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9

i

DICTIONARY

OF

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

II.

DICTIONARY

• • o

OP

«> -rf

HILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

INCLUDING

MANY OP THE PRINCIPAL CONCEPTIONS OP ETHICS, LOQIC, AESTHETICS,

PHILOSOPHY OP RELIGION, MENTAL PATHOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY,

BIOLOGY, NEUROLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL

AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, PHILOLOGY, PHYSICAL

SCIENCE, AND EDUCATION

AND OIYINO

A TERMINOLOGY IN ENGLISH. FRENCH, GERMAN, AND ITALIAN

WRITTEN BY MANY HANDS AND EDITED BY

JAMES MARK BALDWIN

Ph.D. (Prdtoetoh), Hoh. D.So. (Ozoh.), Hon. LL.D. (Glaboow)

8TUABT PBOFE8SOB 19 PBIHCEIOH TTHITEBSmr

WITH THE CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL

BOARD OF CONSULTING EDITORS

IN THREE VOLUMES WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXTENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHIES

VOL. II

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

HonHon

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited

1902

:•• • •••• •.••: ; •:: : .7. . .

• • ••• ••••••*•*«•

Oxford

BOBACl HABT, FBIKTEB TO THE UVIVEB8ITT

^^^

^^. ..Q^

COLLABORATORS

Signatures. ^^^^OR:

(J. M. B.) Professor J. Mabk Baldwin, Princeton Uniyersity.

CONSULTING EDITORS:

ForXSngliBh.

(J. D.) Professor John Dewet, Chicago University.

(W. J.) Professor William Jakes, Harvard University.

(E. B. P.) Professor B. B. Poulton, Oxford University.

(A. S. P. P.) Professor Andrew Seth Peinole-Pattibon, Edinburgh University.

(H. S.) Professor H. Sidgwiok ^ Cambridge University.

(G. P. 8.) Dr. G. F. Stout, University Reader, Oxford.

For French.

(T. D.) Professor Yves Delaqe, Sorbonne (Faculty des Sciences), Paris.

(Th. P.) Professor Th. Floubnoy, Geneva University.

(P. J.) Professor Piebbe Janet, Collie de France.

(L. M.) L. MarilubbS Lecturer, Sorbonne (Hantes Etudes), Paris.

For Oerman.

iennaUniversil^ [tL G.) Professor E. Gboos, University of Giessen.

(S. E.) Professor S. Exneb, Vienna University. &G.) ~ " (H. M.) Professor Hugo Munstebbebo, Harvard University.

(Th. Z.) Professor Th. ZfEHEN, University of Utrecht

For Italian.

(£. M.) Professor E. Mobselli, Genoa University.

(G. Y.) Professor G. Villa, Liceo Tasso, Lecturer, University of Rome.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS:

For Iiogio and Payohology. (C. L. F.) Mrs. C. Ladd-Fbanklin, Baltimore.

For Bibliography. (H. C. W.) Professor H. C. Wabben, Princeton University.

EDITORS ASSISTANTS: For Biography. Professor G. A. Tawnbt, Beloit College.

For Philology. Professor W. M. Ubban, Ursinus College.

CONTRIBUTORS*:

Fhilooophy.

(A. C. A. Jr.) Professor A. C. Abmstbong, Jr., Wesleyan University.

(B. B.) Dr. B. BosANQUET, Oxshott, Surrey, England.

(J. D.) Professor John Dewey, Chicago University.

(H. N. G.) Professor H. Ni Gabdineb, Smith College.

(G. £. M.) G. E. MooBB, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

(A. S. P. P.) Professor Andbew Seth Pbinole-Pattison, Edinburgh University.

(J. R.) Professor Josiah Rotce, Harvard University.

(E. T. S.) Professor E. T. Shanahan, Catholic University, Washington.

(K. H. S.) R. H. Stetson, Harvard University.

liOgio.

(R. A.) Professor R. Ad axbon \ Glasffow University. (C. L. F.) Mrs. C. Ladd-Fbanklin, Baltimore. (C. S. P.) Dr. C. S. Peibcb, Milford, Pike Co., Pennsylvania.

Bthlcfl. (J. S.) Professor James Seth, Edinburi^h University. (W. B. S.) Professor W. R. Sobley, Cambridge University.

* The names of oontribxiton are given in this list under one subject only,, although in many cases they have written in other subjects as well.

86S657

vi CONTRIBUTORS

F^yohology.

(J. McE. C.) Professor J. McE. Gattell, Columbia UnivexBity.

(E. C. S.) Professor E. C. Sahford, Clark University.

(E. M. S.) Mrs. H. Sidowick, Principal, Newnham College, Cambridge.

(G. F. S.) Dr. G. F. Stout, University Reader, Oxford.

(E. B. T.) Professor E. B. Titchekeb, Cornell University.

(H. C. W.) Professor H. C. Wabben, Princeton University.

(J. M.B.) TheFiditor.

FhUology.

(B. I. W.) President B. I. Wheeleb, University of California.

Fhysioal Soienoe and Hathematiofl.

(J. S. A.) Professor J. S. Ames, Johns Hopkins University.

(E. W. D. ) Professor Elleby W. Davis, University of Nebraska.

(H. B. F.) Professor H. B. Fiite, Princeton University.

(S. N.) Professor Simok Newcomb, Washington.

Mental Pathology and Anthropology.

(J. J.) Professor J. Jastbow, Wisconsin University. (A. M.) Dr. Adolf Meteb, Worcester, Mass., Insane Asylum.

Biology.

(C. B. D.) Professor C. B. Davbnpobt, Chicago University.

(E. S. G.) E. S. GooDBiCH, Lecturer, Oxford University.

(C. S. M.^ Professor C. S. Minot, Harvard University.

(C. Ll. M.) Principal C. Lloyd MoBgan, University College, Bristol.

(E. B. P.) Professor E. B. Poxtlton, Oxford University.

(W. F. R. W.) Professor W. F. R. Weldon, Oxford University.

EoonomioB. (A. T. H.) President A. T. Hadlet, Yale University.

Folitloal and Booial Philosophy. (J. B.) Dr. James Bonab, Civil Service Commission, London.

[F. H. G.) Professor F. H. Giddikos, Columbia University. /(F. C. M.) F. C. Montague, Oriel College, Oxford. - (W. D. M.) Dr. W. D. Mobbison, London.

Iiaw.

(S. E. B.) Judge S. £. Baldwin, Connecticut Supreme Court of Appeals ; Professor,

Yale University.

Philosophy of Religion.

(E. G. B.) £. G. Bbowne, Lecturer, Cambridge University.

(J. E. C.) Rev. J. EsTLiN Cabpenteb, Manchester College, Oxford.

(A. T. 0.) Professor A. T. Obhond, Princeton University.

(R. M. W.) Professor R. M. Wenley, Michigan University.

Education.

(C. De G.) Professor C. De Gabxo, Cornell University.

""" Aesthetics.

^J. R. A.) Professor James K Angell, Chicago University. (J. H. T.) Professor J. H. Tupts, Chicago University.

Neurology and Physiology.

f-a u^ii President C. L. Hebbick, University of New Mexico. ^ • '' } Professor C. J. Hebbick, Deiiison University. (C. P. H.) Professor C. F. Hodob, Clark University.

Bipliography. (B. R.) Dr. Bbnj. Rand, Harvard ^University.

ADDITIONAL COSTRIBUTORS TO VOL, II.

(L. C.) Professor Louis Cout^bat, University of Toulouse. (V. W.) Lady ViCTOBiA WelbV, London. (T. F. W.) Dr. T. F. Wbioht, Boston.

' Joint authorship.

PREFATORY NOTE

With this volume the text of the Dictionary is completed. The Editor has nothing to add to the explanations given in the Preface to Vol. i; but it is his sad duty to record the death of two more of our collaborators. One of these, M. L^n Marillier of the Sorbonne, a member of the Board of Consulting Editors, gave time and labour generously to the determination of the French equivalents, and all those who use the Dictionary are indebted to him. His death is a severe blow, especially to the study of Comparative Religion, but also to that of Philosophy and Psychology. The other, Professor Adamson of Glasgow, con- tributed many ai-ticles on Logic, mainly to the first volume. His eminence in the department of Philosophy is well known to all readers of the work.

The Editor wishes to thank correspondents and reviewers for bringing to his notice various minor errors in Vol. i. The indulgent criticism so far made of the work encourages the editorial staff. Only on two points has the book been somewhat misjudged : we are not in any sense slighting Qreek and Latin philosophy, and the remarks in the General Preface do not mean to suggest that we are. As it happens, much of the historical matter on classical thought is in the present volume. And, again, we are not in any way claiming that the treatment of biography is more than the proverbial 'part of a loaf'; it was a question, indeed, of part of a loaf or no bread. The bibliographies of Vol. iii will supplement the biographical notices, of course, very essentially.

The Dictionary is indebted for special articles to the new contributors mentioned at the end of the list of Collaborators given in this volume ; and also to Professor Fabian Franklin of Baltimore, who gave his co-operation in the pre- paration of the article on 'Probability,' to which bis initials (F.F.) are attached. On the other hand, the connection of Dr. Tosti with the work ceased with the issue of the first volume.

The Editor finds himself also under very great obligations to those who prepared the exhaustive hidexes ; their names are given in connection with their respective lists.

THE EDITOR.

Pbikgetoh, June, 1902.

CONTENTS

VOLUME I:

LIST OF COLLABORATORS.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

ABBREVIATIONS :— I. Op Teems.

II. Of Titlei^ of Journals, ftc.

TEXT— A TO

VOLUME II:

PREFATORY NOTE.

TEXT— te TO Z.

ADDENDA: INDICES^ L Gbeek Terms. II. Latin Terms.

III. German Terms.

IV. French Terms. V. Italian Terms.

VOLUME III:
PREFATORY NOTE.
GENERATE BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
I.	General.
IL	Bibliography A. History op Philosophy.
III.	>»	B. Systematic Philosophy.
IV.	i»	C. Logic.
V.	»»	D. Aesthetics.
VI.	»»	E. Philosophy of Religion.
VIL	i»	F. Ethics.
vin.	f»	G. Psychology.

(See the detailed Table of Contents in Volume III.)

ABBREVIATIONS

1. ABBREVIATIONS OF TERMS OCCURRING IN TITLES OF JOURNALS AND OTHER

PUBLICATIONS

a.	»au8, an.
Abhandl.	«=Abhandlung.
Abstr.	B Abstract.
Abth.	i-Abtheilung.
Acad., Acoad., Akad.	B Academy, &c.
Addr.	^Addi'esses.
Adv.	-B Advancement.
Aesth.	i- Aesthetic, &c.
Ak.	sAkustik.
Alien.	a Alienist.
allg.	Ballgemein.
Amer.	a American.
Anat.	"Anatomy, Anatomical, &c.
angew.	aangewandt.
Ann.	a Annals, &c.
AnthropoL	a Anthropological, Anthro-
	pology, Ac.
Anthropom.	■1 Anthropometry.
Antiq.	K Antiquities.
AntoL	esAntologia.
AnTf.	i-Anzeiger.
Aphor.	sAphorismen.
Arb.	» Arbeiten. '
Arch., Ark.	= Archives, &c.
Archaeol.	« Archaeological, &c.
art	«s article.
Absoc.	i- Association.
Aufl.	-Auflage.
Augenh.	« Augenheilkunde.
AU8g.	-BAusgabe.
Beitr.	-Beitrftge.
Belg.	— Belgique, &c.
Ber.	-Bericht.
Berl.	B Berliner.
Bib.	-BibUcal.
Bibliog.	K Bibliography, Biblio-
	graphical, &e.
Biblioth.	-^Biblioth^ue.
Biog.	•-Biography, &c.
Biol.	s Biological, &c.
Bk.	-Book.
Bl.	-Bhitt.
Best.	a Boston.
Brit.	« British, Britannica.
Brox.	KBruxelles.
Bull., BoU.	a Bulletin, &c.
C. R.	BComptes Rendus.
Cal.	K California.
Canad.	e Canadian.
Cathol.	n Catholic, &c

Cent. Centralbl.	«= Century. ^Centralblatt
Chir., Cinxg. Chr^t., Christ. Cien.	^Chirurgical, &c. s Chrdtienne, Christian, &c. B^Ciencia.
Giro.	« Circulars.
Cinxg. Clin.	■sCirugia. » Clinical, &c.
Co., Comp. Comm.	» Company, a Commission.
Comm*r, Comm'rs.	■1 Commissioner, &c.
Commun.	a Communication, &c.
Compar. Cong. Contemp. Contrib.	B Comparative. B Congress. ^ Contemporary. » Contributions.
Corresp. Crim.	« Correspondenz. -« Criminal, &c.
CriminoL Crit.	«■ Criminology. » Critical.
Cyc	■1 Cyclopedia.
d. Descrip. deutsch.	«de, der, &c. « Descriptive, ssdeutscher, &c.
Devel. Diet. Dis.	e Development(al). » Dictionary, &c B Disease.
Diss.	» Dissertation.
Eccles.	» Ecclesiastical.
Econ. ed. Educ.	■■Economics, Economy, &c. a edited, edition, a Education, &c.
Electr.	s Electric, &c
Electro-biol. Encyc. Brit. Eng. trans. Enseignem. Entomol. Entwickelungsmech.	s Electro-biology, &c. « Encyclopaedia Britannica. B= English translation. s Enseignement. s Entomology, &c. ^Entwickelungsmechanik. « Etude.
Etk.	-Ethical, Ethics.
EthnoL	-Ethnology. » Examination*
Exper. Explan.	—Experimental, ftc. —Explanatory.
f.	-fttr.
Fasc.	—Fascicule.
Files., Filoz. Fortn.	— Filosofia, &c. -Fortnightly.

I. SMttfiyiATIONS OF TERMS

XI

Fortsch. Ft. ♦ Franf.

Gaz., Gae.

Geb.

Gen.

Geneeek.

G«oI.

G«r.

geriehtl.

Qesch. Geaell. Gior.

H.

Habil.

Handb.

HandwOrterb.

Heilk.,.lik.

H6p.

Hoap.

Hypnot.

I,l8t.

loon.

imman.

Inaug.

Inebr.

Inq.

Inaian.

Inst

Int

Interm^d.

Intermed.

Interpret.

Introd.

Ital.

J.

Jahrb.

Jahreaber.

Jahi^

Just

k., kgl.

Kantatud.

Uin.

krim.

KriminoL

krit, Krit

Lab.

Lane

Laryng.

Laiyngol.

Lecta.

LegisL

Lehrb.

Lfg.

Linn. Lit

Hag.

Med., M^ MeA-Chir. M6d.-PB7ehoI.y fte.

> Fortschritt. 'French. •Fran^ais. 'Freniatiia.

-Gazette, &c. -Gebiet

> General. iGeneeskunde. 'Geology, &c.

• German, tgerichtlich. ■gesammt. >Geschichte.

■ Geaellachaft. ■Giomale.

:Heft

- Habilitationsschrift •Handbook, Handbuch. ' HandwOrterbuch. sHeilkunde.

History, &c. »H6pitaL •Hospital. 'Hypnotism, &c.

:l8tituto.

'Iconoclast, Iconography, &c.

• immanent, &c.

■ InauguraL 'Inebriates, Inebriety. ■Inquiry.

: Insanity.

• Institute, Institution, &c.

• International. 'Interm^diaire. 'Intermediate.

> Interpretation.

• Introduction.

• Italian.

•Journal.

'Jahrbuch.

'Jahresbericht

'JTahi^gang.

'Justinian.

• kOniglich. 'Kantstudien.

- klinisch. ••kriminal. =Kriminologie. ekritisoh, Kritik, &c.

> Laboratory.

■ Lancisiana. 'Laryngoscope, Laryngo-

tomy, &c.

> Laryngology, -ist, &c.

- Lectures. Legislation.

> Lehrbuch. tLieferung.

• Linnaean.

• Literary, Literature.

' Magazine.

: Medicine, Medical, &c. 'Medico-Chirurgical, &c 'Medico-Psychological, &c.

M^m,

Mens.

Ment

Met., M^t.

Meth.

Microg.

Miorosc, mikr.

Mitth., Mitt

Mo.

Mod.

Monatsbl.

Monatsh.

Monatssch.

Monog.

Mor.

MoiphoL

MOnch.

Mus.

N. S. N.Y.- Nat. NatnL Natural. Naturf: Naturw. nederl. N4o-ScoL Nerv. Nervenh. Neurasth. Neurol., N^vroL Neurot. Nic No. Norm. Nouv. Nov.

Ocul. 0£fenb. Ohrenh. Ophthal., Ottal.

Org.

Orific.

Osp.

OsteoL

Otol.

Fftd.

Pathol., Patol.

Pedag.

Perc

Phar.

PhiloL

Philos.

Phys.

PhysioL

Pogg.

PolicL

Polit

Pop.

Pract.

prakt

Pref.

Pres.

Presb.

Princ

Proc.

■■M^moires. -BMensuel, -elle.

B Metaphysics, fte.

«= Method.

■■ Micrographic, &c.

B Microscopy, Microscopical,

mikroskopiscfa, &c. « Mittheilungen. a Monthly. B Modem, &c. ■iMonatsblatt ^Monatbheft « Monatsschrift ■■Monograph.

— Morals, aoral. ■> Morphology, &c. B Miinchener.

= Museum.

•

= New Series. ■■New York. ■■ NaturaL » National. ■■Naturalist, &c. ■■ Naturforscher. «• Naturwissenschaft. f^ nederlandsch. ■^ N^-Scolastique. iB Nervous, &c. B Nervenheilkunde. » Neurasthenia, &c. ■■ Neurology, &c. ■■Neurotomy, &c. B Nicomachean. tm Number. ■■ Normal. ■sNouveau, &c. s Novum.

aOouliste, &c. aOffenbarung. ■s Ohrenheilkunde. « Ophthalmology, Ophthal- mic, kc, a Organum. -Orifical. a-Ospedale. s Osteology, &c. « Otology, &c.

«^ Pftdagogik» ko, >« Pathology, &c.

— Pedagogy, &c. B Perception.

B Pharyngologie. ■> Philology, &c.

— Philosophy, &c. ■B Physical.

•s Physiology, &c » Poggendorft ■■Policlinic, &c. ■'•Political. m Popular, as Practical. »praktisch. B Preface, -s Presidential. ■■ Presbyterian. B Principles. ■■Proceedings.

zu

I. ABBREVIATIONS OF TERMS

Prog.

Psych.

Psychiat.

Psychol. y Psicol., &c.

Pt

PabL, pubL

Quart. Quest. Quind.

R.

Bdschau.

Rec.

Ref.

Rendic

Rep.

Rep'r.

Res.

Rev.

rev.

Rhinol.

Riv.

Roy.

8.

Samml.

Schol.

Sci.

Sclent.

Sciol.

Sem.

Semej.

Sent.

Sitzber.

Skand.

Smithson.

Soc.

Sooiol.

Span.

Specul.

spek.

Sperim.

Staatswiss.

Stat.

SUtist.

Stud.

> Program, Programmab-

handlung.

■ Psychio, Psychical. Psychiatry, fto. Psychology, &c. Part

' Publications, publishedby.

•Quarterly.

Questionnaire, Questions. 'Quindlcinale.

^Reale (ItaL).

> Rundschau.

'■ Record, Reoueil. -Reference, Reformed.

■ RendicontL Report.

( Reporter. ■Research. ■- Review, &c. ■revised.

■ Rhlnology. ' Rivista.

> Royal.

■ Series. :Sammlung. 'Scholastic.

: Science.

• Scientific

< Sciolism, Sciolistic.

> Seminary, Seminar. ' Semejotica. Sentiments.

' Sitzungsbericht.

> Skandinavian. 'Smithsonian.

Society, Social. 'Sociology. ^Spanish. 'Speculative. . spekulativ.

t Sperimentale (Italian), i Staatswissensohaft. : Station. 'Statistics, &o. Studies, Studien.

SuppL	■-Supplement, kc
Surg.	» Surgery, Surgical.
Syst.	■-System.
System.	• Systematic, systematisch,
	&c.
Theol.	B Theology, &o.
Therap.	■-Therapeutic, ftc
Thom.	■sThomiste.
Tiid.	^Tijdskrift
trad.	straduit.
Trans.	B Transactions.
trans. (Eng. &0.)	a translation (English, ftc).
Trav.	sTravauz.
Ti^at.	» Treatise.
Trib.	» Tribune.
Trimest	-Trimestriel.
ft.	■rftber.
u.	e=und.
Uebers.	B Ueberstttzt
Univ.	s University.
Univl.	■- Universal.
Untersnch.	s Untersuchungen.
V.	=von.
Ver.	eVerein.
verb.	» verbesserter.
Verb.	sVerhandlung.
verm.	svermehrte.
Vocab.	» Vocabulary.
vol.	« volume.
Vortr.	KVortrSge.
Vorw.	eaVorwort.
Vtljsch.	» Vierteljahrssohiift.
Wien.	-B Wiener.
Wise	» Wisconsin.
Wiss., wifls.	aWissenschaffc, wissen-
	schaftlich.
Wochensoh.	B Wochenschrift.
WOrterb.	s-WOrterbuch.
z.	Bzur, zum.
ZooU	>= Zoology, &0.
Zeit.	—Zeitung.
Zeitoch.	^Zeitschrift.

n. ABBKEVIATIONS OF TITLES OF JOURNALS

AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

AbhandL d. k. Bftdis. Gesell. d. Wise.

AbhandL d. physioL Oesell. zu Berlin

AbhandL z. Philos.

Acmd. R. M^-Chir. d. France

Addr. and Pk>c. Natnl. Educ. Aasoo.

Alien, and Neurol.

AUg. Pftd.

Allg. Wien. med. Zeit.

AUg. Zeitsch. 1 Psyehiat.

Amer. Anthropol.

Amer. JT. Med. Soi.

Amer. J. of Inaan.

Amer. J. of Ophihal.

Amer. J. of Phyidol.

Amer. J. of Psychol

Amer. J. of Sci.

Amer. JT. of Sociol.

Amer. Med.-Suiig. Bull.

Amer. Natural.

Amer. Phys. Educ Bev.

Amer. Presb. Rev.

Anat. Anz.

Anat. Hefte

Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit and Soc. ScL '

Ann. Clin, de Bordeaux

Ann. d. Mai. de I'Oreille

Ann. d'OcuL

Ann. d. Phyalk u.Chemie (or Wiedemann's Ann.)

Ann. d. Sci. Nat.

Ann. d. Sci. Psych.

Ann. de Microg.

Ann. de Philos. Chr^t.

Ann. de Psyehiat.

Ann. di Freniat.

Ann. di NeuroL

Ann. di Otol.

Ann. di Ottal.

Ann. of OtoL, Rhinol., and LaryngoL

Ann. M^.-p8ychoL

Ann. Soc. Boy. d. ScL M^d. et Nat. de Broz.

Ann^ BioL

Ann^ PhilooL

Ann^ Psychol.

Annto SocioL

Annual Encyc.

Anomalo

AnthropoL

Antiq. Bom. Syntagma

Arch. Clin, de Bordeaux

Arch. d'Anat. Microsc.

Arch, d* AnthropoL Crim.

Areh. de NeuroL

Arch. d'Ophthal.

Arch, de Physiol.

Arch, di Psichiat.

Arch. f. Anat u. Entwickelungagesoh.

Arch. f. Anat. u. Physiol. — Physiol. Abth.

Arch. f. Anat. u. PhysioL— Anat. Abth.

Arch. f. Augenh.

Arch. f. d. ges. PhysioL (or PflOger's Arch.)

Arch. f. Entwickelungsmech.

Arch. f. exper. Pathol.

Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.

Areh. f. krim. AnthropoL

Arch. f. LaryngoL u. Rhinol.

Arch. f. mikr. Anat.

Arch. f. Ohrenh.

Arch. f. OphthaL (or ▼. Graefe's Arch.)

Arch. f. pathol. Anat. (or Virchow's Arch.)

Arch. f. Psyehiat.

Arch. f. Religionswiss.

Arch, f . syst. Philos.

Arch. Int. de LaryngoL et d'Otol.

Arch. Ital. d. BioL

Arch. Ital. di LaringoL

Arch, of NeuroL and Psychopathol.

Arch, of Ophthal.

Arch, of OtoL

Arena

Atlantic Mo.

Atti R. Accad. d. Linoei

Atti Soc. Rom. di AntropoL

Beitr. z. Ak. u. Musikwiss.

Beitr. z. Augenh. (Deutschmann's)

Beitr. z. exper. PSychol.

Beitr. z. pathol. Anat.

Beitr. z. Psychol, u. Philos.

Ber. d. k. sftchs. Gesell. d. Wiss.

Ber. d. Senckenberg. Naturfl -Gesell.

BerL klin. Wochensch.

Bern. Stud. z. Philos.

Bibliog. Anat.

Biol. CentralbL

BioL Lectures

Biol. Untersuch. (Retzius's)

Blackwood*8 Mag.

Boll. d. Soc. di Natural, in Napoli

BolL d. Polidin. Gen. di Torino

Boll. d. Soc. Lane d. Osp. di Roma

Boll. d. Soc. Med.-Chir. di Pavia

Boston Med. and Surg. J.

Brain

Brit. Med. J.

Brit. Quart. Rev.

BulL Acad, de M^.

XIV

II. ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES

Bull. Amer. Acad. Med.

BalL Johns Hopkins Hosp.

Bull. M6d.

BulL Mus. Compar. Zool. Harvard Coll.

BulL Soc. d*Anthropol. d. Paris

Bull. Soo. d. M^d. Ment. d. Belg.

Bull. Soc. Franco-Belg.*

Bull. Soc. Roy. d. Sci. M^. et Nat. d. Brox.

Bull. Soc ZooL d. France

BulL Univ. of Wise

Gathol. Univ. BulL Cellule

Centralbl. f. allg. Pathol, a. pathol. Anat. CentralbL f. Anthr^>oL Centralbl. f. med. Wiss. Centralbl. f. Nervenh. u. Psychiat. Centralbl. f. Physiol. CentralbL f. prakt. Augenh. Century Mag. ChUd-Study Mo. Cleveland Med. Gaz. Columbia Univ. BulL Columbia Univ. Contrib. to Philos. Commun. all* Accad. Med.-Chir. di Napoli Compar. Embryol. Contemp. Rev.

• Corresp.-BL d. deutsch. anthrqpoL Gesell. Course in Exper. Psychol. C. K Acad. d. Sci. C. B. Acad. d. ScL Mor. et Pol. G. R. Soc. de Biol.

Deutsch. Arch. f. klin. Med. Deutsch. med. Wochensch. Deutsch. med. Zeit. Deutsch. Rdschau. Deutsch. Rev.

Deutsch. Zeitsoh. f. Nervenh. Diet de PhysioL

Edinburgh Med. J.

Education

Educ. Rev.

Encyc. Brit.

Et. publ. p. Pdres Comp. d. J^sus

Eth. Nic

Eth. of Nat

Field Columbian Museum — Anthropol. Ser.

Folk-Lore

Fortn. Rev.

Fortsch. d. Med.

Forum

Friedreich's Bl. f. gerichtL Med*

Gac. Med.

Gen. Corresp.

Gen. Meth.

Gen. Morphol.

Gesch. d. Aesthetik

Gesch. d. christl. Eth.

Gesch. d. Philos.

Gior. di PatoL Nerv. e Ment.

Glasgow Med. J.

Handb. d. Physiol. Handb. of Mor. Philoa. HandwOrterb. d. Staatswiss. Hist, of Eth. Hygeia

Inaug. Diss.

Inland Educ.

Int. J. of Ethics

Int. Med. Mag.

Int. Monatssch. t Anat. u. Physiol.

Int Sci. Ser.

IntermM. d. Biol, et d. M^.

Interm^ d. Neurol, et d. Ali^n.

Iowa Med. J.

J. Amer. Folklore

jr. Amer. Med. Assoc.

J. Anthropol. Inst

J. Asiatic Soc.

J. Bostoa Boo. Med. SoL

J. de TAnat et de la Physiol.

J. de Neurol, (et d'HypnoL)

J. de Physiol, et Pathol. G^

J. de Physique

J. Int. d'Anat et de PhysioL

J. Linn. Soc.

J. N. Y. EntomoL So&

J. N. Y. Mioiose. Soc.

J. of Anat and Physiol.

J. of Compar. NeoroL

J. of Educ.

J. of Exper. Med.

J. of LaryngoL, RhinoL, and OtoL

J. of Ment Sci.

J. of MoiphoL

J. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis.

J. of Ophthal., Otol., and Laiyngol.

J. of Orifio. Surg.

J. of Pedag.

J. of PhjrsioL

J. of Polit Econ.

jr. of Specul. Philos.

Jahrb. f. Philos. u. spek. Theol.

Jahrb. f. Psychiat u. NeuroL

Jena. Zeitsch. f. Naturwiss.

Johns Hopkins Hosp. Rep.

Johns Hopkins Univ. Circ

J. Roy. Statist Soe.

KanBaw Univ. Quart.

EjLutstud.

Klin. Monatsbl. f. Augenh.

Klin. Vortr. a. d. Geb. d. OtoL a. Phar.-Rhinol.

Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft

Krit. d. reinen Vernunft

La Nature La Parole Lancet LaryngoL Lects. on Met Lehrb. d. PsychoL Linn. Soc. J. Zool. Linn. Soc Trans. Lyon M^

Mag. Nat Hist

Manicomio Mod.

Manual of PsychoL

Med. Jahrb., Wien

Med. -Leg. J.

Med. Mag.

MM. Mod.

Med. Record

Med. Hmes

Mem. Amer. Acad. Arts and ScL

IL ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES

XV

Mem. Amer. Mas. of Nat. Hist, N. T.

Menu Boat. Soe. Nat. Hist

M^m. Soc d'Anthropol. Paris

M^m. Soc ZooL d. France

Ment DeveL in the Child and the Race

Ment. Dia.

Meth. of Eth.

Mitteil. d. zooL Stat zu Neapel

Monatssoh. f. Ohrenh.

Monatssch. t Pajohiat u. IKenrol.

Monist

Mor. and Legist.

Mor. Sent

Mozphol. Arb. (Schwalbe)

Moiphol. JahrbL

Mfknch. med. Wochenseh.

KatScL

Nature

Natur XL OiKenh.

Natorw. Wochenseh.

NenroL CentralbL

New World

Nineteenth Cent.

Noidiakt Med. Arkiy.

Norsk Mag. t Laegeyid.

North Amer. Ber.

Northwest Lancet

NoQT. loon, de la Salpfttritoe

Not. Org.

NnoTA AntoL

Na X . Meo. V •

N. T. State Hoq>. Ball.

Open Court Ophthal. Bee Ophthal. Bey.

Pftd. Monatsh. Pedag. Sem.

Philoa. Aphor.

Philoe. d. Grieehen

Fhilos. Jahrh.

Philos. Mag.

Philoa. of Edae.

Ph£los.Bey.

Philoa. Stnd.

Philoe. Trans. Bey. Soo.

Philoa. Zool.

Phyaioal Bey.

PhysioL d. Geruchs

PhysioL OpUk

PhysioL f^ohoL

Polit Soi. <)iiart

Pop. Set Mo.

Praet Eth. *^

Presb. and Bel Bey.

PkeeseM^

Pkvase M^ Belg.

Princeton Contrib. to Philoe.

Princeton Contrib. to Psychol*

Princ of Eooa.

Princ of Eth.

Princ of PqrehoL

Princ of ScL

Princ of Sociol.

Proc Acad. Nat Soi.

Proc Amer. Acad. Arts and Sci.

Proc Amer. Assoc. Ady. Sci.

Proc Amer. Med.-PsychoL Assoc

Pn>c Amer. Philos. Soc

Proc. Amer. PSychoL Assoc

Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc

Proc Entomol. Soc.

Proc. Manchester Lit. and Philos. Soc

Proc. Boy. Soc.

Proc. Soc Psych. Bes.

Proc ZooL Soc

Progrte M^d.

Przeglad Filoz.

Przeglad Lekarski

Psicol. Contemp.

Ftaychiater

Psychische Stud.

P^choL als Wise.

PsychoL Arb.

PsychoL Ezper.

PsychoL Bev.

Publ. Amer. Acad. Polit and Soc ScL

Quart Med. J. Quart J. Microsc Sci. Quart, jr. of Inebr.

Beal-Encyc

Bee d'OphthaL

Bondic K. I. Lombard.

Bep. Brit Assoc Ady. Sol.

Bep. Bureau EthnoL

Bep. Comm*r Educ

Bep. Smithson. Inst

Bey. Bleue

Bey. d. Deux Mondes

Bey. d. Quest Hist

Bey. d. Quest. Sclent.

Bey. d. Bey.

Bey. de TEnseignem.

Bey. de THypnot

Bey. de PUniy. de Brux.

Bey. de M6d.

Bey. de Med. y Cirug. Pract

Bey. de M^t. et de Mor.

Bey. de Mor. Sociale

Bey. de Paris

Bey* de Psychiat., de Neurol, et de PsychoL

Ezp6r. Bey. de PsychoL Clin, et Th^rap. Bey. Encyc Bey. G^n. des Sci. Bey. G6n. d'OphthaL Bey. Int de I'Enseignem. Bey. Int. de SocioL Bey. M6d. de la Suisse Bomande Bey. (Mens.) de I'SooIe d'AnthropoL Bey. N^o-Scol. Bey. NeuroL Bey. P^dag. Bey. Philos. Bey. Scient Bey. Thom. Bey. Trimest Microg. Biy. di Filoc Scient Biy. di PatoL Nerv. e Ment Biy. di ScL BioL Biy. Filos.

Biy. loon. Policl. Gen. di Torino Biy. Ital. di Filos. Biy. Ital. di SocioL

Biy. Mens, di Psich. Forens., Antropol. Crim., ecc

XVI

n. ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES

Biy, Quind. di F^iool. Riv. Sperim. di Franiat.

Science

Sci. ofEdac.

ScLProgroBS

Scient. Amer. Sappl.

Semaine M6d.

Semej. malat. ment.

Sitzber. Akad. Wiss. Berlin

Sitzber. Akad. Wisa. Mdnchen

Sitzber. Akad. Wiaa. Wien

Skand. Arch, t PhysioL

Social and Eth. Interpret.

Sperimentale

Stud, in Edac.

Stud. Yale Payohol. Lab.

Syst. Dia. Eye

Syst d. PhiloB.

System. TheoL

Tbzas Acad, of Soi.

Toledo Med. and Surg. Rep'r.

Trans. Amer. Microso. Soo.

Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc.

Trans. Canad. Inst

Trans. Illinois Soc Child-Study

Trans. Boy. Soc. Canada

Trans. Boy. Soc Edinburgh

Trib. M^

Tuke*s Diet of PsychoL Med.

Twentieth Cent Pract of Med.

UnivL Cyc

UnlT. Med. Mag.

Univ. of Cal. Stud.

UniT. of Chicago Contrib. to Philos.

Uniy. of Iowa Stud, in Pqrchol.

Univ. of Toronto Stud. — PsychoL Ser.

Verb. d. Berl. Qesell. 1 AnthropoL

Vocab. of Philos.

Voprosl Philos.

Yrach

Vt^sch. f. gerichtL Med.

Vtljsoh. f. Musikwiss.

VtUsch. f. wiss. Philos.

Weekbl. ▼. h. nederl. Tijd. Geneesk.

West London Med. J.

West Beserve Univ. BulL

Westminster Bev.

Wien. klin. Bdsohau.

Wien. klin. Wochenseh.

Wien. med. Presse

Wien. med. Wochenseh.

Wise. Geol. and Nat. Hist. Surrey BulL

WOrterb. d. philos. Begriife

WOrterb. d. philos. Grundbegrilfe

Zeitsch. t angew. Mikr. Zeitsch. t Augenh. Zeitsch. f. BioL Zeitsch. f. EthnoL Zeitsch. f. Hypnot Zeitsch. f. imman. Philos. Zeitsch. f. kathol. Theol. Zeitsch. t klin. Med. Zeitsch. t, Krim.-AnthropoL Zeitsch. f. Ohrenh. Zeitsch. f. pftd. Psychol. Zeitsch. f. Philos. u. P&d. Zeitsch. f. Philos. u. philos. Krit. Zeitsch. f. physioL Chemie Zeitsch. f. PsychoL Zeitsch. f. wiss. ZooL ZooL Anz. ZooL Jahrb.

L

{continued)

* • •

LEADING OF PROOF — LEADING FRI^ClEliE* ••.••:•%:'•: :/•:

of Fxoof : no concise foreign equivalents. The operation bringing up to attention, among propositions admitted to be tnia, certain relations between them which kgicaUy compel the acceptance of a con- elnsioii. (G.8.P.)

Ti— illnggginclpla: Oer.leitendesPrinzip; Ft. principe diredeur ; Ital. princijno fonda- mtniaU. It is of the essence of reasoning that the reaaoner should proceed, and should be ooDscioius of proceeding, according to a general habit, or method, whidb he holds would either (according to the kind of reasoning) always lead to the truth, provided the premises were true; or, consistently adher^ to, would eventually approximate indefinitely to the truth ; or woidd be generally conducive to the ascertainment of truth, supposing there be any aaoertainable truth. The effect of this hsiAt or method could be stated in a proposi- tion of which the antecedent should describe all possible premises upon which it could operate, while the consequent should describe hiow the conclusion to which it would lead would be determinately related to those premises. Such a proposition is called the ' leading principle' of the reasoning.

Two different reasoners might infer the same conclusion from the same premiss; and yet their proceeding might be governed by Imbits whidi would be formulated in Afferent, or even conflicting, leading princi* pies. Only that man's reasoning would be good whose leading principle was true for all possible cases. It is not essential that the reasoner should have a distinct apprehension of the leading principle of the habit which governs his reasoning; it is sufficient that he should be conscious of proceeding according

II.

to a general method, and that he should hold that that method is generally apt to lead to the truth. He may even conceive himself to be following one leading principle when, in reality, he is following another, and may consequently blunder in his conclusion. From the effective leading principle, togeUier with the premises, the propriety of accepting the conclusion in such sense as it is accepted follows necessarily in every case. Suppose that the leading principle involves two propo- sitions, L and Z , and suppose that there are three premises, P, P', P^ ; and let C signify the acceptance of the conclusion, as it is accepted, either as true, or as a legitimate approximation to the truth, or as an assump- tion conducive to the ascertainment of the truth. Then, from the five premises Z, L\ F, P', P", the inference to C would be necessary ; but it would not be so from Z, Z^ P', P'' alone, for, if it were, P would not really act as a premise at all. From P^ and P^^ as the sole premises, C would follow, if the leading principle consisted of Z, Z^ and P. Or from the four premises Z', P, P', P", the same conclusion would follow if Z alone were the leading principle. What, then, could be the leading principle of the inference of C from all five propositions Z, L\ P, P', P'^, taken as premises 1 It would be sometiiing already implied in those premises; and it might be almost any general proposition so implied. Leading principles are, therefore, of two classes; and any leading principle whose truth is implied in the premises of every infei*ence which it governs is called a ' logical ' (or, less appropriately, a formal) leading principle; while a leading principle whose truth is not implied in the premises

B

LEAST SQUARES — LEGITIMATION

is called a 'factaal' (or fnaterial) leading principle. (c.b.p.)

Leggt SqnarMi (method of): see Ebbobs OF Obsebyation.

IMPt-handedness : see Dextbality.

SLat. legcdis] : Ger. gesetdich ; Fr. . legale, (i) Pertaining to law. (2) Conformable to law. (3) Pertaining to law, as distingaished from equity. (4) De- fined or created by law, e. g. legal offences, legal disabilities.

Legal dsfenoe: one sufficient under the rules, of l§kw. Legal ethics :. the ethical rules goTeri»&g ]fche coV^rli/f %1%9 legal profession. That may be legal *wlu(h js neither just no/^iiknirdI3c.* ."^I^D {>m\ie*quod licet hone- Bt/i.^ e^^vi n, ^ ^i^ regulis imu dnHqui, 144. (8.E.B.)

Ziegal FiotdoiL: Ger. ReclUsfieUon] Fr. fiction Ugale; Ital. finzione legale. The assumption, as a fact, of what is not known to be such, made by authority of law to pro- mote justice.

It IB generally done by the coarts, some- times by the legislature. Thus the English courts of common law, in order to take juris- diction of matters of admiralty jurisdiction, anciently allowed a plaintiff to describe his cause of action as arising at Havre, to wit, in Westminster, and refused to allow the de- fendant to contest their right to entertain the case by denying the averment as to West- minster. Cf. Maine's Ancient Law, 26.

Legal fictions furnish the means by which most nations develop their system of proce- dure from formal into rational methods. See, as to their use in Boman law, Sohm*s Inst, of Soman Zato, § 38 ; Hadley's Introd. to Boman Law, 96. Wills causelessly disinheriting chil- dren could be set aside, 'hoc colore, quasi non sanae mentis faerint cum testamenta ordini^ rent. Sed hoc dicitur non quasi vere furiosus sit, sed recte quidem fecerit testamentum, non autem ex officio pietatis. Nam si vere furiosus sit, nullum testamentum est ' {Inst, of Just,, ii. 18, de inoffieioso testamento), (8.E.B.)

Ziegted [Lat. legere, to read]: Qer. Le- gende ; Fr. l^ende ; Ital. leggenda. An edi- fying tradition which has grown up spon- taneously and uncritically around some his- torical personage, and which, though lacking in historic verity, is valuable in the revelation it makes of the spirit and life of the people and time that produced it.

In ecclesiastical history: legend is the story of a saint or other religious personage which has grown up gradually in response to

the requiremeots of religious edification, and which, though containing a nucleus of tnith, is not historically reliable.

The legend differs from the m3rth in that it ordinarily develops about a r^ personage, whereas the myth may be pure fiction, and oixlinarily arises out of a personification of some natural object or force. See Mtth.

Literature : Ehbet, Allg. Gesch. d. Litera- tur d. Mittelalters im Abendlande (1874-87) ; MiLMAN, Hist, of Latin Christianity ; Leckt, Hist, of Rationalism in Europe. (a.t.o.)

LagiriatJon [Lat. lex, ]&w,^.latio, a pro- posing] : Ger. Gesetzgehung ; Fr. legislation ; Ital. legidazione, (i) The act of making a law, by a legislator or legislature. ' In legis- lation both the contents of the rule are de- vised, and legal force is given to it, by simul- taneous acts of the sovereign power which produce "written law." All the other law sources produce what is called ** unwritten law," to which the sovereign authority gives its whole legal force, but not its contents, which are derived from popular tendency, professional discussion, judicial ingenuity, or otherwise, as the case may be' (Holland, Jurisprudence, chap. v. 66). (2) The law made by a legislator or legislature.

Judicial legidation: the virtual making of law by judicial magistrates, by declariug in their judgments that to be law which had not previously been enacted or genei'ally recognised as such. (s.£.b.)

Legitimate (in law) [Med. Lat. legitimor t%is\ : Ger. gesetsmdssig, legitim ; Fr. legitime ; Ital. legittimo. Accordant with law ; having the support of law ; legally entitled, especially of a child bom in lawful wedlock (whether begotten in wedlock or not).

Legitimate portion : that share of a parent's estate which, by the rules of the civil law, can- not be willed away from the natural heir without some recognized legal justification. (8.e.b.)

LegitamatioiL [Fr.] : Ger. Legitimation ; Fr. legitimation; Ital. legittimazione. That by which an illegitimate child is made legiti- mate in law.

By English and American common law there is no method of legitimation. The later Roman law allowed it by virtue of a marriage of the parents at any time after the conception or the birth of the child {Inst, of Just,, iii. i, 2V Similar laws have been enacted in many ot the United States.

By English common law, legitimation has no extra-territorial force. Cf. Wharton, Private ItU. Law, chap. v. (sjb.b.)

LEIBNITZ — LIABILITY

X«ibniti (or Xeibiiim), Baron Gottfiried Wilhalm Ton. (164^1716.) Bom at Leipzig, where his father was professor of ethics, he was educated at Leipzig and Jena Umrersities. He received a doctorate in law, hut had hecome deeply read in scholasticism and logic. For a period he had also studied Bacon, Hohhes, Kepler, Oalilei, Gassendi, and, to some extent, Descartes; and was for a time converted to the mathematico- mechanical conception of nature. Under ,ihe patronage of Baron Boinehurg he pre- pared for a political life, became assistant to Lasser in the preparation of a reformed oode of Boman law, and member of the Court of Appeals in Mainz (1670). He visited London, met Newton, Boyle, and others, and became Fellow of the Royal Society. In Paris he was intimate with Cassini and Huyghens. In 1676 he accepted a position in the court of the Duke of Brunswick-Lilnebnrg, and (1678) was made counsellor and member of the supreme court. Called to Berlin in 1698 by Princess Sophia Charlotte, he estab- lished tiie Scientific Society, which has since become Berlin University.

Lemma [Gr. X^^a^, gain, an assumption, premiael: Oer. Hulfisatz^ Lehnaatz; Fr. Jemme; Ital. Umma, A theorem which inter- rupts the course of development of a mathe- matical theory, but which is inserted to supply a premise for one of the theorems.

This use of the word seems to go back to Euclid, at least ; and even Aristotle uses the word — ^not a common one with him — in con- nection with geometry, in the first chapter of the Topics, With Aristotle, however, it means a premise ; and with the Stoics, more particularly, the major premise of a syllo- giam. (cs.p.)

Tuftiici mt^egty [Fr.}, also written 'leze- mijesty ' : Gkr. MajeUduMeidigung, Hock' verrat ; Fr. Uae-majestB ; Ital. Uda maeM. The crime of direct attack on the state, or on its sovereign, his family, or his chief officers of government.

Formerly in Europe this crime was also regarded as comprehending offences committed directly against God, such as sacrilege, blas- phemy, or apostasy ; being thus termed Uw" majesti divine (Merlin's Repertoire de Juris- prudence, sub verbo). OiUse-majeeti humaine there were several degrees, the offence being pushed so fiBir in France as to include em- bezzlement by public officials and unlawful assemblies. The crime of High Tbeason (q. V.) was known by this name in England

in the time of Glanvil (12th century). The Roman law named this offence maieekUis crifnen, or more fully 'crimen laesae, immi- nutae, diminutae, miuutae, maiestatis,' Dig.^ xlviii. 4, ad Legem Itdiam Maiestatis; Smith's Diet, of Greek and Roman Antiq, {maiestas)] Heineccius, iltUt^. /?om. <SJ^n(a^ma,

iv. § 46 f. (8.B.B.)

Leflsingp Ootthold Bphraim. (1729- 81.) Educated at the Fttrstenschule in Meissen, and at Leipzig, in philology and theology. After 1748 he spent some time as journalist in Berlin. .Went to Wittenberg (1752) to complete his studies; returned to Berlin (1753) to resume his work as jour- nalist and critic. After two years spent in Leipzig, he returned once more (1758) to Berlin. In 1760 he became secretary to General von Tauenzien in Breslau, during the Seven Years' War; 1767, official play- wright and artistic director of the Hamburg theatre; 1770, librarian of the ducal library at Wolfenbattel.

Ketwes, George Kenxy. (1817-78.) An English Positivist, born in London. In youth a business clerk, he began the study of medicine, but abandoned it for philosophy and psychology. Spent two years in Ger- many, retumiug to London in 1840, and de- voting himself to literature. He was literary editor of The Leader (1849-54), and founded the Fortnightly Review,

Iflahility (in law) [Fr. lier, from Lat. legare, to bind] : Ger. Naftbarheit ; Fr. re- sponsabiliti; Ital. risponsabtlitd^. Such a rela- tion by one to another as will or may support an action by the latter against the former.

The maker of a note, as soon as it is de- livered, comes under a liability to the holder, which may support an action, and will, if the note be dishonoured when due. The contingent UabiUty of the endorser of a note becomes an absokUe liability when the note is dishonoured, and due demand and notice follow. Liability is viewed by Austin ' as a sanction ' imposed by law as a penalty for disobedience of law. But an unintentional act of violence to another may impose an actionable liability, though there was no intent to disobey the law. Lia- bility for an act whereby another is injured can be rested better on the natural obligation to act in contemplation of the natural ten- dency, under existing circumstances known or Imowable, of the act to do harm (see Holmes on the Common Law, 79, 81, 162).

Limited liability : (i) a liability of share- holders in a business corporation or joint-stock

B a

LIBELT — LIFE

company, limited by law to the amount of their sabscriptiooB for shares ; (a) the restricted liability of shipowners for accidents occurring without their fault (see U. S. Beviaed SuUuieSf § 832). Jndimdudl liability : that which one holding a representative position as executor, cashier, or governor, may incur by contracting on his personal credit, though not for his personal benefit. The common-law maxim is Ubi tui, ibi remedivm. (8.E.B.)

Libaltp Zarol. (1807-75.) Educated at BeriiUf under Hegel, in philosophy. Wrote the gold medal essay on Spinoza (1828); re- ceived his doctorate in philosophy (1830). Took part in the Polish revolution in that year, and was imprisoned nine months. In 1840 he opened a private school at Posen, and edited two joumab. His life was given to literature. He was again imprisoned (1846-8), and his journal suppressed (1849). Took a prominent part in the reorganization of Great Poland, and protested in the Parliament at Frankfort against the incorporation of Great Poland in Germany. He was the first famous Polish philosopher.

Liberalism [Lat. libera free] : Ger. Liberal' iamua; Fr, liberalisme ; IteA, UberaUamo. (i) The personal disposition to free and untram- melled thought and action.

(2) The social sentiment which welcomes reforming and progressive opinion and action.

Liberalism is opposed to conservatism in both these meanings; but a certain relative balance between them is necessary to stable social organization, in which the writer {Sadal and Eth, Interpret.^ chap. v. § 3 ; cf. Royce, Paychol, Rev.t v. 1898, 113) has likened them to habit and accommodation in the indi- viduals life. Extreme liberalism, taking the form of a disposition to accept innovations as such, is called radicalism.

Liierature: see Sociology, and Social

PSTOHOLOQT. (J.X.a, V.H.G.)

Xib«rty (i) and (2) Libertariaiiinn [Lat. libertas]: Ger. Frmheit; Fr. liberie; Ital. UbertH, (1) See Fbsedox (various meanings), and Will; (2)£thicall2n>ETXB]iiKi8M(q.v.), also the references made under (i). (j.m.b.)

Lilmrty (political) : see Fbxedox (political and social).

Libairtj (religious): Ger. BdigionefreiheU ; Fr. liberie reUgieuee; Ital. Uberid. rdigiosa, 1'he legally secured right of the individual to hold and practise without interference any form of religious belief and worship he may choose, in so £Eur as the exercise of his pre- rogative does not conflict with the fundamental

political and social principles of the society to which he belongs.

The history of religious Uberty in modem times begins with the edict of toleration by Constantino in 313 A. d. Throughout the middle ages the enforcement of conformity to prescribed forms of belief was regarded as a duty. The Reformation did not e£fect much advance in freedom, but Catholic and Protes- tant alike claimed the right of coercion. A considerable advance was made at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when equal rights were accorded to professors of the Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinistic fiiiths. The French Bevolution marked the beginning of a new era, in which the principle of religious freedom in its widest sense has gradually secured almost universal recognition.

Liieratwre: Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ; Guizot, Hist, of Civili- zation in £urope ; Volt aibe. Essay on Tolera« tion ; LoGKE, Essays ; Leckt, Hist of Ra- tionalism; Bancboft, Hist of the United States. Cf. Ebastiakibm, and Galucait-

IBM. (B.M.W.)

Lie [AS. leogan]: Ger. Liige; Fr. menr eonge; ital. memogna. Any intentional de- ception of another by positive misrepresenta- tion. Cf. Equivocation.

The essence of the lie rests in the intention to deceive ; yet the means of the deception, by positive misrepresentation — as contrasted with either negative suggestion {euggeetio fdUi) or omission of truth {m2>pre88io vert)-— seems, though casuistical, to be well established. The following example from Macaulay {Hist. of England^ chap, ix) illufitrates this ' diiBtinc- tion without a difference.' Bishop Comp- ton, who had invited William of Orange to invade England in 1688, is asked by King James if there is any 'truth in the statement in William's manifesto that some spiritual peers had invited him ; he replies : * Sir, I am quite confident that there is not one of my brethren who is not as guiltless as myself iu this matter.' Macaulay remarks: 'The equivocation was ingenious; but whether the di£ference between the sin of euch an equivocation and the sin of a lie he worth any expense of ingenuity may perhaps be doubted.'

The question of the ethical justification of a lie is also quite apart; whether right or not, a lie is a lie ' for a' that.' See Vsracitt, and cf. Casuistbt. (j.m.b.-h.8.)

Xdfe and Orgaaiio [AS. hlifianj Gr. ipyamy] : Ger. Leben, Lebetoesen (living being),

LIFE AND ORGANIC

crffoniaeh; Fr. vie, organiqus] Ital. vita, Dirganieo, A form of organizatioii found in c^tain material things, having the properties of self-perpetuation, for a longer or shorter time, and of reproduction in some form, and further distinguislied by certain characters deeeribed as vital properties or properties of Lrvnro Mattsb (q*v.). Matter having this organization and these characters is called ' living ' or * organic/ as opposed to ' dead ' or ' ixunrganic ' matter. Of. ako Protoplasm.

The theories of life have always turned on the form of organization displayed, as con- trasted with other forms, such as notably the ehemical. The problem seems little nearer solution now than in the time of the specala- taona of Aristotle. To Aristotle the soul was the * form ' or ' formal cause ' of the organized body, the matter of which was the ' material cause ' of the living creature. The scholastic theory of ' vitality ' or ' vital force ' postulated a principle additional to those of mechanical action and chemical organization, a view which laboured under the obscurity of the word ' force,' and came to be directly challenged when the generalization of the Coksebvation OF Ehxbgt (q. V.) was announced. This diffi- culty, i. e. of determining whether vital phe- nomena are sulrject to the law of conservation, has never been overcome. The question is as to whether or not vital changes, such as those of development and growth, can be adequately accounted for as transformations of the known forms of energy; and if not, what more is necessary. Current views divide into (i) the mechanical or chemical, which holds that vital phenomena are entirely ex- plainable in terms of mechanical and chemical change; (2) vitalism or neo-vitalism, hold- ing to a 'something over,' which takes the form (a) of a new force or energy (e. g. growth- force or bathmism of Cope ; * genetic energy ' of Williams), {h) a property of ' self-adaptation ' (Henslow) or ' direction ' (Eimer), or {e) the assumption of a form of ' so-called ' directive force which, while diverting, guiding, or shunting physical energy, yet does not alter its amount. This last view often makes con- sciousness the new agent, and represents a distinct tendency in discussion to restate the question in terms of a dualism between matter and mind 'rather than between matter and life ; the additional point being assumed, or directly advocated, that life and mind are coterminous. This does not alter the essential eonditions of the problem, although it is held to strengthen the position of vitalisni by

making accessible to it the facts and argu- ments in support of some sort of causal activity of mind. PhilosophicaUy, however, it has the distinct advantage of reducing two dualisms to one, and of bringing the question within the lines of one of the broadest and most critical problems, i.e. that stated by Aristotle in terms of * matter and form,' dis- cussed by religious philosophers under the heading of teleology, and taking the form in modem metaphysics of the inquiry as to the final category of organization (matter and motion, dualism of body and mind, or monism in some higher term). Cf. Mind and Body, Oboakizatiok, Teleology, and the remarks on teleology under Hebedity. The discus- sion labours under the confusions hidden in the words Cause, Fobce, Eneboy (which should also be consulted). Cf. also Obioin OF Life.

As to the explanation of the facts involved, the rival theory to vitalism is natural selec- tion, which is at its best in explaining the apparently vital directive movement in evolu- tion, but weaker in explaining individual growth and development. On the other hand, vitalism makes its strongest stand in what is called the developmental mechanics of the individual, where the fects of Beoenebatxon (q. V.) and organic accommodation, it is held, can only be described in vitalistic terms and illustrate the inscrutable mystery of life (cf. Wilson, The Cell, 329). It is interesting to note, as illustrating tiie truth of this opposi- tion, that the new vitalism is current for the most part in countries — notably Germany and the United States — where the problems of ontogeny are especially investigated, while in other countries — notably England — vitalism in any form is criticized as mysticism.

Literaiure: Abistotle, zoological writings; "WuNDT, Logik, n.i. 3, 4, 'd. I^gik d. Biol.'; Cope, Primary Factors of Organic Evolu- tion ; Yebwobk, Qen. Physiol. (Eng. trans.) ; Williams, The Qenetic Energy of Organisms, Science, May 27, 1898 ; Sandemak, The Problems of Biol. ; Eimeb, Organic Evolu- tion (Eng. trans.); Wilson, The Cell; OsBOBN, From the Qreeks to Darwin ; Bbooks, Foundations of Zool., v. Bukoe, Lehrb.d. Physiol. (1889); du Bois-Beymond, Ueber d. Grenzen d. Naturerkenntniss ; Jai^p, Pres. Add. Chem. Sec. Brit. Assoc., Beport, 1898; Lloyd-Mobgan, Monist, Jan., 1899; Wabd, Naturalism and Agnosticism; and most of the general works on the Biological

ScIBKOES (q. v.). (JJCB., O.L&.K.)

LIFE — LIMITATIVE

Zdie (spiritual) [ME. lif] : Ger. geistiges Leben ; Fr. la vie apiriiuelle ; Ital. mta spiritudU. (i) That activity of a self-con- scious being which gives rise to moral, Aesthetic, and religious experiences.

(2) In theology: the divine life which is manifested in Christ, and in which the be- liever is by faith enabled to participate.

The spiritual life represents the central mystery of the Christian faith. The new birth involves the throwing away of the old carnal life and the putting on of a new life, of which the central principle is to be the spiritual energy of Jesus Christ. In the New Testament the spiritual life is not only repre- sented as ideally rich and complete, but also as in its nature eternal as the life

of God. (A.T.O.)

Light : see Vision.

Light of Nature [trans, of Lat lumen naturae or naiwrale, a term used by Aquinas, SuTMna Theologiae, Ft. I, qu. 12, art. 13, and elsewhere. It is not necessary to suppose that he borrowed the term irom the passage of Aristotle's De Anifna, 430 a, 14, where the creative intellect is compared with light]: Ger. natUrlickes Lieht; Fr. lumQre natureUe (Pascal); Ital. lume naturale (Galileo). A natural power, or instinct, by which men are led to the truth about matters which con- cern them, in anticipation of experience or revelation. See Lumen (also for literature).

The phrase is used in contradistinction to supernatural light. Tucker^B Light of Nature pursued is a book written as a mild reaction against Locke and the Associationalists in the direction of the philosophy of common sense. (c.s.p.)

Light Semation: Ger. Lichiempfindung ; Fr. eeneation lumineuee; Ital. eenecudone lu- minosa. Visual sensation. See Vision. See

also B1UQHTNE88. (E.B.T.)

Likeness or Sesemblance (conscious- ness of) [AS. lie, in gelie, like]: Ger. Aehn- lichkeit ; Fr. reeeemblanee ; ltd. somiglianza, or raeeomiglianza. Two mental objects or contents are said to be alike for consciousness when in respect to certain features one might be taken for the other. This is hit off in the current conundrum : ' What is most like a rain-drop ) ' Answer : ' Another rain-drop.' Such objects are said to have likeness, to be alike, or to resemble each other.

Theories of likeness are based on partial identity of the two mental contents (cf. Bb- sxhblangb) ; partial recognition of one in the other; partial assimilation of one to the other.

or of both to a third ; or on an active adjust- ment to one which holds also in part for the two. The last of these views, to winch the writers adhere, is well summed up by Ward : ' Presented objects become related as "like" either in virtue of the active adjustment to a change of impression which their partial assimilation defeats, or in virtue of an anticipated con- tinuance of the impression which this assimi- lation confirms' (art. Psychology, in Encyc, Brit,, 9th ed., xx. 1 80). Cf. the classification given under Resemblance, and the topics there referred to.

The case in which two things are alike in all respects — are taken one for the other — is mentioned under Indiscebniblbs, and Dif-

FBBBNCB. (J.M.B.-4}.F.S.)

Limen [Lat.]: equivalent to Thbeshold (q.v.), which is already current, and is pre- ferred.

The adjectives ' liminal ' (at the threshold), 'subliminal' (below the threshold), and 'supra- liminal ' (above the threshold) are useful. Cf. Limits of Stimulation. (j.m.b.)

LimitatiTe [Lat. limitare, to enclose]: Ger. limitativ {prtheti)\ Fr. limitatif; Ital. limitaiivo. (i) Applied to a third quality of judgments, additional to affirmative and negative. The idea of such a third quality originated among the Romans from the difference between 'homo non est bonus' and 'homo est non bonus,' the latter being the limitative.

(2) Setting limits in the sense (2) given under Limitinq Notion (q. v.).

It is one of the numerous cases in which accidents of language have affected accepted logical forms without any good reason. Boe- thius and others applied the infinitation to the subject also, which De Morgan has shown makes a valuable addition to logic. Wolff, however, limited the modification to the predicate, without showing any serious reason for such application. Kant adopted it be- cause it rounded out his triad of categories of quality. His defence, as reported by Jasche, is that the negative excludes the subject from the sphere of the predicate, while the unendliche, limitative, or infinite judgment puts it into the infinite sphere outside the predicate. It is to be remarked that Kant regards a positive mark as differing per se from a negative one, and, in particular, as having a far narrower extension. Like most of the old logicians, he virtually limited the universe of marks t(t such as arrest our attention. If that had been explicitly and

LIMITING NOTION — LIMITS

coDsisteiitly done, it would have constituted an interesting particular logic, in which there would be a material and not merely formal difference between affirmative and negative facts. It is probable that Kant also under- stood the affinnative proposition to assert the existence of its subject, while the negative did not do so ; so that ' Some phoenixes do not rise from tiieir ashes' would he true, and 'All phoenixes do rise from their ashes ' would be false. The limitative judgment would agree with the affinnative in this respect. This was probably his meaning, and he did not 6h6erYe that his limitative judgment, 'The human soul is immortal (nichtsterblich)/ may be construed as equivalent to the conjunctive judgment, ' The human soul is not mortal, and it is the human soul.' No doubt Kant would have seen a world of difference between these two assertions. In that case he should have adopted a fourth quality, ' The human soul is not immortal.' (c.s.p.)

XnmitiTig Notion: Qer. Grenabegriff] Fr. ncHai^Umite; Ital. ccneetto limtte. (i) A term used by Kant in a single passage of the Krii. d. reinen Vemunfi (ist ed., 255) to signify that a Noumekon (q. v., ad fin.), whiob is a thing in itself regarded as an object of reason, is something to which experience caimot aUain, but is the inconceivable some- thing behind the phenomena. The passage reads : ' Der Begriff eines Nonmenon ist also bloss ein Grenzbegr^f um die Anmassung der Sinnlichkeit einzuschriinken, und also nur Ton negativem Gehrauche.' (j.m.b.-<!.s.p.)

(2) The notion of what would be the limit- ing or extreme case of the application of a truth or principle.

The limiting notion in this sense^ involves abstraction from the conditions of particular existence ; and it also fulfils an ideal. Hence it is both limitative and negative with refer- ence to existence in the sphere of the particular. Cf. LiMiTATrvB (2), and Limitb (in mathe- matics). The validity of Kant's negative conclusions regarding God, freedom, and im- mortality turns upon the construction of the negative character attributed to the limiting notion, L e. upon the theory of reality of the noumenal or universal sort. (j.m.b.)

Xisiits (in mathematics) [Lat. limes, a boundary] : Ger. Grenze ; Fr. limite ; Ital. Imite. A fixed quantity towards which we conceive or prove a variable quantity to approach, so that their difference becomes infinitesimal, though, it never entirely dis- appears, is called a limit.

A simple example is that of the series

i + 4 + 4 + TV+*<5*» ^ which each term is half the preceding one. It is evident that the sum of the terms will always be less than i by the last term, thus i + }+4 = i""4> &c. Now since, by halving a quantity continually, we can make it less than any assignable quantity, it is clear that there is no limit to the possible smallness of the difference be- tween the sum and i. On the other hand, the sum can never become equal to i, because we shall always have a difference equal to the last term of the series. In this case the value I is said to be the limit of the sum of the series. (b.h.)

Lixnits (of Stifnulation. (i) and (2) of SeniatioiL) : Gter. Grenzwerthe ; Fr. kendue ; Ital. limine, (i) The limits beyond which, in either direction, stimulation of a sense-organ is ineffective ; (2) the houndaries of a sensa* tion series or continuum, (e.b.t.)

In intensity : the extremes of intensity of stimulus that give sensations. The lower limit of sensation, the minimal sensation, the limen or Thkbbhold (q. v.), is, the just noticeable intensity of sensation. The upper limit of sensation, or the maximal sensation, is that due to the most intense stimulus. The Bangb (q. V.) of sensation, according to Wundt, is measured by the maximal sensation divided by the threshold.

Wundt introduced the term Beizhohe for the upper limits The existence of the lower limit is in part due to the interference of physical and physiological stimuli, in part to physiological inertia and dispersion, and in part may perhaps be regarded as a case of subconscious stimulation. The upper limit is perhaps due to the injury of the sense-organ by intense stimulation. Cf. Fechi^b's Law, Webbb's Law, and Pbtchofhtsioal Methods. (j.u<'k.c.)

In quality, &c : the term * limits of stimu- lation,' with its correlate 'range of stimula- tion,' applies also to sensation qualities. We may detennine qualitative limits in two dif- ferent ways. The upper and lower limit of tone stimulation, e. g., may be given as the greatest and least number of vibrations in the second that produce a tone sensation (see Auditory Sensation under Heabino). Or we may inquire as to the least number of vibrations necessary for the cognition of a tone of given vibration rate: this number seems to vary between 2 and 20. Moreover, every sense- oi^gan shows limits with respect to the time intervals of stimulation, while the eye

LINDNER — LIVING MATTER

and skin have also limitB with respect to extent.

LUeraJturei KtaPE, Ontlines of Fiiychol., 34; Wtnn>T, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), i.

334 1 (E.B.TO

UBdB6ir« Otto. (1820-67.) Bom and educated at Breslau, he deroted himself especially to philology and philosophy. He became a private instructor in Berlm, and in 1847 took a position on the Vostiwihs Zeitwag^ becoming editor-in-chief in 1863.

Une of Beanty: Qer. Sehonhsitdmu\ Fr. ligne de beaute ; Ital. linea di beUezza. A term applied by Hogarth ( 1 7 45) to a serpentine line, which he regai-ded as the most beautiful outline.

In his Analysis of Bsautt/ (1753) Hogarth styled the serpentine line ' line of grace ' (see Gback), and restricted the term 'line of beauty " to the waving line (^. He regarded 'variety' as the ground of its aesthetic

value; (J.H.T.)

Xdne of Direction : Ger. Richtungdinie {'Strahl)'^ Fr. ligns de direeUon; Ital. linea di direzione. The line of direction is the straight line connecting a luminous point with the nodal point of the ' reduced ' eye, and prolonged to meet the retina. It gives the position on the retina of the luminous point. See Fig. 7 under Vision.

Literature: Hslmholtz, Fhysiol. Optik (and edX 91, 742 ; Wukdt, Physiol. Psy- chol. (4tn ed.), ii. 98 ; Sahfobd, Course in Ezper. Psychol., expts. 106, 117; Aubebt, PhysioL Optik, 600; Fick, in Hermann's Huidb. d. Physiol., IIL i. 64 ; Hbbino, ibid., 349; Beitr. z. Physiol., i. (1861) 25 ff. Cf. LnfB OP Vision. (b.b.t.)

UxLO of Regard: Ger. BlickHnie; Fr. ligne de regard (Helmholtz, Physiol, OpUk, Fr. trans., 599) ; Ital. linea di nUra, The straight line connecting the point of regard or fixa- tion point with the centre of rotation of the eye. See Fig. 7 under Vision.

Literature: Helxholtz, PhysioL Optik (and ed.), 91, 617, 679 ; Sanfobd, Course in Exper. Psychol., 119, and expts. 176, 177, 219; WuNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 99, 121; Aubxbt, Physiol. Optik, 419, 646; Hbbino, in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., in. i. 441. See Link ov Vision. (b.b.t.)

Uno of Vision or Xdno of Sight s Ger. Gesichtdinie ; Fr. rayon visud; Ital. hnea visudle, A straight line joining the fovea with the fixation point, and making with the Optical Axis (q.v.) an angle of about five

terms of the nodal point of the 'reduced' eye, and accordingly termed the 'principal ray of direction.' It is practioally coineidmit with the Linb of Rboabd (q.v.; see aJso Fig. 7 under Vision).

LiUraiure: Wallzb, Human Physiol., 412 ; HSLMHOLTZ, Physiol. Opiik (2nd ^)» 9i,«6i7 ; WuNDT, PhysioL PsycdioL (4th ed.), ii. 99, 121; Aubbbt, Physiol. Optik, 415, 417 ; FiCK, in Hermann's Handb. d. PhysioL, III. i. 59 ; Hebing, ibid., 349. (E.B.T.)

Lingviatie SoieBee! see Philology, Language, and Phonbtics.

Listing's I«Rw: Ger. Listing' sches Oesetz der Augenhewegungen ; Fr. hi de Listing pour Us mouvements de VobU ; Ital. legge di Listing, ' If the Linb of Rbgabd (q. v.) is carried from the primary to any other position, the toraiou of the eyeball in this new position is as it would be if the eye had turned about a fixed axis, standing at right angles to both directions of the line of r^und ' (Helmholtz).

The law has two corollaries: (i) that in movements fix)m the primary position there will not be, and (2) that in movements from secondary position to secondary position there will be, rotation about the line of regard. Cf. Sanford, Course in Exper. Psychci., expt. 131 b, and App. I.

Literature: Hblmholtz, PhysioL Optik 2nd ed.), 623; WuNDT, PhysioL PsychoL 4th ed.), iL 1 16 ; Sanfobb, Course in £xper. Psychol., expt. 131 b; Axtbbbt, Physiol. Optik, 646, 653; Lb Contb, Sight» 147; Hbbing, Binocul. Sehen (1868), 64, 68 ; RuBiB, Lehrb. d. Ophthal., L 37. (b.b.t.)

Jdttri, MaximilioaFaia SmiU. ( 1 801- 81.) Bom and educated for medicine in Paris. In 1830 he fought on the barricades in Paris as a republican. Shortly after this he began writing scientific articles for Le National. In 1839 he became a member of the Academic des Inscriptions et Belles- Lettres. In 1840 he read the works of Auguste Comte and became a leader among the advocates of the Positive philosophy. He took up the Histoire littiraire de la Francs upon the death of Fauriel in 1844. ^^^ i^^3 he presented the Academy with the first part of his Dictionnaire de la Langue Franifaiss\ he continued also his contributions to medical literature. Member of the Assembly in 187 1, and life senator after 1875. Member of the Academic Fran^ise after 1874.

Living Matter: Qer. lebendiger Staff i

Fr. substance vivante; Ital. sostanxa (or

degrees. The line may also be defined in | materia) vivente. Matter in the peculiar unr

8

\

LIVINa MATTER

fiiable or labile condition which enables it to manifest the properties or functions of life. These properties are (i) nutrition in its widest sense, as including all the processes of anabolism and katabolism. (a^ Beproduc- tion: the power of changing-dead (food) matter into itself, thus reproducing itaeii and increas- ing in amount up to the limit of the food supply. All known Hving matter has thus arisen from previous living matter. (3 ) Irrita- faility, including the iundamental functions of conductivity and contractility: the property of living matter by which it is enabled to respond to stimuli, i. e. to maintain continu- ously internal adjustments to external changes, an essential characteristic of life. (cv.b.)

ChenUeai Oompantion. Protoplasm is not a unitary chemioJ substance, but it is a com- plex mixture in ever-varying proportions of very many different substances. The quest for a definite chemical formula for protoplasm has proved vain. Living substance can at present be defined, not in terms of chemical composition, but in terms of its morphological and physiological properties. The nature of the bond which holds these diverse substances together and maintains the integrity and continuity of the life process during the continual flux of the elements of its physical basis, which, in short, renders living substance self-perpetuating — ^this is the problem of life, and it is apparently as far from solution to-day as it was in the time of our fathers, who cloaked their ignorance under the term ' vitalism.' Cf. Life.

Vital manifestations, however, so hr as they have yet been analysed, reduce themselves to physico-chemical forces, from which it may be inferred that the distinguishing features of' living things depend upon the nature of the interrelation of these forces rather than upon any special super-physical force. But it does not at all follow that the synthesis of Uving substance would be possible, even if we were able to make artificially all the proxi- mate chemical compounds wUch are mingled in its structure. For, as Oscar Hertwig has pointed out, none of the protoplasm now living has been formed in any other way than by the propagation of pre-existing protoplasm ; it is, therefore, the product of an exceedingly long historical development.

At present, however, our knowledge of the molecular structure of the proximate ingre- dients of protoplasm -is very meagre. The rimplest ox these organic compounds have very large molecules, often with more than a

thousand atoms. The formula for a molecule of albumen has been given as C^Hig^NnSOg,, and for haemoglobin, C^H^N,3,Fe,S,0,„. This peculiarity alone is sufficient to ex- plain many of the properties of organic substances, such as their inability in most cases to dialyze and to diffuse rapidly in solutions* For some interesting speculations growing out of the properties of the twelve elements chiefly represented in organized bodies (viz, C, N, S, H, O, P, CI, K, Na, Mg, Ca, Fe), see Spencer's PriTiciples of Biolog^ and Yerwom's G&neral Phynclo^. The latter author gives a brief account of Pfliiger s interesting researches on the r61e of cyanogen, ON, in the metabolism of proteids, from which the conclusion is drawn that the essential difference between living and dead proteid is the presence of the radical cyanogen in the former, but hot in the latter. Further study of the properties of some of the non-living compounds of this radical brings out some curious resemblances witli living proteid (notably in their tendency towards transforma- tion and polymerization), and PflUger con- cludes : ' Accordingly, I should say that the first proteid to arise was living matter, endowed in all its radicals with the property of vigorously attracting similar constituents, adding them chemically to its molecule, and thus growing ad infinitum. According to this idea, living proteid does not need to have a constant molecular weight ; it is a huge molecule, undergoing constant, never-ending formation and constant decomposition, and probably behaves towards the usual chemical molecules as the sun behaves towards small meteors.

Another, and perhaps the simplest, method of considering the problem of living matter, though it suffers, as do all others, from the impossibility of concrete demonstration, con- cerns itself not with the analysis of the material elements of living substance into units whose quantitative formulas somehow are supposed to represent the potency of the substance, but with a synthesis of the several energies after the analogy of the composition of forces in mechanics. This theoiy does not suppose that the several grades of vitalized matter differ in ways tiiat can be expressed by chemical formulas, but the forces merged into the living entity are conceived of as consti- tuting a unitary force compounded from the more elementary ones, merged in it in such a way that, if our knowledge were complete enough, the several vital activities might be

LIVING MATTER

expressed somewhat as are the complex curves of geometry. The essential point of this theory lies in its insistence that the vital activity is a unit and not a compound thing. A method of dynamic notation is greatly needed in this connection.

Mtcroicopie Structure, Casual examina- tion of protoplasm, even with rather low magnifying powers, shows that it is hy no means homogeneous ; and the more thorough the examination, the more forcibly is this differentiation impressed upon the observer. When properly prepared by suitable reagents it is seen to be composed of a more fluid portion or plasma (cytolymph, enchylema, or ground-substance), and a more dense material, the spongioplasm. The latter must not, how- ever, be regarded as normally a solid, for living substcmce as a whole is unquestionably liquid.

The theories of protoplasmic structure fall into two general classes : those which regard the more fluid plasma as the essential vital part, and those which regard the more dense frame- work as the essentifJ, the interstitial substance serving simply as a vehicle for nutrition, &c. Though the former of these views is supported by several eminent authorities, yet the great majority of observers hold to the latter con- ception in some form, or regard both ingredi- ents as equally essential. But these observers are by no means agreed as to the nature of the spongioplasm. We have, accordingly, from this point of view, four theories of protoplasmic structure : —

I. The granular theory. The microscope does unquestionably reveal the presence of numerous granules both in living and in prepared protoplasm, and they have given rise to much speculation. They have been variously termed micellae, pangens, ideo- blasts, ideosomes,pla8tidule8,bioplast8, gemmae, biogens, biosomes, microsomes, &c. The latter term is perhaps the most unobjectionable, as involving less of hypothetical interpretation. Many authors regard these bodies as a sort of biological unit of lower order than the cell. The existence of such units was postulated from theoretical grounds by several of the earlier authors (Spencer's ' physiological units,' Nageli's ' micellae,' Darwias ' gemmules,' &c.), and they figure very largely in the writings of sevenJ recent authors (notably Weismann and Altmann).

n. The filar theory. According to this conception, usoally ascribed to Flemming, the spongioplasm is composed of interlacing

threads which do not unite to form a reti- culum.

III. The reticular theory. The structure is conceived of as a mass of threads which are combined into a more or less regular network. This reticular appearance is very often ob- served, though it is not always possible to prove that the fibres actually anastomose. The microsomes are often seen in connection with it, either at the nodes of the reticulum or strung along the fibres. Probably the majority of competent observers, at least until very recently, have held to this view.

IV. The alveolar theory. This we owe primarily to Btltschli, whose researches upon artificial foams lend some support to the belief that protoplasm is a microscopic foam or emulsion of two liquids of difierent densi- ties. The fibres of the other theories are the walls of the vesicles of this emulsion as seen in optical section. This idea is being adopted, wholly or partially, by a rapidly increasing number of both zoologists and botanists, particularly those of the younger generation.

Probably no one of these conceptions ex- presses the whole truth. Indeed, Wilson has very recently brought forth strong direct evidence that the alveolar spheres, microsomes, and some, at least, of the true thread struc^ tures of the cytoplasm, are all different grada- tions of one structure. He agrees with Kolliker that 'no universal or even general formula for protoplasmic structure can be given,' and adds: 'Life in its fuU sense is the property of the cell-system as a whole rather than of any one of its separate elements. Nevertheless, we are perhaps justified in maintaining that the continuous substance is the most constant and active element, and that which forms the fundamental basis of the system, transforming itself into granules, drops, fibrillae, or networks in accordance with varying physiological needs.'

Properties, Since the dawn of science, there has been a strong tendency towards mysticism in the ti-eatment of all phenomena connected with life. Of the commonly enu- merated fundamental physiological properties (spontaneity, irritability, contractility, growth, reproduction, &c.), all, except possibly the last, when rigidly defined, can be shown to be manifested in some degree under proper couditions by dead substances. The specific living substance contains no elements not found in unoi^ganized matter, though, as we have seen, these elements are probably arranged in a characteristic manner. If we follow

lo

LIVING MATTER

Yerwom and say that ' the life-process con- nsts in the metaholism of proteids/ it is plain ihat there is no room here for any meta- physical agency, since metaholism is merely the snm of the chemical processes going on within the hody.

The present tendency is to study the properties of living beings in the same way as we do the properties of other physical bodies, viz. experimentally. This, of course, has always b^n the method of physiology, hat of late it has been widely extended into the fields of experimental morphology and experimental embryology, in the hope of determining, not only what the phenomena of these sciences are, bat how they came to be so. Since all vital manifestations can probably be reduced to responses of the living material to the forces impinging upon it from the environment, this study resolves itself into two problems, viz. the intrinsic proper- ties of the reacting substance as such, and the specific effects of outer forces upon this substance.

The former problem includes the study of the protoplasmic constants, such as general chemical properties, physical structure, here- dity, &c., and is far less advanced than the latter. Since in nature these two fiEUitors are always represented in every vital pheno- menon, for scientific purposes they must be artificially separated, either by logical analysis or actually, under experimental conditions. Hence the motive for the present tendency towards experimental biology. It must be admitted that this analysis has not yet been carried very &r. Even Hebxdity (q. v.), the name given to the self-perpetuation of vital processes from generation to generation, is not rigidly true to type, i. e. variations occur, whose connection with external conditions cannot always be traced, and the embryo- logists are divided into opposing schools on the question of the relative importance to the course of the ontogeny of intrinsic, i. e. in- herited, factors and those which are extrinsic, i. e. determined by the direct action of the environment. This is the modem phase of the old controversy between Pbefobmation and EnoENBSis (see those terms, and cf. Wil- son, The Cell in Development and Inheritcmce, particularly the last chapter).

All the phenomena of growth, however much they may be dependent upon inherent structure, are also affected variously by environmental influences. For instance, the necessity for the division of a growing body

into units (cells) of small size is due simply to the fact that during growth the absorbing surface, by which alone nutriment can enter the protoplasm, increases as the square of the radius, while the protoplasmic mass, in which the consumption of nutriment takes place, increases as the cube of the radius. Obvi- ously a limit is soon reached beyond which nutriment cannot be absorbed as fast as it is consumed, and either growth must cease or the mass must be divided so as to permit an increase of surface without a corresponding increase of mass. One of the most striking cases of the influence of external forces upon the course of development has been recently brought out by Loeb, who finds that unferti- lized eggs of searurchins, if put into water containiDg a definite proportion of magnesium chloride for a short time and then transferred to ordinary sea water, will develop into normal larvae without previous fertilization. See Pabthenooenesis (artificial).

Again, observation shows that different organisms are adapted to very diverse environ- mental conditions, so that what is favourable to one may be fatal to another. This pre- sumably rests upon a difference in the structural organization of the protoplasm. But experiment teaches us that an animal or plant may, by gradually changing the external conditions of life, be acclimated or accommo- dated to an environment which would have been fatal to it before. This change in the condi- tions of life may be brought about in a race by natural selection, or it may be produced in an individual by the direct influence of the environment upon the living matter. Daven- port explains the latter case by the assump- tion of a specific kind of molecule in the protoplasm which is capable of responding to a certain stimulus. The repeated application of this stimulus might destroy these molecules faster than they could be replaced, and in consequence the organism would in the end be unable to respond to this particular stimulus. If the stimulus is an injurious one, the organism would no longer be injured by it. This hypothesis would explain, not only acclimatization, but also immunity after innoculations, &c.

Many attempts have been made to localize the various vital processes within the cell. Thus, the chromatin of the nucleus is regarded by many as the specific bearer of heredity. It is, however, impossible wholly to exclude the participation of the cytoplasm in the process of fertilization. The nucleus, more-

II

LIVINO MATTER

over, is sometimeB spoken of as the source of the chemical energy of the cell, though it is more correctly descrihed as the centre of the metaholic actiyities of the cell. The naclens is sometimes seen to migrate in a large cell to the point of most active growth, and in other cases is enlarged and cnriously modified in corrilation with special metaholic functions of its cell. It is well known that non-nucleated hits of protoplasm, while they may ingest and partially digest food, are incapable of assimi- lating it, and hence soon perish. On the other hand, experiments show that the nucleus is also incapable of prolonged life without the cytoplasm. It has also been shown that, though nucleated bits of protoplasm are in many different organisms capable of regenerating the whole body, nevertheless there is a limit of size (which differs in different animals) below which such regeneration cannot occur, on account of deficient organization, even though all the other conditions seem to be fulfilled. Thus, Lillie found that a nucleated fragment of the protozoan Stentor could regenerate the whole body, provided it con- tained at least one twenty-seventh of the mass of the normal Stentor, but not if smaller than this.

The reactions of organisms to external stimuli are reduced in last analysis to re- actions of their individual cells; they can therefore best be studied in the unicellular animals and plants, since here each cell can express its proper reaction by free movement. Accordingly, we have an extensive series of researches upon the reactions of such cells to external stimuli, giving us the following types of simple responsive movements: (i) chemo- taxift, response to chemical stimuli; (2) phototaxis (helioti-opism), response to lumi- nous stimuli; (3) thermotaxis, response to thermal stimuli; (4) hydrotaxis, movements towards or from moisture; (5) barotaxis, movements determined by pressure, and in- cluding (a) thigmotaxis (stereotaxis), move- ments towards or from a solid object; (6) rheotaxiR, movements with reference to tJie direction of flow . of a current of liquid ; (c) geotaxis, movements with reference to the direction of gravity; (6) tonotaxis, move- ments with reference to the density of the medium ; (7) galvanotaxis (electrotaxis), move- ments with reference to electrical stimuli.

It is to bis noted that these simple re- actions, which are common to animals and plants, include nearly all (and perhaps quite all) the elements of the sinapler reflexes of

higher animals. These reflexes, therefore, aa Loeb has so forcibly argued, are not to be regarded as functions of nerve cells only, but rather of protoplasm as such.

The preceding reactions may all be described as ' directive effects of unilateral stimulation ' (Yerwom). Of course, they are not confined to unicellular organisms^ for free cells within the bodies of higher animals (leucocytes, sperm cells, &c.) undoubtedly obey these laws ; so also many of the movements of the bodies and organs of these animals, such as the various tropisms recognized in physiology. Even when fr'ee movement of the reacting cells is prevented by the adjacent tissues, the forces underlying chemotaxis, &c., undoubtedly govern intra-cellular life to a large extent. This is best iUustrated by the selection of food. Thus, each of the various types of cells of the body, all of which are bathed in a common nutrient fluid — the body lymj^ — selects the materials of which it has need, and no others.

The ultimat-e explanation of all these re- actions is, naturally, to be sought in internal organization. The importance of the latter factor is also shown by the &ct that the same reaction often follows from very diverse stimuli. For instance, muscular contraction can be evoked by chemical, mechanical, thermal, or electrical stimulation. In other words, the organization of contractilis sub- stance is such that if its vital equilibrium is disturbed by any cause whatever, its energy is discharged in a single mode. It follows that any living tiseue which has any considerable structural differentiation possesses a certain Specific Enkbot (q. v.), though just howfarthe * specific energy ' of any given oi^gan (notably among the sense organs, where the term was first applied) is due to internal cellular organi- zation of the primary reacting cells, and how far to differences in the connections of these cells with other cells, is still an open question.

Literature: Chemical composition: Bohob, Lehrb. d. physiol. u. pathol. Chemie (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1894); Gamoee, Physiological Chemistry of the Animal Body (London, 1880); KossEL, Ueber die chenusche Zusam- mensetzung derZelle, Arch. f.Anat. u. Physiol., Physiol. Abth. (189 1); Lea, Chemical Basis of the Animal Body, Appendix to Foster^s Physiol. (6th ed.); Malfatti, Zur Chemie des Zellkems, Ber. d. naturw.-med. Yereins za Innsbruck, xx (189 1-2); Neitmeistsb, Lehtb. d. physiol. Chemie (2nd ed., Jena, 1897); PFLtJOBB, Ueber die physiologische Verbren-

12

LIVING MATTER

niiDg in den lebendigen Organismeu, Arcb. 1 d. ges. Physiol., z (1875); Rbxkks and RomwAi^D, Stnd. a. das Protoplasma (Berlin, 1 881); ScHWABZ, Die niorphologische nod ehemiache ZosammensetznngdesProtoplasmas, Beitr. z. Biol. d. Pflanzen, v (Breslaii, 1887) ; ZnroFrsKT, Ueber die Orosse des Hamoglo- binmolecflls, Zeitseh. f. physiol. Chemie, z (1885) ; Losw, Die chemische Energie der lebenden Z^llen (Munich, 1899); The Fro- teids of Living Matter, Science, N.S., zi (1900).

Microscopic stmctore: IL Altmann, Die ElementarorganismeD u. ihre Beziehungen za den Zellen (2nd ed., Leipzig; 1894) ; Q, F. Andbbws, The Liviog Sabitance as sach and as Organism, J. of Morphol., ziL No. 2, snppl. (1897); Th. Botsbi, Zellenstudien, Jena. Zeitsck f. Naturwiss., N. F.,ziT (1887),

ZT (1888), ZVii (1890); O. BUTSCBLI,

UntersnclL ii. mikr. Schaume n. das Proto- plasma (Leipzig, 1892 ; Eng. trans, with eztensiye bibliog., London, 1894); J. B. Cabvot, a series of articles in La Cellule, i. ff. ; Y. Delaob, La Structure du Proto- plasma et les Th^ries sur I'H^rMit^ (Paris, 1895); T. W. Engblicakn, Zur Anatomic nnd Phjsiologie der Flimmerzellen, Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., zziii (1880); B. v. Eslanqeb, Nenere Ansichten iiber die Struktur des Protoplasmas, Zool. Centralbl., iii (1896); W. ELEMMiiro^Zellsubstanz, Kern u. Zelltheilung (Leipzig, 1882); Neue Beitiiige zur Kennt- niss der Zelle, ii. Theil, Arch. f. mikr. Anat., zzzTii (1891); M. Hbidenhaik, Ueber Kern und Protoplasma, Festschr. f. Kblliker (1893); L. F. Hbnkbgut, Lemons sur la Cellule (Paris, 1896); O. Hebtwio, Die Zelle und die Oewebe (Jena, 1892; Eng. trans.. The Cell, Outlines of General Anat. and Physiol., London and New York, 1895); C. Naoeli, Mechanisch-physiol. Theorie der Abstam- mungslehre (Munich and Leipzig, 1884) ; E. A. ScHAFEB, On the Structure of Amoeb. Protoplasm, Proc. Roy. Soc. (London, 1891); E. SraASBUBOBB, Zellbildung und Zellteilnng (3rd ed., Jena, 1 880) ; Stud. (i.das Protoplasma, Jena. &itsch. f. Naturwiss., z (1876); W. WAitDETEB, Die neueren Ansichten tlber den Bau und das Wesen der Zelle, Deutsch. med. Wochensch. (1895); A. Weisicaitn, Essays upon Heredity aud kindred Biol. Problems (trans, from the Oerman; 2 vols., Ozford, 1892) ; The Qerm-Plasm, a Theory of Here- dity (trans.. New York, 1893) ; J. Wiesnbb, Die Elementarstruktur u. das Wachstum d, lebenden Substanz (Vienna, 1892); E. B.

Wilson, The Cell in DeveL and Inherit- ance (New Y<»rk and London, 1898); The Structure . of Protoplasm, in Biol. Loots, delivered at the Marine Biol. Lab. 1898-9 (Boston, 1 899), also in Science, N.S., z, July 14, 1899; A. ZiBUfEBMANN, Die Morphologic und Physiologic des pflanzlichen Zellkemes, cine krit. Litteraturstudie (Jena, 189^).

Properties: Bbbtbelot, Fization directe de I'Azote atmospb^rique libre par certains Termins argileuz, C. R.Acad. d.8ci., ci(i885), czy (1892), czvi (1893); A. Binbt, The Psychic Life of Micro-organisms (authorized trans., Chicago, 1890); G. Bobk, Ueber Yer- wachsungsversucbe mil Amphibienlarven, Arch. f. Entwicklongsmech., iv (1896); H. Buchkeb, Die chemische Reizbarkeit der Leukocyien, &e., Sitzber. d. Ges. f. MorphoL u. Physiol, z. Mttnchen, vi (1891); C. B. Daten- FOBT, A Preliminary Catalogue of the Pro- cesses concerned in Ontogeny, Bull. Mus. Compar. Zool., zzvii. 6 (1895); Ezper. Morphol., Pt. I (New York and London, 1897), Pt. II (1899 ; contains eztensive classified bibliogi-aphies) ; Davekpobt and Castle, On the Acclimatization of Organisms to High Temperatures, Arch. f. Entwick- lungsmech., ii. 2 (1895); Dayenpobt and Nbal, On the Acclimatization of Organisms to Poisonous Chemical Substances, Arch. f. Entwicklungsmech., ii. 4 (1896) ; R. Dubois, Sur la Perception des Radiations lumineuses par le Peau, chez les Prot^es aveugles des Grottes de la Carniole, C. IL Acad. d. Sci., cz (1890); H. Dbiesch, Heliotropismus bei Hydroidenpolypen, Zool. Jabrb., System. Abth., y (1890); Entwicklungsmech. Stud., i-vi, Zeitseh. f. wiss. Zool. (1891-3); Analytische Theorie d. organischen Entwickluug (Leipzig, 1894); Stnd. fi. das Regulationsvermpgen d. Organismen, Arch. f. Entwicklungsmech., t (1897); Th. Eimeb, Die Eutstehung der Arten auf Grund von Vererben erworb. Eigen- schaften (Jena, 1888; Eng. ti*ans., London, 1890) ; T. W. Engelmank, Uber Licht* und Farbenperception niederster Organistneo, ArcL f. d. ges. Physiol., zziz (1882); Bacterium photometricum, ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Physiologic des Licht- und Farbensinns, Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., zzz (1883) ; Ueber Bewegnngen der Zapfen und Pigmentzellen der Netehaut, &c.. Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., zzzv (1885) ; ^' ▼• Ebuln- GEB, Die neuesten Ansichten ii. die Zelltheil- ung und ibre Mechanik, Zool. Centralbl., iii (1896) ; L. Ebbaba, On the Cause of Physio- logical Action at a Distance, Rep. Brit. Assoc.

J3

LIVING MATTER

Adv. Sci- (1892); C. W. Haroitt, Experi- mental Studies upon Hydromedusae, Biol. Bull., i. 1(1899); M. Hridenhaik, Cyto- mechanische Studien, Arch. f. Entwicklongs- mech., i. 4 (1895); C. Hebbst, Ueber die Bedeutung der Beizphysiologie fiir die kansale Auffassung von Yorgangen in der tierischen Ontogenese, Biol. CentralbL,xiv-xv( 1894-5); Ueber die zur Entwickelung der Seeigellarven nothwend. anorg. Stoffe^ i. Theil, Arch. f. Entwicklungsniech., v (1897); 0. Hkbtwio, Ueber den Einfluss der Temperatur auf die Entwick., Arch. f. mikr. Anat., li (1898); W. E. Gabbet, The Effects of Ions upon the Ag- gregation of Flagellated Infusoria, Amer. J. of Physiol., iii (1900); W. His, Unsere Korper- form und das physiologische Problem ihrer Entstehung (Leipzig, 1874); Ueber me- chanische Qrundvor^nge thierischer For- menbildung, Arch. f. Anat. u. Physiol., Anat. Abth. (1894); H. S. Jenxings, The Psy- chology of a Protozoon, Amer. J. of Psychol., X. 4 (1899); The Behaviour of Unicellular Organisms, Woods HoU Biol. Lects. for 1899 (Boston) ; Studies on Reactions to Stimuli in Unicellular Organisms — I. Reactions to Che- mical, Osmotic, and Mechanical Stimuli in the Ciliate Infusoria, J. of Physiol., xxi (1897) ;

II. The Mechanism of the Motor Reactions of Paramecium, Amer. J. of Physiol., ii (1899) >

III. Reactions to Localized Stimuli in Spiro- stomum and Stentor, Amer. Natural., xxxiii (1899); lY. Laws of Chemotaxis in Para- mecium, Amer. J. of Physiol., ii (1899); Y. On the Movements and Motor Reflexes of the Flagellata and Cillata, Amer. J. of Physiol., iii (1900) ; — Reactions of Infusoria to Chemi- cals, a Criticism, Amer. Natural., xxxiv (1900); P. Jensen, Ueber den Qeotropismus niederer Organismen, Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., liii (1893) ; ^* KoKSCHELT, Beitriige zur Mor- phologic und Physiologic des Zellkems, Zool. Jahrb., Abth. f. Anat., iv (1889); F. E. Lillie, On the Smallest Parts of Stentor capable of Regeneration, a Contribution on the Limits of Div i sibility of Living Matter, J. of Morphol ., xii. I (1896); J. LoEB, Einleitung in die vergleichende Gehimphysiologie und verglei- chende Psychologic, &c. (Leipzig, 1899 ; Eng. trans., 1900) ; On the Artificial Production of Normal Larvae (Arbacia), Amer. J. of Physiol, iii. 9 (1900), and Science, N.S., xi. No. 277 (1900); O. LoEW, Ein natilrliches System der Gifl-Wirkungen (Munich, 1893); The Energy of the Living Substance (Loudon, 1896); E. MACH,Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen (Jena, 1886); Die Principien der Warmelehre

(Leipzig, 1896); J. Massabt, La Sensibilite k Concentration chez les £tres unicellulaires marins, BulL Acad. Roy. Belg. (3) xxii (1891); Sur rirritabilit^ des Noctiluques, Bull. Sci. France et Belg., xxv (1893); E. Maupas, Sur la Puissance de Multiplication des Infu- soires cili^s, C. R. Acad. d. Sci., civ (1887) ; E. Metschnikoff, Lemons sur la Patholngie compar^e de I'lnflammation (Paris, 1892) ; C. S. MiNOT, Senescence and Rejuvenation, J. of Physiol., xii (189 1) ; T. H. Mobqan, Ex- perimental Studies on Echinodei-m Eggs, Anat. Anz., ix. 5, 6 (1893); Studies of the ' Partial' Larvae of Sphaerechinus, Arch. f. Entwick- lungsmech., ii. i (1895); Half Embryos and Whole Embryos from one of the first two Blastomeres of the Frog's Egg, Anat. Anz., x. 19(1895); The Fertilization of Non-nucleated Fragments of Echinoderm Eggs, Arch. f. Ent- wicklungsmech., ii. 2 (1895); The Production of Artificial Astrospheres, Arch. f. Entwick- lungsmech., iii (1896); W. A. Naoel, Ueber Galvanotaxis, Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., lix (1895); Der Lichtsinn augenloser Thiere (Jena, 1896) ; W. Ppeffeb, Ueber chemotakt. Bewegungen, Untersuch. Bot. Inst. Tubin- gen, ii (1888); Julia B. Platt, On the Specific Gravity of Spirostomum, Paramecium, and the Tadpole, Amer. Natural., xxxiii (1899); H. QuiKCKE, Ueber den Einfluss des Lichtes auf den Thierk5rper, Arch. f. d. ge& Physiol., Ivii (1894) ; A. Raubeb, Ueber den Einfluss der Temperatur, Sitzber. d. Naturf.-Ges. z. Leipzig, x (1884); W. Roux, Qesammelte Abhandl. tt. Entwick- lungsmech. d. Organismen (Leipzig, 1895); H. S. Russell, The Effects of Mechanical Movement, Bot. Qaz., xvii (1892); J. Saghs, Gesammelte Abhandl. ii. Pflanzenphysiol. (Leipzig, 1892); A. Schapeb, Experimental Studies, J. Boston Soc. Med. Sci. (Jan., 1898) ; Arch. f. Entwicklungsmech., vi (1898); O. V. SiCHEBEB, Chemotaxis der Warmbliiter- Leukocyten ausserhalb des Korpers, Mdnch. med. Wochensch., xliii (1896); E. Stbas- BUBOEB, Wirkung des Lichtes und der Warme auf Schwarmsporen, Jena. Zeitsch. f. Natur- wiss., xii (1878); H. M. Vbbnon, The Effect of Environment on the Development of Echino- derm Larvae, an Experimental Inquiry into the Causes of Variation, Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc, clxxxvi. B (1895) ; M.Vebwobn, Psycho- physiologische Protistensiudien (Jena, 1889) ; Allg. Physiol. (Jena, 1897) ; General Physio- logy, an Outline of the Science of Life (Eng. trans., London and New York, 1899; contains a good bibliography) ; A. D. Walleb, Galvano-

14

LOCAL SIGN — LOCALIZATION

tiopism of Tadpoles, Sci. Progress, iv(i895); S. WatasA, On the Nature of Cell-Organiza- tion, Woods HoU Biol. Lects., 1893 (Boston); C. O. Whitman, The Seat of Formative and Regeoeratiye Energy, J. of Morphol.,ii(i888); The Inadequacy of the Cell-theory of Develop- ment, Woods HoU Biol. Lects., 1893 (Boston); Evolution and Epigenesis, Woods Holl BioLLect?., 1894 (Boston); S. R. Wil- liams, The Specific Gravity of some Fresh- water Animals in relation to their Habits, Development, and Composition, Amer. Natural., xxxiv(i90o); S. Wikoobadskt, Kecherches BUT les Oiganismes de la Nitrification, Ann. d. rinsU Pasteur, iv (i 890) ; Kecherches sur T As- similation, Arch, des Sci. Biol, de St.-Peters- bour^ iii (1895); ^ ^' Yebkes, Eeaction of Elntomostraca to Stimulation by Light, Amer. J. of Phyuol., iii. 4 (1899) ; E. Yuno, Contri- butions k THistoire de I'Influence des Milieux physiques sur les £tres vivants, Arch, de ZooL, vii (1878), and 2nd series, i (1883); De Tln- fluence des Lumi^res colorees sur le D^veloppe- ment des Animaux, Mitteil. d. zool. Stat, zu Neapel, ii (1880), and C. B. Acad. d. Sci., cxv (1892); L. Zendeb, Die Entstehung des Lebens ans mechanischen Grundlagen ent- wickelt, Pte. I and II (TQbingen, 1900) ; O. Hertwio, Zeit- und Streitfragen der Biologie (Jena, i. 1894, ii. 1897); E. B. Wilson, Becent Aspects of Biological Research ; Origin of Life and Heredity, Int. MoDthly, ii. (1900). (H.H.)

Xrocal Sign : Ger. Lokdlzeichen ; Fr. signes locatix ; Ital. segni loeaU. A specific 'shading' or 'colouring' of certain sensations whereby every such sensation is invariably referred to a definite position upon the organ or else- where in space.

The local signs of pressure may be regarded either dM intensive differences of thickness in the epidermis, differences in tightness of the stretdiing of the skin over underlying parts, &c. (Lotze), or as qualitative (Wundt). The local signs of vision may be simple sensations set up by reflex movements of ocular rotation (Lotze, Helmholtz), similarity and difference of neighbouring and remote impressions (Lipps), or complexes of ' movement ' sensations and retinal qualities (see Indibsct Vision), such as gradations in colour tone (Wundt, Baldwin). Some sort of local sign is a neces- sity for theories of space-perception of the class designated genetic nativism in the ai*ticle Ex- TSVBioir (q. ▼•)' ^^ ^rxiA cases localization can be shown, by experiment, to imply the existence of a disparate local sign : so tactual

localization by association with vision. This fact is, so far, an argument for the existence, in other cases, of a local sign in kind. See Space (perception of), and Extension. (£.b.t.)

This sort of localization should be dis- tinguished from the perception of space or of extension. See Sfagialization. Specific Localization in Space (q. v., i) may require a local sign independently of or in addition to the data of tlie perception of extensiou, as appears negatively in the vague Localization OF Sounds (q. v., also Localization in Space, 2). (j.m.b.)

Literature: Lotze, Med. Psychol. (1852); Stumpf, Ursprung d. Raumvorstellung, 86 ff.; Zeitsch. f. Psychol., iv. 70 ff. ; KtJLPE, Out- lines of Psychol., 344, 368 ff.; Sanfobd, Course in Exper. Psychol., expt. i ; Helh- HOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2iid ed.), 670, 947; Wundt, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 36 ff., 231 ff. ; Human and Animal Psychol., 168 f. ; Outlines of Psychol., 105, 127, 134 ff.; Lippb, Psychol. Stud. (1885), i; Grundthatsachen d. Seelenlebens, 476 f., 488 ff., 513 ff., 542 ff. ; FuNKE, in Heimann's Handb. d. Physiol., III. ii. 404 ff. See also under Extension. (b.b.t.)

J^ooaliMfction (cerebral) [Lat. locfus, place] : Ger. corticcJe Locaiisatian ; Fr. localisatioru eerehrales (generally plural); Ital. loealizza- zioni funzionali del cerveUo. (i) The doctrine that various parts of the brain have relatively distinct functions.

(2) The theory that certain psychical and physiological functions are limited to definite areas or regions of the brain (especially the distribution of conscious activities, such as visual, auditory, and other sensations, as well as voluntary movement of various groups of muscles, to sharply limited areas of cortex).

The theory in its broadest form is thoroughly substantiated by anatomical, pathological, and experimental data.

Two distinct tendencies are represented by the schools headed by Ferrier and Munk on the one hand, and Goltz on the other; the one school claiming that well-defined areas may be recognized, whose functions are limited to reactions upon a single set of muscles or a single class of sensory dis- turbances, or both; the other laying great emphasis on the unity of the brain, and the fact that injury to any region affects the whole cortex, altering the psychical tone as a whole. Munk claims that such motor dis- turbances as occur after injury, e.g. to the parietal cortex, depend upon an impairment

16

LOCALIZATION

of the sensations nooessary to the release of snch movements.

Frohably the two views are not necessarily antagonistic when properly interpreted. It may be granted that certain areas of cortex actuwy stand primarily related to certain groaps of muscles (or their myelonic centres), and certain other ^reas receive the stimali elaborated in the primary projection centre for one organ of special sense; but it may still be trae that every mental presentation is a result of a process of equilibration in the entire organ, and thus that a localized injury will express itself in alterations of mental tone rather than a simple abolition of a single kind of mental expression or a specific modi- fication of consciousness.

The undoubted fact of substitutional functioning is not difficult to understand in view of the great complexity of the cortex, and especially of the far-reaching inter- communication of its different regions.

The precise and minute delimitation of the motor and sensory areas is of great practical importance as an aid in diagnosis and operation in intra-cranial iniuries ; but it has much less significance for tne proper construction of mental processes than has sometimes been supposed.

Our most reliable data are derived from experimental study of lower animals and records of autopsies in cases of brain trauma. Naturally the results of complete extirpation of the hemispheres have not been observed in man. In a few instances such an operation has succeeded in dogs, with results such as the following : strong irritation of the skin caused the animal to growl and bite, loud noises awakened him from sleep, taste of food excited impulse to eat, and he reacted to some extent to visual stimuli. On the other hand, originative power was destroyed and all trace of recognition and memory was obliterated. In other words, although com- plicated cyclical reflexes exist, there is no evidence of psychic functions of the higher orders. All voluntary motion is, of course, impossible.

The researches of Munk have proved the very minute delimitation of the motor areas for the limbs and body regions, and also for the special senses. The centrifugal paths from the various parts of the cortical field for vision are said to be arranged to cor- respond quite minutely with the parts repre- senting the various parts of the retina, so that visual stimuli give rise to co-ordinated

oculo-motor reflexes appropriate to direct the axes of vision towaids the segment of the retina stimulated, and experimental irritation of these cortical regions calls out the same reflexes— the subject not being under the influence of an anaesthetic.

Removal of a single cortical motor centre, or the cortical centres for both limbs on one side, results in the permanent prevention of all independent voluntary motions of the corresponding muscles, but such motions as are performed in conmion with other organs, especially those of the corresponding muscka of the other side, may still be performed. So walking, swimming, and co-ordinated motions may coexist with a true cortical hemiplegia, thus showing that the volitional stimulus for correlated motions passes via a secondary apparatus below the cortex. The arrangement explains the possibility of an acquired quasi-reflex mechanism. The areas for general sensation correspond in general to

Fig. I (ndnced from N»onyn). The three cortical fields for aphMia. Areas the injury of which may prodaoe disturbances of speech. A, Broca's region, or that oontroUing the motor activities of speech, injury to which produces motor or atactic aphasia. B. Wernicke's area (hindennost two-thirds of first temporal oonvolation). Injury of this area of cortex prodaoes auditory aphasia. C Visual speech area, injury to which produces word-blindness and visual aphasia.

the cortical motor areas for the same regions, though the two are not mutually inclusive. The reported loss of sensation due to operative ii^ry of the hippocampal region and iimbic lobe is probably due to simultaneous injuiy of corona fibres which here lie near the surface.

While removal of the cortical areas for the extremities destroys permanently the tactile sensations for the corresponding members, the general sensitiveness remains, as also the response to painful irritation. The localized tactile sense is abolished, while 6

LOCALIZATION

general seaaation and •pain are eimply modified or diminislied.

The explanation of the facta of localiza- tion is attended with dlfficnlties, bnt it is rendered eimpler by recent his- tological researches (see ^Aiir, and Nbbtods Btstbu). Monk refers the loss of motor and sen- sory power resulting from extir- pation of the cortical areas to the prevention of the formation of the motor and sensorj pre- sentations. A dog whose visual sphere is removed may then be said to suffer psychical blind- ness, and it wonld be but a step to add that the motor inco-or- dination resulting &om injuries to the ceatres for the exti'e- niities is a psychical paralyais (cf. PsTCHic DinisiiBSB). The minute delimitation of the areas for each segment of a sensory field is rendered impossible by the overlapping and intercommuni- cation between them, but there is no reason to doubt the exis- tence of such extensive repre- sentation on the cortex. The most recent experiments all con- firm the idea that the entire cortical representative apparatus reacts as a single mechanism, eo that every 'state of conBoiou&- aeas* is in a sense the pro- duct of the equilibration of the totsli^ of cortical activities. The preponderance of activity in one sensory sphere affects this rap- port, in a way constituting a conscioos excitation of that sense. It follows that any iqjoiy to one part of the cortex not only abolishes the vestiges of previous excitations of that sense, but enfeebles the entire intelligence, by cutting out a variety of asso- ciational vestiges, both of the lost sense excitations and of pre- sentations in which they formed an essential part, though originating in other spheres.

Details of localization may be gathered from the figures.

Bittorical. That the brain is in some way associated with thought was recognized very eariy, and this view prevaUed among the

Greek physicians, in spite of the fact that Aristotle described the brain as the most bloodless and inert organ of the body, de- signed simply to regulate the heat of the

latter, much as the condensing vapours of the sky mitigate summer heat and drought. I^- thagoras, Hippocrates, and Plato clearly recog- nized the head as the seat of the intellect and will, while in the days of Ptolemy Soter some attempt was made to localize funddons. Era- sistratus believed that the sensory nerves

'7

LOCALIZATION

spring from the meninges, while the motor are derived from the substance of the brain itself (a view intelligible when we take into account the close attachment of the sensory ganglia to the meninges). Blerophilus is said to have anticipated Descartes in the belief that the vital forces reside in the ventricles, a view to which the followers of Gklen also subscribed. The Arabian physicians and their successors extended the doctrine of localiza- tion. Albertus Magnus assigned judgment to the frontal regions, imagination to the pa- rietal, and memory to the occipital. The notion of animal spirits within the ventricles survived to some extent till the i8th century.

where the agitation is communicated to the central mass of vital fluids therein. The currents thus produced may, under suitable conditions, pass out through the motor nerves to muscles, producing what are now called reflexes. The soul itself is lodged in the ' pineal body/ which was selected from among the organs of the body because of its central azygous position and its close connection with the ventricles. The soul is usually afi^ected by the currents setting from the body, and fabricates its presentations from the impres- sion thus derived, but it also impresses its own acts upon the vital fluids, giving rise to motor currents. Aimless eddies may produce

Fig. 5. Zones and centrei of the lateral aspect of the hiunan cerebrum. (After Mills.)

Malpighi was the first to ascribe the higher Ainctions to the grey matter.

Descartes was the first to elaborate a con- sistent theory of brain functioning. Influenced by Harvey's discovery of the mechanics of circulation, he taught that the friction in- volved in circulation sufficed to vaporize and excite various elements of the blood. Some of these elements pass to the reproductive organs, and behave as the forerunners of Darwin s gemmules might be expected to do, while others, destined to the brain, there evolve the gaseous animal spirits on which nervous action depends. All nerves are tubes containing these spirits. In the sensory nerves the currents set towards the brain.

phantasy, and there is a separate mental activity to correspond to each form of dis- turbance in the vital humours.

Descartes' speculations prepared the way for a variety of localization theories. Willis located memory in the convolutions, imagina- tion in the ciJlosum, sense-perception in the striatum, visual perception in the thalamus, and involuntary motion in the cerebel- lum. Meyer, on the other hand, regarded the cerebellum as the organ of abstraction, and located memory in the roots of the cranial nerves. Thus the way was prepared for Gall and Spurzheim. Gall's theory rested on the assumption that the skull depends for its form upon the growing brain, that there-

18

LOCALIZATION

fore its sorfiBLce reflects the state of develop- ment of the brain, and that size and configu- ration alone determine mental power. To these may be added snndiy cmde psycho- logical postulates. Though phrenology is primarily a system of psychology, its popu- larity depended on the purely empirical form in which it was clothed, while what really gave it its power with the masses was the hct that it served to give a scientific character to certain theories which survived astrology under the name of physiognomy or cheiro- mancy.

The researches of Broca, by which he was enabled, in i86t, to locate a cortical centre for articulate speech, mark the real beginning of the modem doctrine of cortical localization. For a time all disturbances of speech were referred to this area. Our present know- ledge permits us to state that lesions of the posterior portion, or pars operculariSj of the third firontal gyms (commonly known as Bnx^i's convolution, marked ' speech ' on Fig. 3) produce motor aphasia, called 'Broca's type,' but many hold that it is amnesic afiiasia, the pure motor aphasia arising from a subcortical lesion. The accidental discovery by Fritsch and Hitzig^ during the Franco- IVnssian War, that the galvanic current applied to the cortex is capable of exciting the motor mechanism, opened the way for experi- mental researches, and from this time onward the pathological method and the experimental have co-operated in the cultivation of this field. For details of localization in the case of speech, see Speech and its Defects.

LiUratwre : besides the general treatment in the various physiological psychologies, the following special memoirs may be consulted: Beevob and Hobsley, A Minute Analysis of Cortical Centres in the Monkey, Philos. Trans. Boy. Soc. (1887, 1888); also Arrangement of the Excitable Fibres of the Internal Capsule of the Bonnet Monkey, Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc. (1890, B); Bboca, Sur le Si^ge de la Faculty du Langage articull, &c. (Paris, 1861); J. M. Chabcot and A. Pitbeb, Les Centres moteurs corticaux chez THomme (Paris, 1895); H. H. Dokaldsok, Report of Six Lectures on Cerebral Localization, Amer. J. of PsychoL, iv (1891); L. F. Babkeb, The Sense-areas and Association-centres in the Brain, as described by Flechsig, J. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis., xxiv (June 6, 1897); L. EdikgbB) The Significance of the Cortex considered in connection with a Report upon a Dog from which the whole Cerebrum had

19

been removed by Professor Gk>ltz, J. of Compar. Neurol., iii (June, 1893); Exneb, Untersuch. U. die Localisation d. Functionen in d. Grosshimrinde des Menschen (1884); Febbieb, The Functions of the Brain (18*76) ; Floubeks, Becherches exp6rimentales sur les Propri^t^s et les Fonctions dn Syst. nerv. (1824); Fbitsch and Hirzio, Ueber die electrische Erregbarkeit des Grosshims (1870); GoLTZ, in Pflflger's Arch. (1876- 84), various articles; Hebbiok, Neuro- logy and Psychology, J. of Compar. NeuroL, i (1891); HoBSLET and Schapeb, A Review of Experiments upon the Functions of the Cerebral Cortex, Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc. (1888); Loxoet, Anat. et Physiol, du Syst. nerv. (1842); Luciani and Sbppilli, Die Functions-Localisation auf der Grosshim- rinde (Leipzig, 1886), trans, of the original, issued as a prize paper by the R Ist. Lom- bardodi Scienze e Lettere (1885); Luciaiyi and Tahbubuki, SuUe Funzioni del Cervello, Centri psicomotorii e Centri psicosensorii, Riv. Sperim. di Freniat. (1878—9); Lu- ciani, Sulle Funzioni del Cervelletto, Riv. Freniat. (1879), and H Cervelletto, Pubblicaz. del R. Istituto sup. (Firenze, 1891) ; Maqek- DiE, Lemons sur la Fonction du Syst. nerv. (1884); C. K. Mills, Cortical Localization in the Light of Recent Researches into the Minute Anatomy of the Cortex, J. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis., N.S., xx. (1895); also Cerebral Localization in the Light of Recent Pathological Researches, J. of Amer. Med. Assoc., xxvi (1896), and The Nerv. Syst. and its Diseases (Philadelphia, 1898); Muxk, Ueber die Functionen der Grosshimrinde, G^- sammelte Mittheilungen( 2nd ed., Berlin, 1 890) ; Ueber die Fiihlspharen der Grosshimrinde, Sitzber. kgl. preuss. Akad. zu Berlin (1892 ff.); Ueber den Hund ohne Grosshim, Arch. f. Anat. u. Physiol., Physiol. Abth. (1894); NoTHNAOEL and Natjntn, Ueber die Lo- calisation d. Gehimkrankheiten (1887); J. SouBO, Le Syst. nerv. central (1899); A. Tambubini, Contrib. alia Fisiol. e Patol. del Linguaggio, Riv. Freniat. (187 5^; Vulpian, Lemons de PhysioL du Syst. nerv. (1866). (h.h.)

Localuation (in space). Localization in space is the reference of a sense impression or of an object to a local position.

The two general questions which should be distinguished are those (i) of the distribution of localities on the area of the skin and retina (see LooAL Sign), together with the nervous Pbojection (q. v.) of sensations as such to the surface of the body; and (2) the locating of

c 2

LOCALIZATION — LOGIC

objects in the eztenud world. See Spaciali-

ZATIOK.

The earliest theory of space localization in the sense of (i) is what ELamilton calls 'the common dogma of the schools, that the soul is all in the whole body, and all in every one of its parts' (Reid*s Works, Suppl. Diss., 86 1, note). Then follows the doctrine of Descartes, that the soal immediately per- ceives the images in the corporeal phantasy, viz. the brain. The modem treatment of the subject may be said to start with Herbart in Germany and with Bain in England^

Liieratwre: for the Herbartian view see VoLKMAHN, Lehrb. d. Psychol., ii. 117-26; and for Bain's view see Baut, The Senses and the Intellect, 415 ff. Cf. the textbooks of psychology. See also Extensiok, and Space (perception of). (o.f.b.-j.m3.)

Localiiatioii (in time). The reference by the subject of an event in his own history to its position in the time series relatively to the present moment and to other events, past and future. See Time.

The question of the conditions of time localization is comparatively modem. Its detailed treatment begins wiUi the Herbartian psychology in Germany. For something of the theory see Tempobal Sign.

Literaiti/re : VoLKMAim, Lehrb. d. Psychol., ii. 11—20. There is little written on the subject by the classical English psycho- logists ; see, however, Jambs Mill, AjisJysis, chap. X. Ilie best modem reference in Eng- lish is, perhaps, Wabd, art. Psychology,Encyc. Brit., 64-5. See the textbooks of psycho- logy. (G.P.S.-J.M.B.)

Localiiation of Boimcbi : Ger. Lokalisa- tion der Gthik^aem^findungen ; Fr. loealiaation des aenaatumsauditives; Ital. healizzazione (or prcjezione) tpaziale delle sensaziani uditive. The reference of sounds to particular localities in space. See Spacialization. (j.m.b.)

Our apprehension of the distance and direc- tion of sounds appears to be conditioned, primarily, by the relative intensity of the waves that reach the two ears. Localization of sounds is thus a function of Bikaubal Heabikg (q. v.). It is doubtful how far the pure auditory perception could have developed without visual perception; and, indeed, no explanation has as yet been proposed that is adequate in detail to the observed phenomena.

Litwaiure: Pbeteb, Pfltiger's Arch., xl; Von Kbies, Zeitsch. f. Psychol., i. 235, 488 ; MtNSTEBBEBO, Bcitr. z. expcr. Psychol., ii, and (with Fisbce) Psychol. Rev., i. 461 ; Ray-

LEiOH, Nature, xiv. 32 ; Sakfobd, Course in Elxper. PsychoL, expts. 10 1—3; Matsumoto, Yale Studies, v. i if. ; Scbiptuke, ibid., 76 ff. ; Anosll and Fite, PsychoL Bev., viii. 225.

(E3.T.)

Tiocaliiefl Zndiistsy: Ger. Wdtwifih" Bchaft^ localisirte Industrie ; Fr. spSciaUsaiion {d^industrU) locale; Ital. tnduslria locale specializzata. The division of labour between different conmiunities.

' We may mark off three stages of industrial development. The first is where the distinc- tion of trades is introduced, and men no longer consume all or perhaps any part of the articles they have produced ; yet where con- sumers live near the producer and are personally known to him. The second stage is where the element of personal acquaintance disappears. Production no longer waits for orders, but anticipates demand. The third stage is reached when increasing flEtcilities of com- munication make the world one trading com- munity. Then the localization of trades pro- ceeds so far that one countiy, or perhaps one group of towns, produces the greater part of all the goods of a certain sort that are consumed throughout the world ' (Walker). (a.t.h.)

LockOy John. (1632-1704.) Born at Wrington, Somersetshire, England, he was educated at Westminster School, London, and Christ Church, Oxford. Secretary to Sir Walter Vane at Berlin, &c., 1665-6 ; &rmed the acquaintance of Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, 1666. He entered Lord Ashley's family, directing the education of his son and grandson. As lord chancellor, Shaftesbury made him ' secretary of presentations ' to bene- fices. He stayed in France and Italy, 1675-9, and in Holland, 1684-9. ^^ 1690 he pub- lished his fumous ' Essay,' and died at Oates in Essex, Oct. 28, 1704. He is founder of English Empibioism (q.v., also Sensationalism).

Locomotion (i), and (2) Locomotor [Lat. locus, place, + motto, a moving] : Qer. (i) Locomotion,{2)Bewegfmgs'{fver^ug,&c.); Fr. locomotion, loeomoteur ; lUii. {i) locomozione, (2) locomotore. (i) The act or power of moving from place to place. (2) Pertaining to the mechanism of locomotion. See Movs-

MENTy and MUBCLB. (C.F.H.)

Logic [Gr. \oytKri]: Ger. Logik; Fr. logiqtie; Ital. logica. Logic is a science which has not yet completed the stage of disputes concerning its first principles, al- though it is probably about to do so. Nearly a hundred definitions of it have been given. It will, however, generally be conceded that

20

LOGIC

its central problem is the classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into one divisioD, and those which are good into another, these divisions being defined by marks recognizable even if it be not known whether the argaments are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide good arguments by recognizable marks into ihom which have different orders of validity, and has to afford means for measuring the strength of arguments.

An approach to such a classification is made byeveryman whenever he reasons,in the proper sense of that term. It is true that the contem- plation of a state of things believed to be real may cause thecontemplatorto believe something additional, without making any classifica- tion of sQch sequences. But in that case he does not criticize the procedure, nor so much as distinctly reflect that it is just. He can, consequently, not exercise any control over it. Now, that which is uncontrollable is not subject to any normative laws at all ; that is, it is neither good nor bad; it neiUier sub- serves an end nor &il8 to do so. But it is only the deliberate adoption of a belief in consequence of the admitted truth of some other proposition which is, properly speaking, reasoning. In that case the belief is adopted because the reasoner conceives that the method by which it has been determined would either in no analogous case lead to a fi&lse conclusion fipom true premises, or, if steadily adhered to, would at length lead to an indefinite approxi- mation to the truth, or, at least, would assure the reasoner of ultimately attidning as close an ^yproach to the truth as he can, in any way, be assured of attaining. In all reason- ing, therefore, there is a more or less conscious reference to a general method, implying some Qommencement of such a classification of aiguments as the logician attempts. Such a classification of arguments, antecedent to any systematic study of the sulrject, is called the reaaoner's hgiea uten$, in contnutistinction to the result of the scientific study, which is called Icgiea dooen$. See Beasoioko.

^lat part of logic, that is, of logiea docene, which, setting out with Euch assumptions as that every assertion is either true or fabe, and not both, and that some propositions may be recognized to be true, studies the constituent parts of arguments and produces a classification of arguments such as is above described, is often considered to embrace the whole of logic ; but a more correct designa- tion is Critic (Gr. Kptruof. According to

Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle divided logic into three parts, of which one was 1^p^t xp/o-iyV This word, used by Plato (who divides all knowledge into epitactie and critic), waa adopted into Latin by the Bamists, and into English by Hobbes and Locke. From the last it was taken into German by Kant, who always writes it Critik, the initial c being possibly a reminiscence of its English origin. At present it is written Kritik in German. Kant is emphatic in the expression of the wish that the word may not be confounded with critique, a critical essay (Ger. Kritik). [The forms Critique and Critic are used interchange- ably in this work. (Cf. Cbitioism.) (j.m.b.)]

It is generally admitted that there is a doctrine which properly antecedes what we have called critic. It considers, for example, in what sense and how there can be any true proposition and false proposition, and what are the general conditions to which thought or signs of any kind must conform in order to assert anything. Kant, who first nused these questions to prominence, called this doctrine transcendentide Elementorlehre, and made it a large part of his Critic of the Fure Reason. But the Gframmatica JS^^ecukUiva of Scotus is an earlier and interesting attempt. The com- mon German word is Erkenntnisstheorie, sometimes translated Epxstsmologt (q. v.).

It is further generally recognized that another doctrine follows after critic, and which belongs to, or is closely connected with, logic. Precisely what this should contain is not agreed ; but it must contain the general con- ditions requisite for the attainment of truth. Since it may be held to contain more, one hesitates to call it heuristic. It is often called Method ; but as this word is also used in the con- crete, methodic or methodeutic would be better.

For deciding what is good logic and what bad, appeal is made by different writers to one or more, generally several, of these eight sources : to direct dicta of consciousness, to psychology, to the usages of language, to metaphysiosd philosophy, to history, to every- day observation, to mathematics, and to some process of dialectic. In the middle ages appeal was frequently made to authority.

The appeal to direct consciousness consists in pronouncing certain reasoning to be good or bad because it is felt to be so» This is a very common method. Sigwart, for example, bases all logic upon our invincible mental repulsion against contradiction, or, as he calls it, 'the immediate feeling of necessi^' {Logic, § 3, 2). Those who thmk it worth while to

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LOGIC

make any defence at all of this proceeding urge, in efifect, that, however far Uie logician may push his criticisms of reasoning, still, in doing so, he must reason, and so must ulti- mately rely upon his instinctive recognition of good and bad reasoning. Whence it follows that, in Sigwart's words, 'every system of logic must rest upon this principle.' It is, however, to be noted that among the dicta of direct consciousness, many pronounce certain reasonings to be bad. If, therefore, such dicta are to be relied upon, man not only usually has a tendency to reason right, but also some- times has a tendency to reason wrong ; and if that be so, the validity of a reasoning cannot eanHsi in a man's having a tendency to reason in that way. Some say that the validity of reasoning consists in the ' definitive dictum ' of consciousness ; but it has been replied that certain propositions in Euclid were studied for two thousand years by countless keen minds, all of whom had an immediate feeling of evidence concerning their proofiB, until at last flaws were detected in those proofs, and are now admitted by all competent persons ; and it is claimed that this illustrates how far from possible it is to make direct appeal to a definitive pronouncement. Besides, say those who object to this method, all reasoning and inquiry expects that there is such a thing as the truth concerning whatever question may be under examination. Now, it is of the very essence of this ' truth,' the meaning of the expectation, that the ' truth ' in no wise depends upon what any man to whom direct appeal can be made may opine about that question. A forHori it does not depend upon whether I am satisfied with it or not. It is further insisted that there can be no genuine criticism of a reasoning until that reasoning is actually doubted; and no sooner is it actually doubted than we find that conscious- ness has revoked her cUctum in its favour, if she ever made any. It is, indeed, main- tained that so far from true is it that every system of logic must be based upon any in- stinctive recognition of good and bad rea- soning, that it is quite impossible for any reasening to be based upon such recognition in respect to that same reasoning. In reason- ing, a man may feel sure he is right; but to ' rest ' that confidence on nothing but itself is to rest it on nothing at all. If the fact that we must use our reasoning instinct in criticizing reasoning proves that we must appeal to nothing else in such ciiticism, it equally proves that we ought to follow the lead of that in-

stinct without any logical control at all, which would be as much as to say that we ought not to reason at all. A man cannot criticize every part of his reasoning, since he cannot criticise the act of reasoning he is performing in the criticism, it is true. But he can criticize steps whose validity he doubts ; and in doing so, ought to consider in what characters the validity of reasoning consists, and whether the reasoning in question possesses those characters.

Under an appeal to psychology is not meant every appeal to any fact relating to the mind. For it is, for logical purposes, important to discriminate between facts of that description which are supposed to be ascertained by the systematic study of the mind, and facts the knowledge of which altogether antecedes such study, and is not in the least affected by it ; such as the fact that there is such a state of mind as doubt, and the fact that the mind struggles to escape from doubt. Even facts like these require to be carefully examined by the logician before he uses them as the basis of his doctrine. But many logicians have gone much further, and have avowedly baaed their systems upon one or another theory of psychology. Another class of logicians have professed to base logic upon a psychological theory of cognition. Of course, if this is done, such psychological doctrine is placed above logical criticism, or, at any rate, above logical support. For if the truth of a conclusion is known only from certain premises, it cannot be used to support those premises. Now, it may be doubted whether psychology is not, of all the special sciences, the one which stands most in need of appeal to a scientific logic.

Appeals to the usages of language are extremely common. They are made even by those who use algebraical notation in logic * in order to free the mind from the trammels of speech ' (Schroder, Logik^ i. p. iii). It is difficult to see what can be hoped for from such a proceeding, unless it be to establish a psychological proposition valid for all minds. But to do this, it would be necessary to look beyond the small and very peculiar class of Aryan languages, to which the linguistic knowledge of most of those writers is confined. The Semitic languages, with which some of them are acquainted, ai'e too similar to the Aryan greatly to enlarge their horizon. More- over, even if other languages are examined, the value of any logical inferences from them is much diminished by the custom of our grammarians of violently fitting them to the Procrustean bed of Aryan grammar.

22

LOGIC

The objection which has been Boggested to i^peals to psychological results applies with far greater force to appeals to metaphysical j^osophy, which, it will generally be con- ceded, can hardly take a step with security imless it rests upon the science of logic. Neyertheless, a great many logical treatises of Yarions colours make it their boast that they are built upon philosophical principles.

Logicians occasionally appeal to the history of science. Such and such a mode of reason- ing, it is said, for example, was characteristic of mediaevalism or of ancient science; such another produced the successes of modem science. If logic is to be based upon probable reasonings, as some logicians maintain that it must be, such arguments, if critically examined, must be admitted to have great weight. They will naturally be out of place in a system of logic which professes to demonstrate from certain initial assumptions that the kinds of reasoning it recommends must be accepted.

There is probably room for dispute as to whether logic need assert anything at all as an abeolute matter of fact. If it does not, any appeal to experience would seem to be irre- levant. If it does, still the opinion may be that sudi assertions of logic are of so exceedingly broad and sb'ght a nature that the universal experience of every man's every day and hour puts them beyond all doubt — such experiences as that the world presents appear^ ances of variety, of law, and of the real action of one thing upon another. As appearances, these things do not seem likely ever to be doubted. K logic has need of any £Acts» and if such facts will suffice, no objection can well be made to an appeal to them.

The boundary between some parts of logic and pure mathematics in its modem treat- ment is almost evanescent, as may be seen in Dedekind's Was dndundvxu iollm cHe Zalden (1888, £ng. trans. 1 901). There are, however, departments of logic, such as the logic of pro- bable inference (if that be regarded a part of logic), in which appeal is sometimes made to nwthematical results, such as Bernoulli's law of highnumbei-s. Itseemstobethegeneralopinion that nothing so difficult as mathematics can be admitted into, or be appealed to by, the science of logic, which has the peculiarity of consisting chiefly of truisms.

In mathematical reasoning there is a sort of obaervatiou. For a geometrical diagram or array of algebraical symbols is constructed according to an abstractly stated precept, and between the parts of such diagram or array

certain relations are observed to obtain, other than those which were expressed in the pre- cept. These being abstractly stated, and being generalized, so as to apply to every diagram constructed according to the same precept, give the conclusion. Some logicians hold that an equally satis&ctory method depends upon a kind of inward observation, which is not mathematical, since it is not diagrammatic, the development of a concep- tion and its inevitable transformation being observed and generalized somewhat as in mathematics; and those logicians base their science upon such a method, which may con- veniently be termed, and is sometimes termed, a Dialectic. Other logicians regard such a method as either extremely insecure or as altogether illusory.

l^e generally received opinion among pro- fessors of logic is that all the above methods may properly be used on occasion, the appeal to mathematics, however, being less generally recognized.

Literature : the history of logic in Western Europe, down to the revival of learning, is given by P&aittl, Gesch. d. Logik im Abendlande. Upon the points upon which this author touches, he always affords valu- able information, though liis judgments are peremptory and slashing. Unfortunately, he omits much which was regarded by the authors of whom he treats as most impor- tant, because he does not himself so regard it He also omits much which would be in- teresting to a reader taking a broader con- ception of logic. It is baldly necessary to say that upon some large subjects his views are controverted. Of the modem develop- ment of logic there is no satisfactory history ; but there are notices good as fitr as they go in Ubbbbwbo, Syst. d. Logik (Eng. trans.) ; in the much earlier work of Baohmank, Syst. d. Logik (1828); in Hamilton, Lects. on Logic ; and for later work in B. Ebdmann, Logik. Oh. Siqwabt, Logic (Eng. trans.), and WuNBT, Logik, may also be profitably consulted. See under the logical topics gener- aUy (e. g. Empibical Loeio, Fobmal Looic, Judgment, and Pboposition) ; and also

BiBLIOO. C. (C.8.P., CL.F.)

Logic (Hegel's Logik) : see Hbqbl'b Tbb-

MINOLOaY, II 6.

Logic (exact): Oer. exakte Logik; Fr. logique exacte ; Ital. logiea eaatta. The doc- trine that the theory of validity and strength of reasoning ought to be made one of the ' exact sciences,' that is, that generalizations

23

LOGIC

from ordinary experience ought, at an early point in its exposition, to be stated in a form from which by mathematical, or expository, Beasokiko (q. v.), the rest of the theory can be strictly deduced ; together with the attempt to carry this doctrine into practice.

This method was pursued, in the past, by Pascal (1623-62), Nicolas Bernoulli (1687- 1759), Enler (1708-83^ Ploucquet (1716- 90), Lambert (1728-77), La Place (1749- 1827), De Morgan (1806-71), Boole (181 5- 64), and many others ; and a few men in different countries continue the study of the problems opened by the last two named logicians, as well as those of the proper foundations of the doctrine and of its appli- cation to inductive reasoning. The results of this method, thus far, have comprised the development of the theory of probabilities, the logic of relatives, advances m the theory of inductive reasoning (as it is claimed), the syllog^ism of transposed quantity, the theory of the Fermatian inference, considerable steps towards an analysis of the logic of continuity and towards a method of reasoning in topicid geometry, contributions towards several branches of mathematics by applications of ' exact ' logic, the logical graphs called after Euler and other systems for representing in intuitional form Uie relations of premises to conclusions, and other things of the same general nature.

There are those, not merely outside the ranks of exact logic, but even within it, who seem to suppose that the aim is to produce a calculus^ or semi-mechanical method, for performing all reasoning, or all deductive inquiry; but there is no reason to suppose that such a project, which is much more consonant with the ideas of the opponents of exact logic than with those of its serious students, can ever be realized. The real aim is to find an indisputable theory of reasoning by the aid of mathematics. The first step in the order of logic towards this end (though not necessarily the first in the order of inquiry) is to formulate with mathematical precision, definiteness,and simplicity, the general facts of experience which logic has to take into account.

The employment of algebra in the investi- gation of logic is open to the danger of degenerating into idle trifling of too rudi- mentaiy a character to be of mathematical interest, and too superficial to be of logical interest. It is furtiier open to the danger that the rules of the symbols employed may be mistaken for first principles of logic. An

algebra which brings along with it hundreds of purely formal theorems of no logical import whatever must be admitted, even by the inventor of it, to be extremely defective in that respect, however convenient it may be for certain purposes. On the other hand, it is indisputable that algebra has an advantage over speech in forcing us to reason explicitly and definitely, if at alL In that way it may afford very considerable aid to analysis. It has been employed with great advantage in the analysis of mathematical reasonings.

Algebraic reasoning involves intuition just as much as, though more insidiously than, does geometrical reasoning; and for the in- vestigation of logic it is questionable whether the method of graphs is not superior. Graphs cannot, it is true, readily be applied to cases of great complexity ; but for that veiy reason they are less liable to serve the purposes of the logical trifler. In the opinion of some exact logicians, they lead more directly to the ultimate analysis of logical problems than any algebra yet devised. See Logical Dia-

6BAM (OB GbAPH).

It is logical algebra, however, which has chiefly been pursued. De Morgan invented a system of symbols, which had the signal advantage of being entirely new and free from all associations, misleading or otherwise. Although he employed them for synthetical purposes almost exclusively, yet the great generality of some of the conceptions to which they led him is sufficient to show that they might have been applied with great advantage in analysis. Boole was led, no doubt from the consideration of the principles of the calculus of probabilities, to a wonderful application of ordinary algebra to the treat- ment of all deductive reasoning not turning upon any relations other than the logical relations between non-relative terms. By means of this simple calculus, he took some great steps towards the elucidation of probable reasoning ; and had it not been that, in his pre-Darwinian day, the notion that certain sulgects were profoundly mysterious, so that it was hopeless, if not impious, to seek to penetrate them, was still prevalent in Great Britain, his instrument and his intellectual force were adequate to carr3dng him further than he actually went. Most of the exact logicians of to-day are, from the nature of the case, followers of Boole. They have modifled his algebra by disusing his addition, subtraction, and division, and by introducing a sign of logical aggregation. This was first

24

LOGIC

done by Jevons ; and he proposed • | •, a sign of dividon turned up, to signify this opera- tion. Inasmuch as this might easily be read as three signs, it would, perhaps, be better to join the two dots by a light curve, thus ^. Some use the sign + for logical aggregation. The algebra of Boole has also been amplified 00 as to fit it for the logic of relatives. The system is, however, far from being perfect See BsjLATiYSS (logic of).

Certain terms of exact logic may be de- fined as follows : —

Aggregation, The operation of uniting two or more terms or propositions, called aggre- gani8, to produce an aggregate term or propo- sition which is true of everything of which any aggregant is true, and {jeJse of everything of whidi all the aggregants are false. It is opposed to compontiony which is the opera- tion of producing from two or more terms or propositions, called the eomponenta, a new term or proposition, called their compound^ which is true of all of which all the compo- nents are true, and f^lse of all of which any are false.

AbwrpUon, law of (Ger. AbsorpHoTisgesetzy The proposition that if of two aggregants one contains the other as a component, the aggre- gate is identical with the latter.

AUemaHve proposition, A term preferred by some logicians to ' disjunctive,' because the latter term is often, as by Cicero and Aulus Gellius, understood to imply that one, and cme only, of the alternatives is true. At the same time, the standard traditional example of a diqunctive was ' Socrates currit vel Plato disputat/ and the rule was 'Ad veritatem disiunctivaesufficit alteram partem esse veram.' l^evertheless, the narrower sense was also recognized, and the term alternative is per- haps preferable.

Associative. An operation combining two elements is associative if, and only if, in combining the result with a third element, it makes no difference whether the middle element be first combined with the last and the result with the first, or the other way, so long as the order of sequence is preserved. Addition and multiplication are associative, while involution is not so; for ten to the three-square power is a milliard, while ten cube squared is only a million. An associa- tive algebra is an algebra in which multipli- cation is associative.

Commutative, An operation by which two elements are united is said to be eommtUative if, and only if, it makes no difference which is

taken first. Thus, becaase twice three is thrice two, numerical multiplication is commutative.

Composition : see Aggregation, above.

Compound : see Aggregation, above.

Copula is often defined as that which expresses the relation between the subject- term and the predicate-term of a proposition. But this is not sufficiently accurate for the purposes of exact logic. Passing over the objection that it applies only to categorical propositions, as if conditional and copulative propositions had no copula, contrary to logical tradition, it may be admitted that a copula often does fulfil the function mentioned ; but it is only an accidental one, and its essential fiiDction is quite different. Thus, the propo- sition ' Some favoured patriarch is translated ' is essentially the same as 'A translated favoured patriarch is ' ; and ' Every mother is a lover of that of which she is a mother ' is the same as 'A mother of something not loved by her is not.' In the second and fourth forms, the copula connects no terms; but if it is dropped, we have a mere term instead of a proposition. Thus the essential office of the copula is to express a relation of a general term or terms to the universe. The universe must be well known and mutually known to be known and agreed to exist, in some sense, between speaker and hearer, between the mind as appealing to its own further consideration and the mind as so appealed to, or there can be no commu- nication, or 'common ground,' at all. The universe is, thus, not a mere concept, but is the most real of experiences. Hence, to put a concept into relation to it, and into the relation of describing it, is to use a most peculiar sort of sign or thought; for such a relation must, if it subsist, exist quite otherwise than a relation between mere con- cepts. This, then, is what the copula essen- tially does. This it may do in three ways : first, by a vague reference to the universe collectively ; second, by a reference to all the individuals existent in the universe distri- butively ; third, by a vague reference to an individual of the universe selectively. ' It is broad daylight^' I exclaim, as I awake. My uni- verse is the momentary experience as a whole. It is that which I connect as object of the composite photograph of daylight produced in my mind by all my similar experiences. Secondly, ' Every woman loves something ' is a description of every existing individual in the universe. Every such individual is said to be coexistent only with what, so &r as it

25

LOGIC

is a woman at all, is sure to be a lover of some ezistiDg individual. Thirdly, * Some fJBkvoured patriarch is translated ' means that a certain description applies to a select indi- ▼iduaL A hypothetical proposition, whether it be conditional (of which the alternative, or disjunctive, proposition is a mere species, or viee versa, as we choose to take it) or copula- tive, is either general or tU nunc, A general conditional is precisely equivalent to a uni- versal categoricaL * If you really want to be goody you can be/ means ' Whatever determi- nate state of things may be admissibly supposed in which you want to be good is a state of things in which you can be good.' The universe is that of determinate states of things that are admissible hypothetically. It is true that some logicians appear to dispute this ; but it is manifestly indisputable. Those logicians belong to two classes: those who think that logic ought to take account of the difference between oue kind of universe and another (in which case, several other substan' Hae of propositions must be admitted) ; and those who hold that logic should distinguish between propositions which are necessarily true or &lse together, but which regard the fiftct from different aspects. The exact logician holds it to be, in itself, a defect in a logical system of expression, to afford different ways of expressing the same state of facts ; although this defect may be less important than a definite advantage gained by it. The copulative proposition is in a similar way equivalent to a particular cate- gorical. Thus, to say 'The man might not be able voluntarily to act otherwise than physical causes make him act, whether he try or not,' is the same as to say that there is a state of things hypothetically admissible in which a man tries to act one way and voluntarily acts another way in consequence of physical causes. As to hypothetical tU nunc, they refer to no range of possibility, but simply to what is true, vaguely taken collec- tively.

Although it is thus plain that the action of the copula in relating the subject-term to the predicate-term is a secondary one, it is nevertheless necessary to distinguish between copulas which establish different relations between these terms. Whatever the relation is, it must remain the same in all preposi- tional forms, because its nature is not ex- pressed in the proposition, but is a matter of established convention. With that proviso, the copula may imply any relation whatso-

ever. So understood, it is the abttract copula of De Morgan {Camb, PkUos. Trans,, x. 339). A transitive copula is one for which the mood Barbara is valid. Schroder has demonstrated the remarkable theorem that if we use is in small capitals to represent any one such copula, of whicli * greater than' is an example, then there is some relative term r, such that the proposition * jS is P ' is precisely equivalent to ' i$ is r to P and is r to what- ever P is r to.' A copula of correlative indu- eion is one for which both Barbara and the formula of identity hold good. Representing any one such copula by is in italics, there is a relative term r, such that the proposition * S is P' IB precisely equivalent to ' <S is r to whatever P is r to.' If the last proposition follows from the last but one, no matter what relative r may be, the copula is called the copula of inclusion, used by C. S. Peirce, Schriider, and others. De Morgan uses a copula de- fined as standing for any relation both transi- tive and convertible. The latter character consists in this, that whatever terms / and J may be, if we represent this copula by is in black = letter, then from '/ is /' it follows that ' «/ ifl /.' From these two propositions, we conclude, by Barbara, that ' / is /.' Such copulas are, for example, ' equal to,' and ' of the same colour as.' For any such copula there will be some relative term r, such that the proposition * S is P' will be precisely equivalent to ' S' is r to everything, and only to everything, to which P is r.' Such a copula may be called a copula of correlative identity. If the last proposition follows from the last but one, no matter what relative r may be, the copula is the copula of identity used by Thomson, Hamilton, Baynes, Jevons, and many others.

It has been demonstrated by Peirce that the copula of inclusion is logically simpler than that of identity.

Diagram : see Logical Diaobam.

Diidogism. A form of reasoning in which from a single premise a disjunctive, or alterna- tive, proposition is concluded introducing an additional term ; opposed to a syllogism, in which from a copulative proposition a propo- sition is inferred from which a term is elimi- nated.

SyUogitfiu All men are animals, and all animals are mortal ;

.*. All men are mortaL Didlogism, Some men are not mortal ;

26

LOGIC — LOGICAL

.*. Either some men are not animals, or

some animals are not mortal. Dimension. An element or respect of extension of a logical universe of such a nature that the same term which is individual in one such element of extension is not so in another. Thus, we may consider different persons as individual in one respect, while they may be divisible in respect to time, and in respect to different admissible hypothetical states of things, &c. This is to be widely distinguished from different universes, as, for example, of things and of characters, where any given individual belonging to one cannot belong to another. The conception of a multidimensional logical universe is one of the fecund conceptions which exact logic owes to O. H. MitchelL Schroder, in his then second volume, where he is &r below himself in many respects, pronounces this conception ' untenable.' But a doctrine which has, as a matter of &ct, been held by Mitchell, Peirce, and others, on apparently cogent grounds, without meeting any attempt at refutation in about twenty years, may be i-egarded as being, for the present) at any rate, tenable enough to be held.

Dyadic rekuion, A fact relating to two individuals. Thus, the fstct that A is similar to B, and the fact that il is a lover of B, and the &ct that A and B are both men, ore dyadic relations; while the fact that A gives i? to C is a triadic relation. Every relation of one order of relativity may be regarded as a relative of another order of relativity if desired. Thus, man may be regarded as man eoexitteni withy and so as a relative expressing a dyadic relation, although for most purposes it will be regarded as a monad or non-relative term.

Index (in exact logic) : see sub verbo.

Many other technical terms are to be found in the literature of exact logic.

Liieraiure : for the study of exact logic in its more recent development, excluding proba- bility, the one quite indi^nsable book is SchbOdbb, Algebra d. Logik; and the bibliography therein contained is so exhaus- tive that it is unnecessary to mention here any publications previous to 1 890. Schroder's pains to give credit in full measure, pressed down and running over, to every other student is hardly less remarkable than the system, completeness, and mathematical power of his work, which has been reviewed by C. S. PxiBCE in the Monist, vii. 19-40, 1 7 1-2 1 7. See also C. S. Peibcx, Studies

in Logic ; Pop. ScL Mo., xii. i ; and Proc. Amer. Acad. Arts and Sci., vii. 287. Cf. SoxBNTiFio Method. (o.s.f.)

Logic (of chance) : see PBOBABiLiTf .

Logic (of emotion): see Terminology, English, ' Affective Logic'

Logic Asocial) : see Social Logic.

Logic (symbolic) : see Symbolic Logic.

Logical [Lat. logicalis, from logica, logic] : Ger. logisch ; Fr. logique; Ital. logieo. Irre- spective of any facta except those of which logic needs to take cognizance, such as the facts of doubt, truth, faJsity, Ac.

Logical poaeibiUty is, according to usage, freedom from all contradiction, explicit or implicit; and any attempt to reform the inaccuracy would only bring confusion.

Logical necessity is the necessity of that whose contrary is not logically possible.

Logical induction is an induction based on examination of every individual of the class to which the examination relates. Thus, conclusions from a census are logical induc- tions. While this mode of inference is a degenerate form of induction, it also comes into the class of dilemmatic reasoning.

Logical truth is a phrase used in three senses, rendering it almost useless.

1. The harmony of a thought with itself. Most usually so defined, but seldom so em- ployed. So far as this definition is distinct, it makes logical truth a synonym for logical possibility; but^ no doubt, more is intended (Hamilton, Leets. on Logic, xxvii).

2. The conformity of a tliought to the laws of logic ; in particular, in a concept, con- sistency; in an inference, validity; in a proposition, agreement with assumptions. This would better be called mathemaHcal truthy since mathematics is the only science which aims at nothing more (Kimt, Krit. d. reinen Vemunfi, ist ed., 294).

3. More properly, the conformity of a proposition with the reality, so far as the proposition asserts anything about the reality. Opposed, on the one hand, to metaphysical truth, whichis an affection of the m«,and on the other hand to ethical truth, which is telling what a witness believes to l)e trae (Burgers- dicius, Inst. Met,, chap, xviii).

Logical parts and whole. Parts and whole of logical extension.

Logical reasoning. Reasoning in accord- ance with a Leading Peinciplb {q. v.) which thorough analysis, discussion, and experience have shown must lead to the truth, in so far as it is relied upon. But what Aristotle

27

LOGICAL DIAGRAM — LOGICAL MACHINE

understood by a logical demonstration may be seen in his De genercttione animaliumf Lib. II. cap. viii.

Logical prewmpHon. A Wolffian term for synthetic reasoning, that is, induction and analogy; for hypothetic reasoning was not recognized as reasoning at all. The uni- formity of nature is csdled the principle of logical presumption.

Logical division. Division into logical parts.

Logical distinctness. That distinctness which results from logical analysis.

Logical actuality. Kant, in the Logik by Jasche (Einleitung, vii), defines logical actuality as conformity to the principle of sufficient reason, consisting of the cognition having reasons and having no false conse- quences; and he makes this, along with logical possibility, to constitute logical truth, which is thus used in its second sense. But in the Critic of the Fwre Eeason, in discussing the functions of judgments (ist ed., 75), he says that an assertoric proposition asserts logical actuality (Wirklichkeit, which Max Mailer wrongly translates * reality 'V and makes this phrase synonymous with logical truth (which is thus used in its third, and proper, sense).

Logical definition. A strict definition by genus and specific difference. Ockham and hu followers objected to the designation on the ground that the logician, as such, had no occa- sion to define any ordinary term, such as man {Tractalus logiees, Pt I. chap. zxvi). (O.8.F.)

Logical IMftgraitt (or Gxa^): Ger. hgischs Figur; Fr. diagramme hgique; Ital. diagramma logieo. A diagram composed of dots, lines, &c., in which logical relations are signified by such spatial relations that the necessary consequences of these logical relations are at the same time signified, or can, at least, be made evident by tnuisforming the diagram in certain ways which conven- tional ' rules ' permit.

In order to form a system of graphs which shall represent ordinaxy syllogisms, it is only necessary to find spatial relations analogous to the relations expressed by the copula of inclusion and its negative and to the relation of negation. Now all the formal properties of the copula of inclusion are involved in the principle of identity and the dictum de omni. That is, if r is the relation of the subject of a universal affirmative to its predicate, then, whatever terms X, F, Z may be. Every X is r to an X; and

if every JT is r to a Z, and every Z is r to a Z, every X is r to a ^. Now, it is easily proved by the logic of relatives, that to say that a relation r is subject to these two rules, implies neither more nor less than to say that there is a relation /, such that, whatever individuals A and B may be.

If nothing is in the relation Z to ^ with- out being also in the same relation I to B, then il is in the relation r to B; and con- versely, that.

If 2 is r to j9, there is nothing that is Z to A except what ibHo B.

Consequentiy, in order to construct such a system of graphs, we must find some spatial relation by which it shall appear plain to the eye whether or not there is anything that is in that relation to one thing without being in that relation to the other. The popular Euler's diagrams fulfil one-half of this condi- tion well by representing J as an oval inside the oval B. Then, I is the relation of being included within ; and it is plain that nothing can be inside of A without being inside B. The relation of the copula is thus represented by the spatial relation of ' enclosing only what is enclosed by.' In order to represent the negation of the copula of inclusion (which, unHke that copula, asserts the existence of its subject), a dot may be drawn to represent some existing individual. In this case the subject and predicate ovals must be drawn to intersect eadi other, in order to avoid assert- ing too much. If an oval already exists cutting the space in which the dot is to be placed, the latter should be put on the line of that oval, to show that it is doubtful on which side it belongs ; or, if an oval is to be drawn through the space where a dot is, it should be drawn through the dot; and it should further be remembered that if two dots lie on the boundaries of one compartment, there is nothing to prevent their being identical. The relation of negation here appears as 'entirely outside of.' For a later practical improvement see Venn, Symbolic Logic, chap.

xi. (C.8.P.)

logical Xaohine: Ger. logische MaeMna; Fr. madiine logique; Ital. macchine logistiehs (E.M.). An instrument devised to facilitate by mechanical means the handling of logical symbols or diagrams.

There are three such instruments which merit attention:*-

(i) The first was constructed by W. Stanley Jevons in 1869 (announced in his SuhstituHon of Similars, 1869, 60; described in Phtlos.

28

LOGICAL MACHINE

Trans, Boy, Soc., 1870, 497-518; brief description in Froc, Roy, Soc., 1870, 166-9, and Prine, of Sei,, 1874, 123-31). This instrament was preoeded by the logical slate and the Ic^cal Abacus (q. ▼.) {Proe, Man- ehesUr Lit. and Fhilos, Soc,, Apr. 1866, 161 ; SubstitfUion of Similars, 1869, 54-9). In the logical slate the combinations of letters, representing all the possible combinations of a definite number of characters or qualities in a logical oniyerse, were engrayed in vertical eolnmns upon a common writiog-slate. The combinations inconsistent with given premises were then crossed off with a slate pencil, and the conclusions read off from the untouched combinations.

In the logical abacus the combinations were marked on flat slips of wood arranged in horizontal lines on an inclined blackboard having a series of ledges. The slips of wood were furnished with pins, so that those which represented combinations consistent with the premises could be lifted by means of a ruler to the ledge above.

In the logical slate, g^reat care was necessary to cross off all the inconsistent combinations, and in the logical abacus similar care was required in picking out all the consistent combinations. The logical machine of Jevons is a logical abacus in which all that is required of the operator is to press the premises upon a series of keys ; the operation of lifting the combinations consistent with the premises to the higher level being accomplished mechanic* ally by a seiies of levers. By means of a lattice-work with horizontal slits, the com- binations expressed in the premises and consistent with them, and these only, are exhibited to view. This machine, while manifesting considerable ingenuity on the part of the contriver, was nevertheless a cumbersome piece of mechanism. The key- board required two sets of keys, one series for the subject and one for the predicate, and four operation keys, known as the finis, con- junction, copula, and full-stop keys. The combinations were marked upon vertical rods, and a double set of these rods was required. The complex character of this machine ren- dered it unfit to be extended to problems involving more than four terms. At one time Jevons contemplated constructing a machine like it for ten terms, but found that he would have to sacrifice the entire wall-space of one side of his library.

(2) John Venn in 1881 devised a more compact instrument, which he called a logical

diagram machine (Symbolic Logic, 1881, 122). It was also constructed for problems of four terms. For problems of three terms he had used diagrams consisting of intersecting circles, shading out those portions which represented combinations inconsistent with given premises. For four terms, circles were impracticable, hence he used ellipses. His logical diagram machine represents four intersecting ellipses, arranged so that each section represents one of the sixteen possible combinations. These sections are arranged so as to fall below their original level when they are to be rejected as inconsistent with the premises. They are held in place by pins, and when required to fidl, the appro- priate pin must be removed. What corre- sponds to the key-board is therefore a series of sixteen pins, each of whidi must be in- dividually manipulated. There is no device by which a number of sections may be moved at once. The machine is therefore merely a more cumbersome diagram. The method involved is also practically limited to problems of four terms, since the intersections made by four ellipses are already complex enough. An extension of this system would, in the words of Venn, be probably distasteful to any bat a mathematician.

(3) A third logical machine was con- structed by Allan Marquand in 1881 (an- nounced in Johfu Hopkins University Studies in Logic, 1883, 16 ; published in Amer.Acad. Arts and Sci,, 1885, 303-7). It is based upon his logical diagrams (London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, Philos. Mag,, Oct. 1881, 266- 70). These consist of large squares, sub- divided vertically and horizontally into a series of smaller squares, each of which re- presents one of the logical combinations. The squares which represent combinations inconsistent with the premises may then be shaded off. In his logical machine the com- binations are represented by indicators which are arranged like the squares in his logical diagrams. At the outset the indicators are all pointing in a horizontal direction; the premises are then pressed upon a key-board of eight letter and two operation keys, and the indicators which represent combinations inconsistent with the premises fall to the vertical position.

In 1882 Marquand constructed from an ordinary hotel annunciator another machine in which all the combinations are visible at the outset, and the inconsistent combinations are concealed from view as the premises are

29

LOGO- — LOMBARD

impressed upon the keys. He also had designs made by means of which the same operations could be accomplished by means of electro-magnets.

The characteristic of this machine lies in its simplicity, which may be the better appreciated as the machine is extended for problems involving more than four terms. For problems of ten terms Venn would re- quire a new diagram of complicated form, and 1 ,024 keys to operate the instrument. Jevons for a ten-term machine would require 10,240 letters for his combinations, and a key-board with forty-four keys. Marquand's machine for ten terms needs only 124 letters and twen^-two keys.

There is a further difference between the machines. Jevons' presents as the conclusion not all the combinations consistent with the premises, but only those which involve the terms of the premises. For example, in a series of premises, he assumes that the only conclusion desired is the relation of the first to the last tei*m in the series. In Venn's and Marquand's machines the inconsistent combinations only are thrown out, and all the combinations consistent with the premises are exhibited as the conclusion. Hence any term or combination of terms may be made the subject of the conclusion.

In 1883 Marquand published an account of a machine for producing syllogistic varia- tions, which he constructed in 1881 (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Logic ^ 1883, 1 2'5). The two premises and the conclusion of a syllogism are written on three rectangular flaps, which are made so as to revolve on a horizontal axis. The contraposed forms of premises and conclusion are then written on the backs of the flaps. By turning a crank, the eight possible combinations of premises and conclusion are then exhibited to view.

This mechanism could be readily extended so as to exhibit similar variations for argu- ments involving a larger number of premises or conclusions. Marquand's logical machines are now in the Princeton Psychological Labora- tory. (J.M.B.)

Logo-, &c. [Or. \6yosy discourse, lore] : Ger. Logo- ; Fr. logo- ; Ital. logo-. Logo- (in com- bination) refers to the intellectual processes, and often specifically to the process intro- ductory to speech. Thus logopathy has heeu used to indicate a disorder in the formation of thought for the purpose of speaking. On the other hand, logoneurosis is used as well to refer to general mental affections ; while logorrhea

refers to the excessive flow of words, a common symptom in cases of mania ; and logomania to the form of mania in which this occurs. (J.J.)

Logomaohy [Or., taken from the First Epistk of Paul to Timothy, vi. 4 ma&v n€p\ ^7117- I o-eir Ka\ Xoyd/taxW, doting about questions and strifes of wordjs] : Ger. Logomachie, Wortstrei- tigkeit ; Fr. logomaehie ; lUA. contesa di parole, A contention (in which it is not essential that two parties should be active) not professedly relating to the use of words and phrases, but in which proper care exercised to make the ideas clear will show the critic, either that there is no important difference between the position attacked and that defended, or if there is, that the argumentation does not relate to such points.

Theology and subjects connected with it, such as the freedom of the will, have been the great theatre of such war. At present it is still kept up in logic ; and other branches of philosophy are not entirely freed from it. Disputes about the propriety of modes of speech, however hot and silly they may be, are not logomachy. (O.B.F.)

Logos [(^I'-l-* C^er. Logos; Fr. Logos; Ital. II verbo, \i) Reason (q. v.).

(2) The eternal Son of God, in whom the wisdom and power of God are manifested, and who became incarnate in the person of the historic Jesus.

In Greek thought in its earlier stages the Logos is the universal or divine reason of the world. In later Greek thought under theo- sophic impulses the Logos acquired a quasi personality. It is hypostatized, at least in the thought of Pfailo of Alexandria, who ascribes to it some mediating functions between God and the world. The Christian idea of the Logos is contained in the prologue to the Gk)spel of St. John, in which it is identified with the eternal Christ, who became flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. Out of this germ the Chris- tology of the early Church developed, and was embodied in the historic creeds.

Literature : Hsinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in d. griechischen Philos. (1872); Zelleb, Philos. d. Griechen, iii ; Dobneb, Hist, of the Devel. of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. (A.T.O.)

Lomlmrd, Petev. (cir. 1100-63 ^i* ^4-) Educated in theology at Bologna, Rheims, and (under Abelard) Paris. Taught theology successfully at Paris, and became bishop of Paris, 1 159. For his work Sententiarum Libri /F, he received the title * Magister Sen- tentiarum.'

30

LOTZE — LUCIDITY

Budolf. (1817-81.) Bom at Baatzen, Saxony ; studied medicine, natoral pidloeophy, and metaphysics at Leipzig, wbere lie became professor of mental philosophy in 1843. Called to Gottingen, 1844, and to Berlin, 1881, where he died soon after. He helongs to the group of philosophers known as ' Real-Idealists,' opposing Hegel on the one hand and materialism on the other hand ; and he is still a most potent influence. His philosophy is characterized by subtle criticism of the concepts of physical and mental science. He was also one of the pioneers of physio- logical peychology.

Iborva [AS. /t^n, to loTc] : Gkr. Zte&e; Fr. amour; ttal. amore. Dispositional Intebest (q.T.)of an exclusive kind, having a person for its object, and manifesting itself in the following emotional states : (i) pleasure in the presence of a person or other communion with him, and in the thought of him ; (2) pain occasioned by his absence or estrangement; (3) pleasure in his welfare ; (4) pain occasioned by injury to him. (o.F.s.'J.M.B.)

The word seems generally to imply exclusive interest in an individual — an interest of such a nature that no other than the particular person loved can satisfy it. There is, however, another meaning. It is possible to say I love Americans, soldiers, or ' the brethren/ It is also possible in ordinary language to use the term in connection with impersonal objects, as when we speak of ' love of truth ' or * love of beauty.' The emotions in which such interests manifest themselves are more or less analo- gOQS to those connected with attachment to persons. But the word is most properly applied to personal relations, and other usages may be regarded as* derivative and meta- phorical. (O.F.S., J.M.B.) The most important distinctions, of a psychol<^cal sort, are those (i) between love which involves the natural affections and that which is independent of them ; the former is based upon predispositions of a hereditary sort, as is most strongly instanced in maternal affection. The latter sort of love is extremely complex, seeming to involve the whole range of possible interests in persons — impulsive, sen- suous, intellectual, aesthetic, moral. Another distinction (2) is that typified by the differ- ence between the love for persons respectively of the opposite and of the same sex. The former is often called 'romantic' love, and the latter 'fraternal' or 'brotherly* love; and the latter is more akin to the natural affections. Bomantic love may exist, however, between

persons of the same sex. Bomantic love has been the subject of the analysis of novelists, notably of the later ' psychological ' schooL Psychologists usually agree in recognizing in it at least the mating and the sensuous aesthetic impulse, however they may in- dividuaUy disagree in respect to which of these is more fundamental, if either, and in respect to the other more refined factors which contribute to the dispositions involved. Groos connects it with coyness, by which the mating instinct is regulated. The exclusive- ness of the interest is much stronger in romantic love.

In romantic love the conative ingredient is very strongly shown — intruding itself into consciousness — in what is called ' longing ' or ' desire ' for the loved one, being a condition of extreme restlessness and mental distraction which gives peculiar quality to the pain of absence or estrangement. This is not pro- minent in other forms of affection or friendship — at least to the same degree. A recent writer has said : ' Friendship is a satis&ction, love is a desire.'

Literature : perhaps the most painstaking Analysis is that of Baik, Emotions and Will (4th ed.) ; the exclusiveness of the interest involved has been emphasized by RoYCic, The Conception of €k)d, v. Ft. III. vi. See also Gboos, Play of Man, Eng. trans., 252 ff.; Stekdhal, L' Amour (1822); Migheust, L' Amour (1858); De Bobebto, L'Amore (1897). For the psychopathology of love, see Ebafft-Ebing, Psychopathia sexual is (loth ed.). See also most of the textbooks of psycho- logy, and many of the treatises given under Emotiok. Cf. Sbtness. (j.m.b.)

Love (metaphysical) : see Nso-PLATOiriSM, and Mysticism.

Lore (in theology). That attribute of the divine nature by virtue of which Ood rejoices in and conserves the good of his creatures.

Among the divine attributes love holds the place of supremacy, inasmuch as it is an all- comprehending emotional principle, which unites God in his creative and conserving activities with the whole creation. The special love of God for his rational creatures is one of the central doctrines of the Christian theology.

Literature: seeATTBiBUTE8(ofGod).(A.T.o.)

Loyalty (political) : see Patbiotism.

Lucidity [Lat. husidus, light, clear] : Qer. (i) Lucidim, (2) HeUdchtigkeii ; Fr. luciditS; Ital. luciditct, (i) In reference to mental

31

LUCRETTUS — LUSTRE

disease : the ability to think clearly and ap- preciate existing relations. A lucid interval in insanity is thus the throwing off of the delusions and morbid habits of thought inci- dent to the disease, and the resumption of the normal habit Lucid intervals are common in mania, but must not be confused with the mere remission of paroxysms or the intervals between recurrences of mania. The term is also important in a medico-legal sense.

(2) l^ie alleged power claimed by the ' som- nambulists/ the successors to Puysegur, by 'spiritists' and others, of transcending the oitiinary powers of the senses, overcoming the ordinary visual limitations, and seeing things at a distance and through opaque mediums. The theory has been revived by Richet and others in the discussion of experiments in THOUOHT-TBiiNSFEBEircB (q. V.). See Clair-

VOYANOE. (JmT,)

Lueretiiuiy Titna Lueretiiui Canui. (cir. 97-53 B.C.) Little is known as to his life. Roman citizen of noble rank. He may have studied in Athens, becoming familiar with Greek philosophy. His poem, De rerwn Naiuraj revised by Cicero, and still extant, is considered the completest exposition of the theories of Epicurus. Cf. Epigubbanism.

Ludicrowi : see Comio.

Lnl, Baimonv or Lulliuiy Ramimdm, or Lully, BAymondy a]so LuUiiui, and Lvlli. (1235-13 1 5.) Lidifferently educated, al- though of an aristocratic Catalonian fiaimily, on the island of Majorca. Became grand seneschal at the court of King Jacob of Majorca. Li 1266 he was converted to Christianity, sold most of his property, devoted himself for nine years to ascetic practices and the study of Arabic. He formed the plan of converting the Moslems to Christianity by appealing to their higher reason. In 1276 he succeeded in having a college established at Miramar for thirteen Minorite friars, who were to study Arabic and fit themselves for missionary woi*k. To expedite matters he sought a universal and infallible formula or rule, by which doubtM questions of faith could be settled. This came, he believed, as a revelation from Ood on Mount Randa. He wrote in three languages, his devotional poems in Catalan being of high order. Tried several times to interest the pope in his missionary plans, but failed. He wandered about teaching fh)m place to place, making three unsuccessful efforts in Tunis to convert the Moslems, in the last of which he was martyred.

Lvmen (natnrale, gratiae, &c.) [Lat.]. Light ; e. g. of nature {ncUurale), the natural faculties as affording knowledge, wisdom, &c. ; contrasted with light of grace (ffraiiae\ the illumination due to divine grace. See Light OF Natube.

The term is a scholastic and theological one, and is applied also to the various sources of ' light ' or ' leading,' as light of faith (Jidei), of knowledge {acierUiae), Cf. Eisler, Wofierb. d. phtloa. Begriffe, sub verbo, for extensive citations. (j.m.b.)

Limaoy [Lat. luna, the moon]: Qer. Irr- Sinn, Mondmcht (popular); Fr. foUie; Ital. pazzia, hmatico (lunatic, pop.). The term re- flects a bygone notion of an intermittent form of insanity affected by the moon. It is used popularly as synonjrmous with insanity, and is especially prominent in the discussion of the legal relations of insanity. A lunatic is a person who comes under the legal qualifications of insanity.

The law of lunacy, the commissioners in lunacy, lunatic asylum, suggest the use of the term in its general application to insanity. The laws defining lunacy and the proceedings necessary to commit an affected person as a lunatic differ in various countries, but in almost all cases the ability to manage one's own affairs is the important consideration. See Incapacity, and Iksakity (and the lite- rature there cited). (j.j.)

Lust [AS. and Ger. Zu^, desire]: Gkr. (i) Gdust, (2) WoUust; Fr. (i) eonvoiHse (covetousness), (2) impureU; Ital. (i) appe~ titi {bam), (2) canoupUcenza. (i) Craving for inmioderate self-indulgence of any sort.

(2) Restricted in popular usage and in law to inordinate sexual passion.

Usage (i ) is that of the theologians, who extend the term to include ' unsanctified ' desire for earthly pleasure of any sort; and of ethical writers, who, however, emphasize the lower appetences by the term and so lead to the usage (2). Cf. the New Testament (John viii. 44) for usage (i), and the 'Sermon on the Mount' (Matt. v. 28) for usage (2). (j.m.b.)

Lustre [Lat. hicere, to shine, through FrJ: G^er. Glam; Fr. lustre] Ital. hatiTo, 'We term a surface lustrous when the re- flection-image which it gives is intrinsically exceedingly indistinct, or when the clear apprehension of it is prevented by irregu- larities of the reflecting surface. For the most part the two conditions are found to- gether' (Wundt, Phyncl, Psyckdl., 4th ed., ii. 205).

32

. LUTHER — LYMPH

Two illusions of loBtre may be noticed : (i) Binocular. A sheen or polish arises when one half of the stereoscopic field is white and the other black or coloured. This is due to the associative transference of the conditions of objective lustre to the field seen. (2) Mon- ocular. A similar effect can be obtained mon- ocularly by Lambert's method of Coloxjb MlXTDBB (q. v.).

Literature: Sanfobd, Course in Exper. Psychol., expt. 166; Kibschmank, Philos. Stnd.y xi. 147 (to whom metallic lustre de- pends on the parallax of indirect vision); Hesikg, in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., IIL i. 575 ; AuBEST, PhysioL Optik, 553 ; HsLMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd ed.), 932-6, 944. Stereoscopic lustre was discovered by Dove, Berl. Akad. Berichte (1851), 246 ; and Pogg. Ann. (1851), Ixxxiii. 480. (e.b.t.)

ILuther, Kartin. (1483-1546.) Born at Eisleben, Saxony. Educated at the schools in Magdeburg and Eisenach and at the Uni- versity at Erfurt. Began the study of law, but changed his course, and in 1505 entered an Augustinian monastery. Ordained priest in 1507, Professor of philosophy at Witten- heig, 1508; at Erfurt, 1509; professor of thedogy at Wittenberg, 15 10; sent to Borne (15 10) on business for the Augustinian order ; provincial vicar of Meissen and Thuringia, 1515. He first preached against the sale of indulgences, and in 151 7 nailed his famous ninety-five theses on the door of the castle churdi at Wittenberg. Tried by the Diet of Augsburg, 1518; held his disputation at Leipzig with Eck, 15 19; exconmiunicated, and burned the papal bull before his students at Wittenberg, 1520 ; refused to recant before the Emperor Charles Y, and was seized by friends in disguise and carried to Wartburg Castle for security, 152 1 ; returned to Witten- berg in 1522, and resumed his duties in the University. See Luthebanism, and Befob-

MATIOK.

Lntherauunn [Lutheran, an adherent of Luther]: Qer. Lutherthtim; Fr. LuthSran- isme ; ItaL LuteranUmo. llie system of the Lutheran Church, embracing a form of govern- ment and worship, and a confession in which the doctrines of justification by faith, supreme authority of Scriptures, total depravity and inability of man, vicarious and unlimited atonement, and real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, are essential features.

Luther stood for the reform of abuses, an open and authoritative Bible, freedom of private jadgment, and justification by faith without

penance. The Lutheran Church, which is the oldest and largest of the Reformed com- munions, adopts as its symbols the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds, the Augs- burg Confession, which contains its charter, together with Luther's catechisms and various modifications of the Augsburg Symbol. Hold- ing many points in common with Calvinism, it differs from that system in less insistence on the divine sovereignty and the decrees, in the denial of limited atQnement,in the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and in the greater emphasis it places on the historic evolution of the symbols of faith.

Literature: F. C. Baubb, Lehrb. d. Dog- matengesch. (2nd ed., i8g7) ; Ebaut, Conser- vative Befonn (1871); Kahnis, Christenthum u. Lutherthum (1871); H. F. Jacobs, in Johnson's Univl. Cyc. ; Sohaff, in the Schaff- Herzog Cyc. of Eccles. Lit. (a.t.o.)

Luxury [Lat. luxua] : Qer. Luaous ; Fr. luxe; Ital. luseo. Commodities which do not produce, in those who use them, economic efficiency proportional to their cost.

A thing is a luxury if it involves a using up of accumulated power without permanent equivalent for the future. We must beware of defining luxury in terms of pleasure. The more real pleasure a thing gives, the less likelihood is there that it can be described as a luxury ; for the presumption is that it will tend to increase the productive power of those who enjoy it. A pleasure becomes a luxury (i) when it is harmful to the physical or moral constitution of those who enjoy it ; (2) when it involves a waste of capital or of labour power beyond iiv hat the recipient of the pleasure is stimulated by it to replace. (a.t.h.)

I^ymph [Lat. lympha, clear water] : Qer. Lymphe ; Fr. lymphe ; Ital. linfa> Toe fluid portion of the blood which has filtered through the walls of the blood-vessels, has nourished the various tissue elements, received from them their waste products, and which is collected in lymphatic vessels and finally returned to the blood.

Li addition to fluid constituents, lymph con- tains colourless lymph corpuscles which have wandered {diapedesis) through the walls of the blood-vessels, and which are also added to the lymph stream by numerous lymph no- dules located in the course of the lymphatic vessels. Lymph is thus to be distinguished from plasma, which is the fluid portion of circulating or freshly shed blood, and also from serum, which is the fluid portion of coagulated Uood. (c.f.h.}

n.

33

M

M — MADNESS

K. The logical symbol for the Middle Tbbm (q. v.). (J.M.B.)

m. V. Symbol for Mean Variation. See Ebbobs or Obsebyatiok. (j.m.b.)

KcGoshy James, (i 8 11-95.) Edacated at Glasgow and Edinburgh; ordained min- ister of the Church of Scotland, 1835; took part in the organization of the Free Church, and became professor of logic and metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfiast, 1843 ; president of the College of New Jersey at Princeton, 1868 ; resigned, 1888. He belonged to the Scottish school of philosophers. Cf. Natural Realism.

Kadintosli, Sir James, (i 765-1832.) Educated at King's College, Aberdeen, and at Edinburgh. Called to the bar at Lincoln's ^^) i795> knighted in 1803; recorder of Bombay, 1804-6; judge of Vice-admiralty, 1 806-11; returned to England, 181 1, and entered Parliament, 181 3; professor of law and general politics in Haileybury College, 1818-24; a commissioner of Indian affairs, 1830.

Kacrooosm (and Microcosm) [Gr.fuue/x^f , great, and /Lujcpdr, small, + KSafios, universe] : Ger. Makro-, Mikrokoarmts; Fr. macro-, microcoeme; Ital. macro-, microcosmo. The great world, macrocosm, applied to the uni- verse, when contrasted with man, the micro- cosm or little world, the correlation of the two terms being at the same time intended to express an analogy between them.

The idea of such an analogy is present in the Aristotelian philosophy, and was developed by the Stoics in connection with their doctrine of iryrt/fta, the divine reason, which is also the warm vital breath that animates and pnrpo- sively pervades the universe. As the world- soul to the world, so is the individual soul (which is a part of the universal soul) related to the body; and to the universal reason

corresponds the rational or ruling part {to riy€fiovuc6v) of the individual soul. The doc- trine played a gre&i part in the speculations of the Eenaissance thinkers, e.g. m3runo, Paracelsus, Weigel, and Bbhme. jjiT man's nature is to be found the sum or 'quint- essence' of the cosmical forces. Because he unites in his body the finest essence of all material things, man is able to understand the material worml] As an intellectual being, he is at the same time of * sidereal ' origin, and therefore competent to understand the world of intellectual forms, while a ' spark ' of the divine, infused into his nature, enables him to become conscious of God, whose image he is. Thus man knows the universe of being only so far as he is the universe, or contains within himself the principles of all that is. In Bruno's system, not man alone, but every monad or individual substance is an imme- diate manifestation of the infinite life, which thus individualizes and concentrates itself everywhere throughout the universe. Each monad is thus a * mirror ' or microcosm of the all. In the system of Leibnitz, the relation between the individual monad and the uni- verse is similarly expressed. The idea that like is known by like is, of course, as old as Empedocles, of whose theory of perception it forms the central doctrine. Cf. Monad. (a.s.p.p.)

Literatii/re: see the citations in Eisleb, Worterb. d. philos. Begriffe, ' Mikrokosmus ' ; also Flemikg-Caldebwood, Yocab. of Philos., ' Microcosm.' Lotze used the term as title of his general work Microcosmus. (j.m.b.)

KadnesB (and Madman) [Sansk. mod, to be drunk or mad]: Ger. Manie {Toller) \ Fr. fcHie {fou)\ Ital. fdlia, pazzia {pazzo, motto). A synonym of insanity, referring par- ticularly to the disorder of reason or the un- controllable emotion frequently characteristic

34

MAGIC

of the insane state. Madman is also used as a synonym of lunatic. See Insanitt and Saiott, Maxtia, and Fubor. (j.j.)

Kagie (x) and (2) Divinatioii [Gr. fuiyun}, magic, from Mayoc, the priests of the Medes and Persians, and Lat. c^otnatv, to foresee] : Ger. (i) Magie, Zauherei^ (a) Eingebwng; fr. (i) magie^ (2) divinaaicn\ Ital. (i) tnagia, (2) dmnaziane. ( i) A varied and extensive group of pnctioes which appeal to supernal or super- natural agencies and illustrate Supebstition (q. V.) reduced to practice.

Magical practices are found in almost all stages of primitive culture, and have a long and*8ignificant history in ihe chain of civili- zations leading up to the present. While magical powers were in part derived from a deity or spirit, and were ezerdsed like those of possession, a larger and more distinctive group of magical practices depended upon the discovery and interpretation of mystic corresiMndences which were occult or hidden from the popular ken. By the exertion of the will, hy the careful observation of minute ceremonial rules, by the solemn enunciation of formulas and words, by the interpretation of the flight of birds or of the entrails of a beast^ by casting dice and lots, by seeking the significance of personal peculiarities in a system of correspondences, and by a host of similar performances, the shaman or medicine man, the sorcerer or astrologer, the fortune- teller or exorcizer, tries to interpret the past and to influence the future, to control the forces of nature, to remove disease and evil, to bring on health and prosperity. Such proceedings are never wholly fanciful, but involve some fiu>fetched or misleading analogy, vague enough to permit of the adjustment of de^dls to special cases, and yet imposing enough to impress the uncultured mind. In such practices are found some scraps of know- ledge and logical tendencies which, after ages of tortuous progress, have often become the starting-points of true scientific knowledge. For the formulation of such procedure under pQTchological principles, based on ethnology, see Him as cited below.

The study of magic in primitive civilizations contributes much to the comprehension of the mental processes in undeveloped man ; for it shows that in the attempt to regulate the actions of his own life, or to interpret the phenomena of nature about him, the appeal to magical hidden relations was the natural, normal process. Omens and portents, charms and fetiches, rites and offerings, divination

and sorcery were the expressions of a desire for security and for wisdom. Interpretation based upon signs, omens, &c., is called pro- gnosis.

The history of magic in written records can only be referred to in this connection as a vast storehouse for the study of the action of the human mind under impulses and tenden- cies in large part inhibited or transformed, but not without effect on current belief. With the growth of the art of writing and the be- ginnings of natural science, elaborate possibili- ties for occult rites and systems were laid open, which were utilized alike by Assyrian or E^iyptian priests, and by mediaeval astrologers.

The practice of magic or sorcery frequently came into disrepute, and was prohibited by law or even punishable by death. The dis- tinction between 'black magic' and 'white magic ' grew up as the result of such inter- diction. White magic included the production of illusions and entertaining applications of physical principles, and thus became the ante- cedent of modern legerdemain.

(2) Divination is that form of magic which utilizes knowledge derived from some super- human source, the knowledge being acquired by magical means.

Artificial divination is a widespread prac- tice most largely represented in the culture stages above the lowest, though by no means absent in the lowest stages. The methods of divination and augury are almost unlimited, many of them depending on the interpretation by analogy or symbolism of the results of chance or of accidental details. Amongst natural forms of divination may be mentioned the appearances and cries of animals, dreams, configuration of hand and fece, inspection of entrails, the fanciful appearance of flames of fire, or smoke, or ashes; the interpretation of charms, names and marks on tiie body, and so on. Over fifty terms ending in ' -mancy ' (divination) are cited in the literature of this topic. Of special and somewhat artificial devices invented for the purposes of divination, may be mentioned the setting up of sticks, to see whether they stand or &11, the spinning of a teetotum or similar contrivance, the throwing of dice and cards, the melting of lead or wax, pricking for texts in the Bible, and the divining rod. The last has had a specially interesting history, for which con- sult Barrett; Proe. Soc, Pst/ch. Res,, Oct., 1900.

Of all the systems of divination, astrology, which depends upon the prediction of the

35

I) 2

MAGNETIC STOPPER — MAIM ONIDES

fortunes of the individual on the basis of the position of the celestial bodies at the moment of birth, has been the most elaborate and influential, and may be studied for the abun- dant illustrations which it offers of the mental attitude under which the processes of divina- tion flourish. (J.J.) From the standpoint of philosophy, it may be said that there is an element common to these various practices and superstitions by the presence of which they may be fitly de- scribed as magic. This element may be ex- plained or set forth in detail, it can hardly be defined. The essential, or permanent, element common to all ' universes ' of human ezperienob of this sort has been most clearly elucidated by Bastian: 'Sorcery, or, in its higher expression, magic, marks the first dawning consciousness of mutual connection throughout nature, in which man, feeling himself part of the whole, thinks himself able to interfere for his own wishes or needs. So long as religion fills the whole horizon of culture, the vague groping of magic contains the first experiments which lead to the results of exact science. Magic is the physics of mankind in the state of nature. It rests on the beginning of induction, which remains without result only because in its imperfect judgments by analogy it raises the post hoc to the propter hoc.' A similar explanation is wrought out by F. B. Jevons (cited below, chap. iv). Magic, in other words, grows out of a theory of causation. And the business of philosophy is to set forth the &ctors in this theory, no matter how they, and other results or accompaniments, may alter, as they do alter in marvellous ways, throughout the numerous stages varying between lowest savagery, Persian and Babylonian culture, mediaeval prejudice, and modem supersti- tion. (B.M.W.)

Literature: Jevons, Introd. to the Hist, of Religion; Bastian, Rechtsalterthtimer ; Waitz and GEBLAND,Anthropologie d.Natur- volker; B. Spenosb, Australian Aborigines; Ttlob, Primitive Culture, and Early Hist, of Maxikind ; Ellis, Polynesian Researches ; Callawat, Religious Syst. of the Amazulu ; Lenobmant, Magie chez les Chald^ns, and Divination chez les Chald^ens ; Satce, Hib- bert Lects.; EIing, Babylonian Magic and Sorcery; Robebtson Smith, Religion of the Semites; Webeb and Sohnedebmann, Jil- dische Tlieol. ; Eisenmenoeb, Entdecktes Ju- denth. ; Leclebq, Hist, de la Divination dans I'Antiquit^; Bbscheb, Das Transcendentale,

Magie u. magische Heilarten im Talmud; Rhode, Psyche ; Fabnell, Cults of the Greek States ; Fbazeb, The Golden Bough (2nd ed., 1900); CiCEBO, De Divinatione; AusT, Die Religion d. Romer; Maubt, La Magie et TAstrol.; Bband, Pop. Antiq.; Pettiobew, Superstitions of Med. and Suig. ; Menius, De Exorcismo. For mediaeval magic, especially in its ecclesiastical aspects, see Herzog's Real- Encyc, art. Exorcismus. On the subject as a whole, Tylob, Encyc. Brit., art Magic; Blavatbkt, Isis unveiled (an accredited manual of contemporary superstition); White, Hist, of the War&re of Sci. with Theoi. (1897), chap, xii and elsewhere; Lehmann, Aber- glaube u. Zauberei (1898); Rtdbebq, Magic ofthe Middle Ages (trans., 1879); Chevbeul, La Baguette divinatoire (1884); Figuibb, Le Myst^re de la Science, 573-644; Ell- WOBTH, The Evil Eye (1895) ; P. Chbistian, Hist, de la Magie; Lano, The Making of Religion ; de la Saussate, Lehrb. d. Re- ligionsgesch. ; C. Meteb, Der Aberglaube des Mittelalters (1884); Baudi di Yesmb, StoriadelloSpiritismo (1897-8); Bebengeb- Febaud, Superstitions et Survivances; Re- qnault, La Sorcellerie (1897) ; Skeat, Malay Magic (1900); HiBN, Origins of Art (1900),

chap. XX. (B.M.W.-J.J.-L.M.)

Kagnatio Stopper: see Labobatobt AND Afpabatus, DI, B, (a), (8).

Kagnetism : Ger. Magnetismus; Fr. hmk* gniHisme; Ital. magnetiemo. See Magnetic Energy, under Eneboy.

Kagnitnde (extensive) [Lat. magniiudo, bulk, size] : G^r. Grosse ; Fr. grandeur ; Ital. grandezza. That which has dimensions or extension, as a line, a sur&ce, or a solid; called also a geometric magnitude. In other branches of mathematics than geometry the word is replaced by Quantitt (q. v.). (8.N.)

Xagnitude (intensive) : see Quantity.

Kaunon, Salomon, (i 753-1 800.) A Jewish rabbi and philosopher, bom in Lithuania.

Kaimonides (Koaaa ben Maimon in Hebrew ; Abu Imram Kusa ibn Iffainiiin ibn Abdallah in Arabic). (11 31-1204.) Known among Christian writers as R. Mojrses. Early studied the Bible and the Talmud, guided by his father; also mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. Bom at Cordova, he, with his family, was banished for political and religious reasons. In 1 1 59 they were in Fez, in 1 165 in St. Jean d'Acre. He settled in Cairo, foUowed the jeweller's trade, and became famous for learning and medical skill.

3«

MAJOR — MALEVOLENCE

lEi^or [Lat. mataTf greater]: 6er. Dtffir; Fr. majeur ; ItaL maggiare. One of the two fondamental scales or kejs of modem mnsic. Expressed in 'whole tones/ it runs : i, i, 1-2, I, I, T, 1-2. Cf. MiNOB, and Triad.

This is the natural diatonic series, repre- sented by the series of musical tones starting from G. It corresponds to the Greek Lydian, •vad the ecclesiastical Tonic. Gf. Hehnholtz, SenmUona of Tone, 274.

A major intenral is that form of the interval which is greater by a semitone than its ODResponding minor. A major chord is a diozd containing the major third above the inndamental. A major tone is one the vibra- tion ratio of which is 8 : 9, as contrasted with the minor 9 : 10. Gf. Parry, in Grove's Diet. €fMtme, ii. 200. (e.b.t.)

Mi^or and Kinor (extreme, term, premise, mUf &&, in logic): Ger. Ober* and UrUer- {Begr^, &c.); Fr. majeur and mtneur; Ital. fmaggiore and minore. The subject and pre- dicate of. the conclusion of a syllogism are called the extremes {to, &cpa, by Aristotle), because they are only brought together by the agency of the third term,. called, on that account, the middle term (6 lUaot Spos^ Ari- stotle). Of the two extremes, the one that is the predicate of the conclusion is called the major extreme (rd luiCow Sxpop, Aristotle), be- cause in a universal affirmative proposition (the typical formal proposition) its breadth is the greater, while the subject of the con- elusion is the minor extreme {t6 tXamv Sutpov, Aristotle).

Whether the expressions major term and minor term, for the major and minor extremes, ai« grammatically accurate or not, they are consecrated by usage through the scholastic period. The n^jor and minor premises are respectively those which contain the major and minor extremes. Aristotle (L ^noZ. Pr., ix) calls the former ^ «yi&c rh fulCov &tpou wpAraa-iSy ' the proposition about the major extreme.' (cs.p.)

Minority (in Iaw): see Infant.

lEaka-Mlievtt: Ger. (i) Vortauaehmy be- touMfer Sehein ; Fr. {i)fomie, faux eenMarU ; Ital. ( I )Jmzione. ( i ) llie indulgence in Sem- BLAHCX (q. V.) with consciousness of, or for the sake of, the effect upon another.

As is pointed out under semblance, that state of mind may involve self-illusion or not. In the higher forms of semblance, there is the keeping up of the artificial situation without self-illusion, but with direct reference to the effect upon, an observer, a more or less explicit attempt to make another believe,

and BO to sham. It is recommended that the term make-believe be confined to this more particular aspect of the consciousness of sem- blance. The term sham — especially the verbal forms (e.g. shamming) — may well be used as a synonym. The shamming of disease and the symptomatic forms of deception in certain diseases, known as malingering, illus- trate make-believe.

(2) The consciousness of unreality attach- ing to certain mental constructions, notably those of play and art. See Semblanob (also for foreign equivalents), which is preferable in this broad meaning ; and cf. Abt and Abt Theobies.

(3) Used in biology for the attitudes of feigning (e.g. the opossum's feigning death), a form of Semblance (q. v.) which is largely instinctive, and probably only slightly, if at all, conscious. (J.M.B., 0.7.8.)

Kale [Lat. maaeulus]: Ger. tndmnlieh; Fr. mdle ; Ital. maechio. The primary mean- ing refers to the individual capable of pro- ducing spermatozoa or the homologous ele- ments in the lower animals or in plants. By extension it is applied (i) to characteristics of a male individual, especially such as are sexually distinctive; (2) to the spermatozoa or other sexual' elements produced by a male individual or the male gland of an hermaphro- dite. Gf. Sex. (c.b.m.)

ICalebrMiclLey Vioolas. (i 638-1 71 5.) Bom of a wealthy and respectable fiamily. He was too poor in health to attend school. Studied theology at the Sorbonne. Read Descartes in 1664, and devoted himself to philosophy.

Kaleroleiice (or Kalice) [Lat. malevoUnr tia]: Ger. Boehett, BoevnUigkeU; Fr. nudtce, m^haneeti; Ital. mdlevolenzay caUiveriai The disposition to bring pain or misery to another or to take pleasure in it.

The nature of malevolence and the possi- bility of disinterested malevolence have been discussed by the English moralists. Hut- cheson describes 'disinterested malice or delight in the misery of others ' as the highest pitch of what we count vicious ; and, accord- ing to Butler, ' the utmost possible depravity which we can in imagination conceive is that of disinterested cruelty.' At the same time, both doubt the possibility of its being gen- uinely disinterested. ' Human nature/ says Hutcheson, '