scholars of Madhyamaka, in stressing that Nāgārjuna 'opted for an attitude, the suspension of judgement' Fatone trivialises the context of Nāgārjuna's philosophising both in terms of the bodhisattva path and actual monastic and meditative religious practice. There is no mention or clue how this philosophy might operate as a system of spiritual praxis. Here in particular, I think, much progress has been made in the last forty years.

The dust-jacket tells us that 'until Fatone wrote this book it was thought that Nāgārjuna was a nihilist... (but)... he (Nāgārjuna) believes in the existence of one single substance which is the world sub specie aeternitatis'. Now, this is all quite absurd! Fatone certainly opposes the 'nihilist' interpretation of Nāgārjuna, but he is fully aware that he was not the first to do so. The notion of 'one single substance' is also emphatically opposed by Fatone (p.144). Unfortunately, he is a victim of misprints. In his Prologue he states that 'we do agree with the interpretation... that nothing exists except 'one single substance' ...' (pp.1-7). But it is clear from the rest of the book that this is not what Fatone holds, and therefore the text should presumably read 'we do not agree...'. Whoever wrote the dust-jacket had only read the Prologue (or perhaps he was distracted by a visitation). The jacket also says that Fatone died in 1962, in spite of the fact that the Prologue to the Second Edition is dated 1968!). On p.19 too, we are told that an Arhat 'shall be born again in any of the worlds'. Again, on p.95, 'the nega-
tion of his thesis does make any sense'. Presumably a judicious 'not' should be added in both cases. Sometimes it is unclear whether we have misprints, unskilled translation from the Spanish, or mistakes by Fatone himself. Thus:

p.16 - in the first jūna 'objects do not cause voluntary phenomena' - 'volitional' better?
p.43 - Madhyamakakārikā 4.1 - 'Nothing is born by itself' - should read 'from itself'.
p.95 - 'Thus begins the criticism of the antagonist...' This is ambiguous in English. it should read 'by the antagonist'.
p.117 - 'There is no negation possible of that which does not absolutely exist' - read 'of that which absolutely does not exist'.

It is unclear to me whether Fatone reads Sanskrit or not. He almost invariably offers well-known translations. However, there is at least one apparent exception. On p.161, he offers a translation from Candrakirti's Prasannapada on 15:2 which differs from the translation by Schayer to which he had access. The reference is to Louis de La Vallée Poussin's Sanskrit edition. Unfortunately it is mistranslated, and it too appears to be meaning a 'not' ('which does not exist after having not existed').

It is the job of a reviewer to be critical, and this book has some definite faults (in part those of Fatone's sources and publishers). In spite of these limitations, however, I rather liked the book. Our author shows enthusiasm for his subject, and by and large refrains from superimposing on the Madhyamaka his own preconceived ideas of what it is all about. He tries as far as possible to expound the texts and let them speak for themselves. It is good that Fatone places the material in its philosophical (although unfortunately not in its religious and anthropological) context. The book certainly says nothing very new, although it may have been worth saying at the time and in the context in which Fatone wrote it. As it is, with mindfulness of its limitations, this is nevertheless still a useful introduction to Madhyamaka philosophy.

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In the Buddhist literature the lekha 'letter' is a literary genre which seems to have been popular since Nagärjuna in the second century a.C. The Tibetan Tanjur contains thirteen letters, nine of which are edited and translated by Dr Dietz. She has omitted Nagärjuna's Subhilekha, Candragomin's Śīlayalekha and Maitreya's Muhārjakānakelekhā, which have already been edited and translated. Dietz intends to publish the text and translation of Padma-vajra's Prajñalekha in a future publication.

The letters in this volume contain doctrinal, moral and political teaching. Most of them are addressed to lay followers and are mainly concerned with instructing them in correct moral behaviour. Two of the letters in this volume were probably written in Tibetan: Buddhaguhya's and Śīghosha's letters to the Lord of Tibet and his subjects. Buddhaguhya is a well-known Tantric scholar. He was invited to Tibet by King Khri arch lde btsan who reigned from 755 to 797. In his letter he gives some interesting information on the genealogy of the Tibetan king and the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet. The author of the second letter, Sha Dpal dbyan (Śīghosha), was one of the first seven Tibetans ordained in 779 by Sāntarakṣita in the monastery Bum yas. In his letter Sha Dpal dbyan addressed himself to the king in the second chapter, to the ministers in chapter 4.2 and to the ecclesiastics in chapter 4.3. Other chapters are addressed to all Tibetans. Among the authors of the other letters, we also find some well-known scholars such as Jitṣrī, who lived in the second half of the tenth century and the second half of the eleventh. His Āttaratanvīdadhavakramaśekha is addressed to a king who is not identified. His famous pupil Aśā, whose life and activities are well-known thanks to the studies published by Helmut Elmer in recent years, is the author of a letter entitled Vimalaratnakālekhā, addressed to King Kṣiraśūla, a Pāla king known in the Indian tradition under the name Nayapāla. Kamalaśīla, the author of the Madhyamakāloka, the Laṅkavyāpasākikā and other philosophical works, wrote the Dukkhaḥvīśeṇeśa-Deśa for a Tibetan called Lha na mo Tebaṅs p'ai dbyānas about whom nothing is known. Kamalaśīla came to Tibet at the invitation of King Khri arch lde btsan. Sajjana, the author of a letter to his son 'Putralekha', is known as a translator of Vijñānavāda texts and lived in the eleventh century. Mitrayogin, who rejoined for eighteen months in Tibet around the year 1200, addressed a letter, entitled Candrarājelekhā, to a King Candra, probably a king of Vārānasi. A letter addressed to a monk, Rāg gsal gön nu, is attributed to the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara. Another letter, the Gurulekha, is written by a monk, Dge legs pa po, who is perhaps identical with a Dge legs pa po from Kadmy who lived in the eleventh century.

In the first part of her work Dietz carefully examines the letters one by one and discusses the identity of the author of each, the addresser, its occasion and purpose, the nature of its contents, the date of writing, and the sources used by the author. In a special chapter she studies the characteristics of the lekha as a literary genre and also analyses the parikathās and airdeśas which are included in the same section of the Tanjur. The main part of her work contains the edition of the Tibetan text of the letters, on the basis of four Tanjur editions, and an annotated translation. The notes discuss difficult expressions and reproduce the sources quoted in the letters. Extremely useful are the detailed indices: an index of quotations, a list of German translations of Buddhist terms, lists of Sanskrit terms, Tibetan words, Indian names and Tibetan names. The bibliography occupies no less than twenty-three pages.

Dr Dietz's work is a major contribution to both Buddhist and Tibetan studies. She has taken great pains to identify the quotations and to determine the meaning of words and expressions. Most of the letters are written in verse and it is not always easy to translate Tibetan versions of Sanskrit verses in the absence of the original text. Even more difficult to translate are the letters written directly in Tibetan, because the Tibetan language of that period is not very well known. Further study of these letters will certainly lead to different interpretations in several places. It will also be necessary to try to trace the sources used by the authors which have not been identified by Dietz. For instance, in verses 4 and 5 of chapter 4 of the

Gurulekha, the author enumerates twenty-four synonymy of the impurities (klesā). These synonymies are listed in the same order in the Abhidharmakosācārya (ed. P. Predhan, Santiniketyan 1930, p. 44, 15-18). Predhan's text enumerates only twenty-three items but, as pointed out by Walpola Rahula in his translation, one must add yāsudā after paridā (Le compendium de la super doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmakosācārya) d'Asāṅga, Paris 1971, p. 71, note 3). Very similar to this list is the one found in the Yogsārabhāmi (ed. V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1957, pp. 166-7).

With the help of these two lists it is possible to correct the edition of the Tibetan text and the translation. The first verse of the letter by Avalokiteśvara contains several difficulties. Avalokiteśvara writes that the way which all marks have gone is "subtle, difficult to understand and beyond the domain of words". Dietz's interpretation of this line is different: 'dieser Weg ... nicht Reicht auf und schwer zu begreifender Worte ist'. The real difficulty is in the third line: phyogs tsam rgyang par phyogs brgya rgyal ba mthas brjod pa. Dietz sees in this line an allusion to the philosophy of Dignāga and translates: 'wenn man ihm die Kraft eines siegreichen [Buddha] erklärt, nachdem man ihm mittels des Bildens von Vorstellung nur einen Aspekt beigelegt hat'. Probably phyogs tsam renders Sanskrit dīśāprasā a mere indication. Phyogs brgya is a philosophical term for attributing reality to something which is not real. Here it must have a more general meaning, such as to imagine. The author says that he explains the way with the help of the Jina after having imagined having understood a mere indication of its real meaning. In Cittaratanvīśanakramalekha 4.3.3, it is said that one must successively practise compassion (sīhā rje), joy (dgya ba) and equanimity (bcas snyoms). These are the second, third and fourth of the four infinitudes (spraṃsāga). The first is kindness (byams pa) and the text explains that it is impossible for compassion to act if one has not first paid attention to kindness: byams pa yid ba na byas par ... sīhā rje ga la jug ste. This passage has been misunderstood by Dietz (cf. p. 177). Another passage which can be interpreted differently in Sāraññagarbhalekha 4.3.15, where the text says that one must listen to somebody who has meditated a little even if he is not learned (chos pa mthun pa; Sanskrit bahūsrutra). Dietz ren-

ders then pa mthun pa with 'wenn das Gehörte nicht viel ist'.

These few remarks show that it is possible to arrive here and there at different interpretations, but they are not in the least meant to diminish the merit of Dr Dietz's achievement, for which one can have nothing but praise.

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To open a book on Dignāga's system of logic and find at full of tables of figures and other symbols is an intimidating experience if you are not familiar with the techniques of twentieth-century symbolic logic. However, if you are ready for this sort of treatment you will find the book a treasure both of symbolic logic and of Buddhist thought. In a way it is as if the author wanted to produce a study of the principal systems of modern symbolic logic, comparing them, relating them to each other and even developing them to further lengths of subtlety, using Dignāga as material on which to produce their application. A very good and striking example of his methods is the list of sixteen Venn diagrams on p. 58 illustrating the sixteen possible relations between two classes - inclusion, exclusion, overlap combined with the possibilities of being empty or not empty - classes filling between them or not filling between them the whole field of enquiry. Reference is even made to two empty classes in an empty field of enquiry, perhaps in one sense incubi and familiars as classes of evil spirits. The number sixteen is arrived at by pure mathematical necessity once the Venn diagram is accepted as a good symbol for two related classes. The author then goes on to show how many of these relations are found in Dignāga's and other systems of formal logic and how far they are properly distinguished. The mathematically minded will appreciate the beauty of his devices and the clarity of his tables.
One principle of Indian logic, very strange to European thought but very revealing of the weakness of all formal logic, and quite inexpressible in symbolic systems, is that an argument valid in one context can be invalid in another, because if the premises are not accepted by both parties the argument fails though it may be cogent enough in itself. I would go even further myself and wonder whether any word or phrase expressive of a concept expresses the same concept twice. Mathematical symbols are free from this stumbling block. You do not find people arguing fiercely as to what are the factors of 210, because the word 'factor' and the symbol '210' always mean the same. But try to express in symbolic logic the arguments that lead a Jew to become a Zionist and then see how convincing they are to a Palestinian Muslim Arab!

Dignāga's Hetucakra or Wheel of Reason, which is what this book is about, would seem to be absurdly short for an exposition of a whole system of formal logic, occupying little more than one page. Even Wittgenstein's Tractatus in longer than that and no one has attempted such an economical exposition of a philosophical statement in modern times. Presumably it was meant as a mnemonic like the medieval 'Barbara, Celarent,' etc., summary of Aristotle's system, which would be pretty mysterious if you did not know that A, E, I, O stood for four different types of propositions, and the order of those vowels, chosen for their rhythm, not their dictionary meaning, stood for different types of syllogisms, each with its major premise, minor premise and conclusion in that order. 'All men are mortal, we are men, we are mortal' for instance. Dignāga's order is different. He starts with the conclusion or fact to be proved, then comes the minor premise and the major premise is left to the end for a five stage test. It is after all the major premise we are principally relying on. It goes something like this: Sound is impermanent because it is produced, but are all impermanent things produced? Things like pots are produced and are impermanent, while things like space, which is not produced, are not permanent, so we are on the right track - impermanence is found in produced things, but not in unproduced ones - so the argument is valid and we can use the words Pots, Space as the name of this kind of argument. Using as far as possible the same concepts he finds nine different types of argument, and gives them their conventional names. Only two of them come out as valid. Dr Chi then has to show that both systems and all other systems follow the same pattern, namely 'A has a certain relation to B and B has a certain relation to C, allowing A to have a certain relation to C', and he has to show what relations are possible and which sets of three give a valid argument, and how many of these possible sets are covered by Aristotle and how many by Dignāga. This he does brilliantly and exhaustively.

Even without a prior familiarity with symbolic systems of logic, as each symbol is explained as it occurs, it is quite possible to follow the arguments. Indeed the book, comparing as it does different systems, could be used simply as a text-book of symbolic logic, reducing the examples from Buddhist logicians to a subordinate role.

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These fragments from Dignāga, being quotations from his Pramāṇa-samuccaya in the original Sanskrit, by V. M. Naïra, are invaluable clues to Dignāga's exact thought, as the work is otherwise only available to the modern scholar in Chinese and Tibetan translations. They are used in this book to elucidate his position in Buddhist philosophy in relation to other nearly contemporary writers, both with regard to his date and to the development of his thought, questions by no means yet satisfactorily answered. What Randle does is to take each quotation, first in the original Sanskrit and then in his English version, followed by an examination of its meaning and importance in finding answers to these questions. Appendix I then analyses further the evidence thus garnered. Appendix II sketches briefly, for the better understanding of his book, Buddhist logical doctrines under the headings: Perception, Inference, Fallacies, Inference for Another and Validity.

Although in fact this was first published as a monograph by the Royal Asiatic Society (London 1926) and formed part of

Alban Cooko


Existing studies of Buddhist ethics are by and large confined to the Theravada system and have suffered from a lack of perspective in terms of the pattern of development within the tradition as a whole. This defect is mitigated to some extent in the present volume. The work must be commended for broadening out the study of Buddhist ethics to include chapters on the psychological analysis of ethical data in the Abhidharma (Ch.1) and the moral values of the Mahayana Bodhisattva (Ch.5). A final chapter (Ch.6) explores the transcendence of ethical values in the Tantric systems. The author defines his objective as follows:

'The present work seeks to study Buddhist ethics as a developmental process not only in terms of inner dynamics inherent in its doctrinal and ethical formulations but also in terms of its response to various historical compulsions and the ensuing willingness on the part of its followers to introduce into its general framework new values of forms and expressions' (p.1ix).

Yet although Misra locates his subject matter in an expanded philosophical and historical context, he provides little in the way of a novel theoretical interpretation of the data. Much of the material which is presented is not original and it receives no new treatment from the author. The discussion of the Abhidharma in Chapter 3 admittedly 'makes evident the close relationship between psychology and ethics as it was conceived in Buddhism' (p.69), but fails to integrate its conclusions into a coherent theoretical scheme. And Chapter 6, while recognizing the new ethical dimension introduced by the Mahayana, avoids discussion of the problematical ethical implications of its possibilities.

In a brief attempt at theoretical classification Misra contrasts Intuitionism with Ideal Utilitarianism and identifies Buddhism with the former:

'It would be well to make here a brief comparison between two diametrically opposed systems of ethical thought, viz., Intuitionism and Ideal Utilitarianism, and then to see the Buddhist position in this regard. The former is identified with the Kantian system of ethics. [...] Buddha would obviously belong to the intuitionist school of ethical thought' (p.43).

Misra is correct here in recognizing the proximity of Buddhist to Kantian principles rather than to utilitarian ones. Unfortunately, he does not develop this point further, and his general stance on the instrumental role of ethics seems at variance with the above conclusion. In fact, the following comments, made only a few pages later, seem to suggest the reverse position, i.e. that Buddhist ethics is utilitarian and not intuitionist:

'The perfect man is uncontaminated not only by evil or vice but also by good or virtue. Perfection knows no dualism. It is a disposition of mind in which good and evil both become equally undesirable [...] In the Buddhist texts this transcendence of dhamma in the final stage finds enunciation by way of the parable of Raft' [sic] (p.46f).

A number of problems are touched upon but left unresolved. On the relationship between ethics and the samma bonma, the author follows what might be termed the 'transcendency thesis':

'The Dharma of Buddha was practical and dynamic, it was was [sic] also mystical. True to its mystical form, it presented an intermixture of religion and ethics as an inseparable pair, the latter being not an end in itself but a means leading to a higher stage which was a state of complete transcendence' (p.30, my emphasis).

Yet Misra seems in some confusion about this since only two pages earlier he differs from the above view and misquotes Anebacki with approval on the non-instrumental relationship between morality and wisdom:

'Conduct and intuition are inseparably united; they form an essential pair, each performing its specific part with the help of the other. "Morality", remarks Anebacki, "is [sic. not] merely a means to perfection [...] it is an integral part of the perfection..."' (p.28).
Overall, the book must be commended for its scope and for rising occasionally to the discussion of theoretical issues and problems. In the end, however, too many problematic issues are avoided or go unrecognized and the opportunity to elaborate a structural model of the tradition is missed.

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Ananda W.P. Guruge 'Some Problems in Buddhist Ethics' (repr. in his The Miracle of Instruction, Colombo 1982).


Nobody will doubt that there are many similarities between Jainism and Buddhism and that there are very few comparative studies of the two religions and hence, perhaps, the justification for a second edition of an older book in an unchanged form. In fact there are not that many publications on Jainism as such, which contrasts sharply with the abundance of literature on Buddhism, both popular and academic. Probably the best comprehensive and scholarly book on Jainism which is at the same time very readable even for laymen is Helmut von Glasenapp, Der Jainismus. Eine indische Erleuchtungsreligion (Georg Olms Verlagscumhandlung, Hildesheim 1964, a reprint of the original 1923 edition). I am not aware of any comparable book in English, but the entry under 'Jainism' in Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (from the pen of H. Jacob) can still be regarded as highly informative, competent and preferable to most if not all passages on Jainism in books on world religions published since.

The book does not disclose much information about its author, but it is obvious that he was involved in the Jain movement. His name at the end of the Introduction has the designation Jain attached to it and the tenor of the book testifies to his allegiance. He seems to have been based in Surat, India.

He starts his book on a subjective note. In the Introduction he says that having read some Buddhist works in Pali, some in English translation and some secondary English literature on Buddhism, he noticed that early Buddhism resembled Jainism in many respects, and so he went to the Vidyalankara College in Kelaniya, Ceylon, in May 1931 and spent a month there learning about Pali Buddhism. He then visited some other Buddhist localities to study Buddhist ways and customs. The result was his decision to write the present book, in which he would show the similarities between the two religions, mainly by quoting relevant passages from their religious literature.

Right from the beginning, we are left in no doubt that the author regards the early Buddhist teachings as derivative and based on the older Jain tradition. He points out that when Goutama left home he adopted the life of a naked ascetic like the Jain tīṣṇāvarṇās ("those who are clad in space") and when he later proclaimed the Middle Way he changed to wearing clothes, although he did not change the philosophy, anticipating thereby the later schism in the Jain community concerning the attire of renunciation (even before Mahāvira himself started preaching), which led to the adoption of white robes by tīṣṇāvarṇās.

Acknowledging that the passages in the Pali Canon in which Mahāvira is referred to as Nigantha Nāraputta testify to a certain rivalry between Jains and Buddhists, at least at the time of its compilation in the first century B.C. (given wrongly as A.D. by the author) in Ceylon, he dismisses all unfavourable Buddhist descriptions of Jain views as proven wrong by proper consultation of relevant passages in Jain literature. He further quotes some passages from Pali sources, Western scholars and
authors of Jain persuasion to show that the Jain teaching was
even the best established in India even before the Buddha and Mahāvīra
started their respective missions, and that it also reached Cey-
lon before, or at the same time as Mahinda brought Buddhism there.
Jainism and early Buddhism are the same thing to him and he re-
vives the view of J.G.B. Forlong (Science of Comparative Reli-
gions, 1877) that the Buddha of some of the Tibetan, Mongol, and
Chinese sources, which date him to the eleventh centuries B.C., must have, in fact, been the predecessor of Mahāvīra, the
Jain saint Pārāvā.

Many more instances of literary, geographical, and archaeo-
litical evidence are quoted in support of the author’s thesis of the
identity of Jainism and early Buddhism. He calls the original
Jain-Buddhism.

The book consists of six chapters and the first one goes
straight to the heart of the matter, being concerned with “Nir-
vana, Moksha and Liberation”. The author interprets Nirvāṇa
as “extinction of the mundane condition” and Mokṣa as “libera-
tion from the same”, strongly refuting the interpretation of
the former as total annihilation and stressing its positive mean-
which, however, he is unable to define otherwise than “a
positive condition of the soul” which is, of course, indescri-
able. He does quote, though, many instances of indirect descrip-
tions of Nirvāṇa as blissful and full of knowledge. His equation
of the status of the Tathāgata or the Arhat monk with the
status of the inner self or the soul of those who have reached
their goal comes across clearly when he quotes from writings
of Jain saints who used Upanishadic terminology adapted to their
purposes. Here we find the same ambiguity about the meaning
of Aman as the inner universal self and as the individual liber-
ated self often translated as “soul” which became current in
later Hindu and modern Western literature on the subject, both
academic and popular.

The problem of soul or self apart, there is no doubt that
the wealth of quotations from the Pali Canon, commentaries, the
Vinodhage and even a few Mahāyāna sūtras, as well as from
writings on Buddhist both in the East and the West, compared
with numerous quotations from the Jain literature, demonstrate
that most terms used to explain what Nirvāṇa is about are shared
by both religions or philosophies and so is the word itself.

The tricky question of the “Existence of the Soul” is the
subject of the second chapter. The author admits that “the Bud-
hist literature does not contain an explicit description of
the soul”, but opines that “if it is minutely searched, it will
be found to contain enough to show that the Buddhist conception
of the nature of the soul is the same as described in the Jain
literature”. We search, however, in vain for the proof of this
statement anywhere in this chapter. The author’s conclusion
is purely and simply his interpretation of the Buddhist passages
in which constituents of human personality are described as not
mind and not self (anatā), or in which the Buddha maintains
the so-called “noble silence” about the nature of the Tathāgata
or the liberated one. The reasoning behind it is this: if
nothing that can be apprehended is self, i.e. if anything that
can be apprehended is not self, then the self is thereby being
described by implication as a conscious substance, a pure self
or soul which remains when the non-self constituents of the
person have been destroyed or abandoned. The only difference is
that the Buddhist literature simply does not take up subtle ques-
tions of metaphysics and deals mostly with matters easily un-
derstood by ordinary people, so that they may try to tread the path
and eventually reach the same goal as can also be had through
subtle metaphysics. Gradually even they in due course obtain
that subtle understanding.

These are bold views, indeed. But we are treated to more:
The traditional Jain view of the Buddha’s teaching on soul, ac-
cording to the author, is that the soul has the attribute of both
permanent existence and changeability, “From the point of view
of its nature, the soul is indestructible, while at the same
time from its liability to change it is destructible. This is
ture of every existing substance in the universe”. This is also
exactly what the author presents as the Jain teaching on soul.
The approach to the problem in Jain literature uses two stand-
points, “the real and the practical”. From the real standpoint,
the soul is free from karmic bondage and anything else. It is
pure and its nature is that of Nirvāṇa. It is immaterial, unre-
ated and eternal. It has perception and is always conscious and full of knowledge. It is perfect, one and the home of bliss.

According to the practical point of view, the soul, its impure and incomplete conditions are caused by karmic bondage and contact with the body and other objects. "All this description of the soul from the practical standpoint does almost agree with that of the five ekaddhas of the Buddhists," surmises the author (p.93). But it represents, of course, much more than that due to the explicit nature of Jain expositions.

The soul has, in the Jain view, nine characteristics: it (1) is living, (2) has conscious attentiveness, (3) is non-material and (4) is the doer of actions as well as (5) the enjoyer of the fruits of actions, (6) has the size of the body it occupies, (7) wanders in the world in four conditions of life: celestial, hellish, subhuman and human, (8) can become liberated and (9) has the natural tendency to go upward when liberated. At the end of the chapter, the author makes another truly bold statement when he proclaims that if Nirvana is not annihilation, but a positive condition of existence, it must be taken to be nothing else but the pure soul as described in Jainism. What can we say about this kind of reasoning? Perhaps simply that here we have just one of many examples, abundant in the book, which show how innocent the author is of the conceptual sophistication of Buddhist formulations.

The third chapter, entitled "The Path of Nirvana or Liberation", is the longest. Again using mainly quotations, it presents the Buddhist Eightfold Path, with elaborations on its individual parts so that a fairly comprehensive and, on the whole, tolerable picture of the bulk of Buddhist practice leading to the final goal is given. But then the author baffles us again by stating that the Jain Threefold Path is contained in the Eightfold Path and vice versa, and proceeds to present the Jain path in a way which shows a completely different stance from the Buddhist one. Thus, for example, the Jain idea of right view requires the acceptance of the belief in seven principles, among them soul (jiva) and non-soul (ajiva) which would be anathema to any Buddhist. The metaphysical teaching on karmic molecules and the bondage of the soul weighed down by karmic matter is another example of a doctrine hardly compatible with any Buddhist school's ideas.

This is not to say that there are not to be found numerous instances of agreement between the two systems of practical effort on the way to liberation from the round of rebirths, but the substantial doctrinal differences are nonchalantly glossed over by the author so as to render his comparisons virtually worthless. It does not appear at all profitable to go into more details here.

Chapter Five on "Karma and their Fruits" is yet another elaborate example of the fruitless approach, expanding on what was already anticipated on the subject in Chapter Four. The care with which the Buddhist sources avoid unnecessary speculations about the metaphysical nature of the karmic forces is viewed by the author as an absence of a clear, direct and detailed description which the Buddhist writers had in mind but only the Jain authors managed to spell out. A metaphysician, he maintains, can acquire this knowledge and so one should study the subject "cautiously and carefully".

The sixth chapter, on "Ahimsa", is perhaps the least controversial. The author again quotes numerous passages and concludes, quite generously, that Ahimsa has been correctly described in Buddhist texts. As to meat eating permitted to Buddhist monks provided they did not see, hear or suspect that an animal was killed on their account, he does not give much credence to the Pali sources in this respect because of their late codification in Ceylon. Instead he quotes extensively from the eighth chapter of the Lalitavistara Sutra, in his eyes written specifically in reply to those Pali passages which sanction meat eating, where this practice is prohibited as obstructive to liberation. It is, I think, generally known that the Jain attitude to killing and injury is much stricter than the Buddhist one even to the point of impracticability. The author, in fact, in his conviction that early Buddhist stances from pre-Mahavira Jainism detects all stricter Jain rules as implicit in Buddhist sources and advises the followers of the Buddha to adopt this strict avoidance of meat eating, since its practice cannot have been approved by the Buddha who was friendly to all creatures.
The last chapter, "Why Jainism and Buddhism are the Same", again draws attention to the period of severe asceticism in Gotama's life during which he went about without clothes like Jain Digambaras and followed various other rules known from the Jain ascetic code. When he proclaimed his Middle Way he, in fact, embraced the rules as applicable to the Jain brahmachari śrāvakas, i.e. practising Jain layman. But the author also acknowledges the practices of svetambaras as valid and allowing the highest achievement, and so the Buddhist monks' prospects are good, too. What a relief!

The practices of popular Jainism and Buddhism have also been found by the author to be very similar or identical, but above all both religions agree on important tenets of philosophy. Everyone is responsible for his own advancement; Samsāra or the universe is without an end or beginning and without a God creator; the experiences of beings are products of their own karma; the way to saintliness is through endurance and solitary meditation, and Nirvāna cannot be achieved if home life is not abandoned. So whoever wishes freedom from misery must follow the Eightfold Path of Buddhism or the Threefold Path of Jainism.

This is not a scholarly work and there are many deficiencies in it even from the point of view of popular literature. It is, however, a good reminder to us that the study of Jainism has been neglected for too long and that the question of the mutual relation between the two teachings deserves competent treatment.

In broad terms one can say that the two religions have much in common in their attitude to Vedism and Brahmanism, in their ethical outlook and practices, in their practical philosophy of life and its final desirable goal and also in the means to be adopted in the pursuit of that goal. However, they differ widely in doctrinal formulations and interpretations. Early Buddhism is much more sophisticated in its skillful avoidance of definite speculative assertions about the nature of both samsāric realities, if one may use that term, and the nītrvānic achievement. Followers are encouraged to use their judgment and, although they have to have a measure of confidence in the teaching in order to put it to practical test, faith in fixed tenets is never required nor proclaimed to be useful. The later development of Buddhist schools of thought has to be regarded as an example of impressive philosophical work in epistemology, logic and metaphysics of the highest standard, regardless of whether we value or deplore such activity.

Against this has to be put the attitude of early Jainism which somehow plunged headlong into positive assertions, often of a crude nature, about all elements of existence, both conditioned and absolute, and therefore requires from its followers acceptance through faith and many tenets on which they are unable to form any opinion of their own, let alone establish their possible validity on rational grounds. There is no equivalent of the Kāśīmā Sutta in the Jain Canon. There are, of course, also philosophical developments in later Jain thought, but these do not seem ever to have reached the stage of genuine creativity in the activity of philosophsing which would fire the imagination of followers, the general public or scholars at large. Syncretism and eclecticism seem to have been the prevalent tenor of Jain writings, and so Buddhism has stolen the show both in widespread international following and modern scholarly interest.

Still, these are not sufficient reasons for the neglect Jainism has so far suffered at the hands of academicians and for the rather low degree of knowledge about it that generally prevails even among people with genuine interest in comparative religion. This book will not do much to remedy the situation. So let us hope that somebody will take up the challenge and present us with an updated and competent study of this ancient tradition and teaching and its role in the development of Indian religious thought, as well as its contemporary place in the mosaic of world religions.

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