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Unifying Command and Control:
Combating Piracy in the Indian Ocean

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

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Signature: ______________________

May 4, 2012
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Abstract

This paper addresses the command and control structure of the U.S. counter-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa as it currently exists under the cognizance of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), NAVCENT, and U.S. Central Command. It proposes that the C2 architecture is inefficient, is contrary to sound operational art, and does not lend itself to a unified effort across the DIME. The pirate threat originates on the land and transitions to the maritime environment. The paper explores a reorganize C2 by proposing that CTF-151 move from NAVCENT and U.S. Central Command to U.S. Africa Command in order to provide a unified chain of command and thereby enabling coordination across the DIME, under one Combatant Commander.
Introduction

Piracy has been a threat to merchant shipping since humanity first braved the seas. As long as commercial cargoes move via maritime trade routes, there will be those who seek to prey upon the unwary merchant mariner and his goods. The regions of the Indian Ocean bordered by the Horn of Africa, in general, and Somalia, in particular, have seen a dramatic rise in pirate activity and, consequently, an increasing presence of maritime forces seeking to combat this threat to global maritime trade.

Efforts to counter piracy are many and varied; any nation that relies on maritime trade feels its effects and therefore has a stake in eliminating or neutralizing it. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and various other partner nations each have a mission, either diplomatic or military, or both, to counter piracy. These efforts are a full-spectrum endeavor encompassing actions across the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) spectrum. Exploring all of these and how they are related would extend beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to note that each of these areas of effort is interconnected and success will not be possible unless coordinated action, along lines integrated of effort is realized.

This paper will address the command and control structure of the counter-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa as it currently stands under the cognizance of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), a subordinate task force under the Combined Maritime Force resident in United States Central Command and U.S. Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain. The current command and control structure is less effective than it could be. The geographic boundaries defined by the Unified Command Plan (see Figure 1) do not match the command structure of military forces,
nor do they marry with boundaries established by the U.S. Department of State. It does not lend itself to a unified effort across the DIME, as the pirate threat originates on the land and transitions to the maritime environment.

To simplify and clarify the Command and Control structure of U.S. counter-piracy operations, CTF-151 should be realigned under the aegis of the U.S. African Command. In support of this thesis the author will explore the nature and impact of the piracy challenge, describe U.S. and multinational efforts to combat it, and offer conclusions and recommendations with respect to the impact of functional C2 and unity of effort in a realigned CTF-151.

(Figure 1)\(^1\)

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Modern Piracy: Cause and Effect

The United Nations defines piracy in the Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Article 101 as follows:

“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”

Subsequent Articles define what constitutes pirate vessels, which vessels are allowed to conduct counter-piracy and even the possibility that pirate vessels are subject to the loss of their nationality and all that it implies. Also, in Article 105, the preamble outlines the requirements of states in preventing and combating piracy on the high seas:

“Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine

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the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.3"

Article 100 says:

“Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy

All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.4"

What does this mean? While the United Nations has not requested forces, nor does it have current forces assigned under the United Nations’ flag or banner, it requires that member nations have a responsibility to act with regard to piracy. In fact, by participation in the United Nations, it may be presumed that member nations are required to act preventively and actively in response to piracy on the high seas.

Maritime theorist Geoffrey Till asserts, “Modern-day piracy threatens the security of some of the world’s most important sea lines of communication, restricts the free and orderly passage of the maritime commerce that underpins the current world order, raises insurance rates, increases local tensions and puts people’s lives at risk.”5 Geo-political instability leads to the conditions that generate piracy. Conversely, piracy breeds the lawlessness that lends itself to geo-political instability. It is a cyclical problem that requires attention across the DIME. No single approach will generate success.

In its 2011 working paper, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy, One Earth Future Foundation, a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, calculates that Somalia-based piracy

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4 Ibid.
alone results in a cost of $6.6 and 6.9 billion annually. This number is based on nine factors: ransoms paid to pirates- $160 million; higher insurance premiums- $635 million; private security measures- $1.06 to $1.16 billion; diverting merchant traffic- $486 to $680 million; higher speed of advance while transiting known pirate waters- $2.7 billion; higher labor costs (increased pay for mariners while transiting high-risk areas)- $195 million; legal fees (prosecution) and imprisonment- $1.27 billion; military operations- $1.27 billion; counter-piracy NGOs- $21.3 million (Figure 2). A vast majority of this cost is borne by non-government organizations and industry.

(Figure 2)

Much of the pirate activity in the western Indian Ocean (off the coast of the Horn of Africa) has its origins in Somalia. Indeed, the general lawlessness resulting from the lack of a functioning government leaves this region susceptible to the conditions that drive piracy.

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7 Ibid., 2.
8 Ibid., 2.
In his March 27, 2012, address to the Center for American Progress, Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, addresses just that. The U.S. Department of State takes the lead under the diplomatic umbrella for the DIME. The counter-piracy mission drives diplomatic relationships among nations across the globe. By applying diplomatic pressure to nations off-continent, and those on-continent (Africa) in a unified effort to combat the pirate threat, the United States hopes to “leverage all elements” of U.S. power to include diplomatic efforts to “spur collective international effort.”

Mr. Shapiro specifically says the failed state of Somalia is a direct cause of piracy off the Horn of Africa. He goes on to say, “In a globalized world, the impact of piracy in one area of the world can cause a ripple effect greater in magnitude than ever before. We live in an era of complex, integrated, and on-demand global supply chains. People in countries around the world depend on secure and reliable shipping lanes for their food, their medicine, their energy, and consumer goods. By preying on commercial ships in one of the world’s most traversed shipping lanes, pirates off the Horn of Africa threaten more than just individual ships. They threaten a central artery of the global economy, and therefore global security and stability.”

As previously stated, piracy is a global challenge. It has effects in the diplomatic realm because of its effect on regional stability and the requisite regional coalitions to provide support to burgeoning or struggling states. It intersects the global and local economies, both as a cause and effect. It has its origins in unstable civilian populations lacking in a centralized government capable of dealing with the lack of societal stability that leads to criminal acts as a survival mechanism; “Piracy is a prime example of the dangers and

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10 Ibid.
problems that can arise from the presence of ungoverned spaces in our globalized world. In places where pirates operate – through the coastal areas in Puntland and parts of central Somalia – the lack of governance and weak institutions provide them with a safe haven.”

And finally, it requires military intervention because of the armed threat it poses to merchant (and generally unarmed) shipping. This last piece of the puzzle is made more difficult because of the numerous entities currently engaged in the counter-piracy mission, which will be examined shortly.

**U.S. and Multinational Response**

Diplomatically, the United States (via the Department of State) has committed to supporting the Djibouti Peace Process, the Transitional Federal Government, and on-continent missions such as the African Union Mission in Somalia to aid in the “re-establishment of stability, responsive law enforcement, and adequate governance in Somalia.”

Addressing the military component of the DIME in countering piracy (with regard to the approach taken by the United States) isn’t possible without first addressing the two different models used by both the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

The U.S. Department of State separates the African continent into two distinct regions. The northern countries on the continent are grouped into the Near East region which includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen; while the remainder of the continent (sub-Saharan) has its own individually assigned region (see figure 3).

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12 Ibid.
As previously addressed, the U.S. Department of Defense, under the Unified Command Plan, assigns all of Africa with the exception of Egypt to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), while Egypt is assigned to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), whose AOR includes all of southwest Asia, to include the ongoing campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is only a recent change. Until 2008 and the establishment of AFRICOM, the continent of Africa, with the exception of the HOA, was part of European Command (EUCOM); the HOA remained under the cognizance of CENTCOM.

There are three named counter-piracy missions with whom the United States military participates: Operation Atalanta, Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 151. Additionally, multiple other nations have contributed independently to the counter-piracy mission off Somalia: China, India, Japan, Russia, Iran, Thailand, and Malaysia. Much of this transnational effort is based on an international consensus embodied by the U.N. Contact

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Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.\textsuperscript{16} In addition to conducting military operations at sea, member nations and international donors have contributed financially and with various training missions to grow, indigenously, a regional capability to combat piracy and its root causes.\textsuperscript{17}

Operation Atalanta is a European Union mission begun in 2008; it operates and assumes its authority from a United Nations Security Council mandate. Its mission includes:

\begin{itemize}
\item the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast;
\item the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; the protection of African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) shipping;
\item the protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis;
\item in addition, EU NAVFOR -ATALANTA shall also contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{itemize}

Originally scheduled to end on December 12, 2012\textsuperscript{19}, this mission was extended until 2014.\textsuperscript{20}

Operation Atalanta is primarily a military response to piracy by EU member nations but it has also resolved to tackle the problems on land that lead to piracy at sea- that is, addressing the regional instability on the ground. Partnered with Operation Atalanta is the European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia). Its purpose is to provide training and education to the transitional government forces in Somalia in order to increase

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
security and stability ashore.²¹ Operation Atalanta includes forces and personnel from EU member nations and non-member states to include Norway, Ukraine, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia.²² Contributions include both military force and staff:

• Operational contribution to EU NAVFOR
  - Navy vessels (surface combat vessels and auxiliary ships)
  - Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts (MPRA)
  - Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) teams.

• Providing military staff to work at the EU NAVFOR OHQ in Northwood, UK, or onboard units.²³

Command and Control of ATALANTA forces falls under the European Union. Specifically, the Operational Commander (rotated among member nations) reports directly to the European Union Military Committee who receives political direction and strategic guidance from the Political and Security Committee. The Political and Security Committee mandates under the authority and with the advisement of the European Union Military Staff and the European External Action Service. The Operational Command is based in England at Northwood. The Force Commander is located with the forces in the Joint Operation Area.²⁴

The EU is “convinced that only the establishment of the rule of law and economic development will undermine the breeding ground for organised crime in Somalia. The EU is committed to a lasting settlement of the Somali crisis, covering its political, security,
development and humanitarian aspects.” Its efforts reflect a holistic approach to the piracy problem. By addressing the land-based instability and lack of security concerns, the EU hopes to mitigate the role that piracy plays, and the driving factors that lead to piracy in the first place.

Operation Ocean Shield is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation aimed at curtailing piracy, and providing protection to international shipping through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean along the Horn of Africa. Additionally, OCEAN SHIELD is a means for NATO to provide aid in regional stability operations in the form of “capacity building efforts” with local governments (local to the Horn of Africa).26

Operation Ocean Shield has its origins in 2008 when then-Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon called for military protection of food aid ships chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) as part of Operation Allied Provider. Those military vessels were to provide a deterrent effect in order to prevent ships from being hijacked or pirated, the food supplies from being stolen, and the crews from being taken hostage.27

This was followed by Operation Allied Protector28, which carried on the same mission of protecting vessels but also began to conduct surveillance operations. Operation Ocean Shield picks up where Operation Allied Protector left off, beginning in 2009 and continues under its current charter through the end of 2014.29

NATO’s mission, via Operation Ocean Shield, is to “provide naval escorts and deterrence, while increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area in

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29 Ibid.
order to optimize efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics.”

The area of operations for Operation Ocean Shield is found in Figure 4.

(Figure 4)\(^{31}\)

Command and Control of Operation Ocean Shield rests with the Maritime Command Headquarters (in Northwood, England); the Operational Commander rotates among participating member nations. Command for Operation Ocean Shield has been delegated by the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and follows the NATO military chain of command.\(^{32}\) Vessels participating under Operation Ocean Shield coordinate efforts with those European Union forces participating under Operation Atalanta, and with forces assigned via Combined Task Force 151, and other participating nations.\(^{33}\)

\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.


\(^{33}\) Ibid.
Creation of CTF-151

Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 is a subordinate task force (one of three) under the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). The other task forces under CMF also include CTF-150, which “conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean;”34 and CTF-152, which “coordinates Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities with regional partners and conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO), as well as being prepared to respond to any crisis inside the Arabian Gulf.”35

CTF-151 was “established in January 2009 to conduct counterpiracy operations under a mission-based mandate throughout the CMF area of responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.”36 CMF was originally established by the United States to provide a coordinating command to handle regional security and stability concerns in the maritime environment within the international waters of the greater Middle East. The focus of CMF is to “promote security, stability and prosperity across approximately 2.5 million square miles of international waters.”37 Realizing that counter-piracy was more of a law enforcement exercise in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions38 CTF-

38 United Nations Security Council resolutions dealing with piracy include Security Council resolutions include 1918 (2010), 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), and 1897 (2008); all of these deal specifically with piracy based in the Indian Ocean, with pirates originating or basing their operations in Somalia. A catalog of these Security Council resolutions may be found at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/.

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151 was carved from the greater CTF-150 mission of maritime security operations (MSO) in the region.

Command of the CMF is held by the naval component commander within U.S. Central Command. He is also Commander, U.S. Naval Central Command, and Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, and is headquartered in Bahrain. Command of CTF-151 rotates among participating nations. Participation in CTF-151 operations is voluntary and is not limited to any particular international organization or previously established coalition.

CTF-151 is the primary means with which the United States conducts the counter-piracy mission in the maritime domain. U.S forces assigned to CTF-151 operate in a separate chain of command from those participating in the NATO mission, Operation Ocean Shield. Units operating as part of CTF-151 report to the Task Force Commander, who then reports to the CMF Commander.

The Need for Unity of Effort

In her article in the Naval War College Review, “Pieces of Eight: An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa,” Lesley Anne Warner says, “despite assertions that lawlessness on land allows maritime piracy to emerge, present counterpiracy methods have failed to address poor governance and instability within Somalia. Instead, they have dealt only with the sea-based manifestation of land-based malaise (emphasis added). Ideally, a sustainable counterpiracy strategy would address root causes as well as symptoms, in both the short and long terms. By disaggregating Somalia’s maritime insecurity from the

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
insecurity it suffers on land, the United States and its international partners may be unable to achieve a sustainable solution to piracy (emphasis added).”

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the geographic combatant command responsible for all U.S. military activity in all of Africa (with the exception of Egypt) conducts regional stability and partner programs with nations on the continent. Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CTJF-HOA) includes in its mission statement a goal of increasing regional stability by enhancing partner nation capacity. CTJF-HOA’s vision is:

“CJTF-HOA builds and strengthens partnerships to contribute to security and stability in East Africa. The task force’s efforts, as part of a comprehensive whole-of-government approach, are aimed at increasing our African partner nations’ capacity to maintain a stable environment, with an effective government that provides a degree of economic and social advancement to its citizens. An Africa that is stable, participates in free and fair markets, and contributes to global economic development is good for the United States as well as the rest of the world. Long term stability is a vital interest of all nations.”

Presumably, by increasing stability in East Africa on the land, stability in the maritime domain would follow. Warner says that through increased security capacity on land, by enhancing regional coordination and cooperation, that “regional militaries could become more able and willing to build governing institutions” and therefore be more capable

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of combating the problems in direct cause of piracy. The problem, therefore, is that the land-based efforts toward regional stability are divorced from the military actions undertaken to combat the effects caused by the instability ashore.

In his paper, “Irregular Sea Control for Counter-Piracy,” Gordan E. Van Hook recommends a joint effort to combat piracy by basing counter-piracy units ashore, among the population, similar to the way irregular warfare is conducted. He advocates combining the “combat” side of counter piracy at sea with a coordinated humanitarian assistance mission ashore. The problem here is that because of the current combatant command structure, efforts ashore are conducted divorced from efforts at sea.

As previously discussed, the European Union efforts to counter piracy (Operation Atalanta) is partnered with its sister mission ashore, EUTM-Somalia. Because the Operational Commander for Operation Ocean Shield is located in the same (geographic) place as the Operational Commander for Operation Atalanta, coordination in their efforts is possible to address the same issues in a unified manner. Only the United States lacks this unity in effort because of a disjointed command structure.

To summarize U.S. efforts to combat piracy: the U.S. supplies forces to the NATO mission (indeed, the military chain of command for those forces ultimately ends in an American, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, who also happens to be the U.S. geographic combatant commander for the European theater). Land-based efforts toward regional stability lay with AFRICOM, while those efforts at sea remain with NAVCENT. Admittedly, the necessity for a dedicated counter-piracy mission did not fully evolve when there were four separate combatant commanders. Presumably, the reason CTF-151 inherited

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the counter-piracy mission from CTF-150 is because AFRICOM did not exist during the establishment of the task force. To be fair, the entire Horn of Africa was assigned to CENTCOM, with the remainder of Africa falling under EUCOM. Does this account for the disjointed effort? If so, why hasn’t this been resolved under the most recent review of the Unified Command Plan?

**Recommendation and Conclusion**

In order to simplify and clarify the command and control structure for U.S. counter-piracy efforts (and allow for a more efficient and unified line of effort with other government organizations) CTF-151 should be realigned under the combatant command of AFRICOM. This will allow a coordinated military effort ashore with the military mission at sea. Additionally, both AFRICOM and EUCOM are located in the same location geographically. Theoretically, this would allow cross-talk with international partners operating as part of both Operations Atalanta and Ocean Shield.

It has been demonstrated that singular lines of effort, in this case military actions at sea, fail to address the entire issue. Additionally, by only addressing the “M” of the DIME, and in this case between two different COCOMs with different command and control structures, the United States has failed to apply sound operational art to combatting piracy in the Indian Ocean. Capacity-building among African nations is a core mission of AFRICOM; a result of this is a hoped-for increase in stability among struggling African nations. By legitimizing those governments, and their ability to project security within their borders, the solution to piracy in the Horn of Africa can be realized.
CTF-151 is firmly established and nested within the CENTCOM, NAVCENT, and the Fleet command architecture. Via the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) located at Naval Support Activity Bahrain, CTF-151 is able to coordinate among roughly 26 member nations and their supporting naval vessels and personnel. Additionally, the MOC provides an established command center capable of coordinating among all the participating member nations. It may be argued that the current C2 architecture is working. But it may also be debated that the success realized is in spite of that C2 arrangement.

The Unified Command Plan sets geographic borders between the various Combatant Commands. Some of those boundaries are found in the maritime environment. Under the current organization the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility includes the waters up to the coast line of northeastern Africa; this would include the coastline off Somalia. The current C2 architecture for the CMF and various CTFs (specifically CTF-151) then lends itself to maintaining the status quo. CENTCOM “owns” the water in the Indian Ocean, so therefore it should follow that CENTCOM should “own” the naval forces. But this supposition fails to fully utilize sound operational art and divides the lines of effort across two combatant commands.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined a reinvigorated counter-piracy initiative on 15 April 2009, following the pirate incident involving the MV Maersk Alabama. In this announcement she espoused a multi-pronged approach that included coordination among our international partners both militarily and diplomatically, coordination with the shipping industry to improve underway security, and using diplomatic and financial tools to attack the economic support base for piracy. And lastly, she emphasized the importance of working

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with the transition governments on the continent (the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, and the burgeoning government in Puntland) to combat piracy ashore in their countries as well as building a capacity to combat piracy on the sea using their own, organic forces.\footnote{Hillary Clinton, “Announcement of Counter-piracy Initiatives: Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,” Washington, DC, (15 April 2009), accessed 5 April 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121758.htm.}

The international community, as well as elements within our own government, understands the benefits of coordinated lines of effort when it comes to tackling the problem of piracy in the Indian Ocean. By moving the counter-piracy forces afloat to AFRICOM, all counter-piracy efforts will reside under one “roof.” By aligning the Command and Control architecture of the U.S. military mission in the Indian Ocean, and on the Horn of Africa under one Operational Commander, the United States will apply sound operational art and truly unify its efforts within the DIME.
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